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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation proposes a social mechanism to explain consumer fraud from a cross-
national perspective. Drawing on data from the European Social Survey and the 
European Values Study, the dissertation seeks to: (1) contribute to the understanding of 
consumer morality expressed by dishonest behaviour in diverse economic and cultural 
contexts; and (2) demonstrate the value of research based on social mechanisms towards 
the advancement and integration of theories from diverse social sciences. By addressing 
individual-, national- and cross-level variation, an analysis motivated by social 
mechanisms moves beyond description, helping to explain the processes underpinning 
this complex social and political phenomenon. 
The contribution of this dissertation is twofold. From a substantive point of view, the 
dissertation fills a gap in the literature by offering a multilevel theoretical and empirical 
account for consumer fraud. From a methodological perspective, the dissertation differs 
from other pieces of cross-national research, making sense of cross-national data by 
alluding to a social mechanism that helps to explain social phenomenon by integrating 
different levels of analysis. 
This dissertation begins with a general introduction followed by a theoretical chapter, a 
methodological chapter, and three empirical papers, finishing with a general conclusion. 
The introduction provides information that guides and sustains the subsequent chapters. 
The theoretical chapter covers the substantive foundations of the research hypotheses 
and empirical studies, examining the state of the art of economic morality and consumer 
dishonest behaviour. The methodological chapter discusses the potentialities and pitfalls 
of cross-national survey methods and analytical strategies. This discussion is enriched 
by the insights of a systematic literature review—carried out in the context of this 
dissertation—that inspects how social mechanisms are addressed in studies using ESS 
data. The empirical studies are presented in the form of self-contained papers motivated 
by different research questions addressed with cross-national data. The conclusion 
brings together the partial conclusions from the three papers to reflect on 
methodological implications and future directions for research. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This dissertation proposes a social mechanism to explain consumer fraud from a cross-
national perspective. Drawing on data from the European Social Survey and the 
European Values Study, the dissertation seeks to: (1) contribute to the understanding of 
consumer morality expressed by dishonest behaviour in diverse economic and cultural 
contexts and (2) demonstrate the value of research based on social mechanisms towards 
the advancement and integration of theories from diverse social sciences. By addressing 
individual-, national- and cross-level variation, an analysis motivated by social 
mechanisms moves beyond description, to help explain the processes underpinning this 
complex social and political phenomenon. 
The theoretical discussion and empirical work presented here is guided by the following 
questions: (1) Who are the consumers that engage in fraudulent practices in the 
marketplace? (2) Where are they placed in the social structure? (3) What is their 
distribution across Europe? (4) What are their motivations and attitudes towards 
institutions, social order and the economy? (5) How do country characteristics facilitate 
the emergence of fraudulent practices amongst consumers? (6) How do these country 
characteristics interact with specific individual motivations and attitudes to give rise to 
fraudulent practices? The answers to these questions are integrated into a unified 
theoretical framework that bridges individual and societal processes.  
The piece of social research presented in this dissertation was developed along the 
principles of societal psychology. This interdisciplinary form of social research seeks to 
explain social phenomena in the social, institutional and cultural environments in which 
they occur and how they affect and are affected by the cognitive processes underlying 
people‘s thoughts, feelings and behaviours (Gaskell & Himmelweit, 1990). The focus of 
this dissertation is placed on the broad social (e.g., social norms that are favorable to 
fraud), economic (e.g., growth in countries‘ GDP and income inequality) and cultural 
forces (e.g., perception of the level of corruption within the government) that shape 
consumers‘ morality and explain consumers‘ dishonest behavior.  
10 
 
The contribution of this dissertation is twofold. From a substantive point of view, the 
dissertation fills a gap in the literature by offering a multilevel theoretical and empirical 
account for consumer fraud. Studies of consumer fraud are scarce and usually rely on 
consumer perceptions about the severity of specific dishonest actions. The European 
Social Survey (2
nd
 round, 2004/5) provides—for the first time—cross-national data on 
the prevalence and distribution of consumer fraud in European countries. An exhaustive 
literature search did not return any studies that use ESS data on economic morality. 
From a methodological perspective, the dissertation differs from other pieces of cross-
national research, making sense of cross-national data by alluding to social mechanisms 
that explain social phenomena integrating different levels of analysis. 
This dissertation begins with a general introduction, then moves on to a theoretical 
chapter, a methodological chapter, three empirical papers and finishes with a general 
conclusion. The introduction provides information that guides and sustains the 
subsequent chapters. The theoretical chapter covers the substantive foundations of the 
research hypotheses and empirical studies by examining the state of the art of economic 
morality and consumer dishonest behaviour. By looking at unanswered questions from 
the current theoretical framework, and possible hypotheses derived from the literature to 
explain consumer fraud (Karstedt & Farrall, 2004, 2006), a social mechanism to explain 
consumer fraud from a cross-national perspective is proposed at the end of the 
theoretical chapter (p. 57). 
The methodological chapter discusses the potentialities and pitfalls of cross-national 
survey methods and analytical strategies. This discussion is enriched by the insights of a 
systematic literature review—carried out in the context of this dissertation—which 
inspects how social mechanisms are addressed in studies using ESS data (Annex, p 
179). An innovative approach to cross-national research based on social mechanisms is 
advanced in the methodological chapter. The empirical studies are presented in the form 
of self-contained papers motivated by different research questions addressed with cross-
national data. The three papers contribute to test different aspects of the social 
mechanism that explains consumer fraud. Paper 1 describes the top-line findings of ESS 
economic morality module (2
nd
 round, 2004/05), paper 2 moves beyond description to 
focus on the combined effect of social norms and relative deprivation for explaining the 
emergence of dishonest practices using ESS data (2
nd
 round, 2004/05), paper 3 relies on 
EVS data (4
th
 wave, 2008) to investigate the effect of distrust in political institutions, 
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income inequality and level of corruption in public sector on justification of fraud using 
multilevel modelling. The conclusion brings together the partial conclusions from the 
three papers reflecting upon methodological implications and future directions for 
research. 
 
This introduction offers a guide to this dissertation by starting with definitional issues 
and discussion of the social and economic relevance of the study of consumer fraud. 
Gaps in the literature are outlined and the research questions are described and 
discussed. A social mechanism to explain consumer fraud is introduced to be further 
developed in the theoretical chapter. At the end of the introduction, the three empirical 
papers are briefly summarized; particular emphasis is given to their contribution in 
clarifying the research questions addressed in this dissertation.  
 
1.1: Concepts and definitions 
Consumer fraud is a type of dishonest consumer behavior, involving material gains for 
the person who performed it, and clear negative consequences for a company or the 
state, via the acquisition, consumption and disposition of goods, services, or ideas. 
Adopted in this thesis is a vision of consumer citizenship in which consumer and citizen 
roles overlap, where consumers contribute to the wider society through their role as 
consumers (cf Trentmann, 2004). 
Consumer fraud can assume two forms—active and passive—depending on whether the 
consumer initiated the behaviour or if he/she merely took advantage of a situation 
he/she faced (Muncy & Vitell, 1992). An example of ‗active fraud‘ is insurance fraud; 
An example of ‗passive fraud‘ is keeping extra change from a shop assistant. Other 
examples of fraud are income tax evasion, paying cash-in-hand to circumvent taxes, 
falsely claiming social security benefits, bribing public officials and buying on credit 
with no intention of paying. Although not all dishonest practices are necessarily illegal
1
, 
some cross the boundaries of legality. The criminal nature of some of these practices 
justifies the expression ―crimes of everyday life‖, a term proposed by Karstedt and 
                                                          
1
 All the dishonest practices covered in this dissertation are illegal. 
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Farrall (2004)  that will be used interchangeably with consumer fraud
2
 and consumer 
dishonest behaviour throughout this dissertation. 
Consumer fraud cannot be isolated from the social, cultural, institutional and economic 
context in which it occurs and acquires meaning. Fraudulent practices can be more or 
less disseminated in particular social groups, regions or countries. Eventually, they are 
guided by socially shared beliefs about how people ought to behave. These social norms 
dictate the approval or disapproval of other people‘s behaviour and have an effect of 
enforcing the behaviour in the prescribed direction (Elster, 1989). This idea is 
reinforced by the consistent finding that people pay taxes as long as they believe that 
others also comply with the same rule (see Torgler, 2007).  
Social norms for dishonest consumer behaviour are assumed to be rooted in culture, 
specifically in collective ideas of fairness and justice about the economy (Arnold, 2001; 
Booth, 1993; Karstedt & Farrall, 2006). This dimension of culture is referred to as 
economic morality and is expressed by judgments of rightness and wrongness of 
practices of economic agents (consumers, companies, governments, central banks, 
sellers and households). Economic morality should be understood in the wider 
economic and legal context, as the actions of economic agents are constrained by 
institutional forces, economic regulations, its enforcement and its effectiveness. 
Economic morality shapes norms, judgments and practices by dictating its legitimacy in 
terms of what it is right and wrong (Karstedt & Farrall, 2006). These moral constraints 
would impose barriers to dishonest behaviour and may inhibit its occurrence. Put this 
way, high levels of consumer fraud in a particular country signal a country‘s poor 
economic morality. As such, economic morality can also be used in a broader sense to 
refer to the normative landscape of dishonest practices of diverse economic agents in 
particular regions or countries. In this dissertation, this conceptual framework for 
economic morality and consumer fraud is adopted in line with Karstedt and Farrall 
(2006). 
Economic morality evokes other types of dishonest practices from economic agents, 
commonly labeled white collar crimes, such as corruption
3
 or embezzlement. White 
                                                          
2
 Consumer fraud is also used in the literature to refer to fraud committed against consumers. In 
this dissertation this meaning is avoided and consumer victimisation is used to refer to 
individual perceptions of having been a victim of fraud. 
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collar crime is defined as a ―violation of the law committed by a person or group of 
persons in the course of an otherwise respected and legitimate occupation or financial 
activity‖ (Coleman, 1985, p.5). Consumer fraud differs from white collar crime in two 
respects. First, white collar crime implies the abuse of privileges that a respectable job 
entails. The offenders include staff, managers, company owners or governments, but not 
those in the consumer role. This dissertation centers on the description and explanation 
of dishonest practices by consumers only. Second, white collar crime refers to illegal 
activities committed in a professional context. Crimes of everyday life are not 
necessarily illegal, and are committed by ordinary citizens in the course of daily-life 
activities such as shopping, browsing the internet, or filling in a tax form (Karstedt & 
Farrall, 2005, 2007). Figure 1 shows the distinction between fraud, corruption and error 
(customer and official). Concerning the latter, the intentionality of the behaviour 
constitutes the main distinction between consumer fraud and customer error.  
 
Figure 1: Typology of fraud, error and corruption in benefit systems (source: Rand 
Europe, 2010). 
The study of consumer fraud occupies a well-delimited terrain not explored by research 
on white collar or violent crimes committed towards individuals or households. In this 
dissertation, the focus is directed to the identification of specific patterns of occurrence 
                                                                                                                                                                          
3
 Corruption as defined by Transparency International—the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain—is related to public and government sectors as it implies misuse of public power. The 
study of corruption goes beyond the scope of this dissertation and it is treated only indirectly 
inasmuch as it mirrors the dishonest practice of giving a bribe to a public official. 
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of consumer fraud in European countries, to the economic and cultural contexts that 
facilitate its emergence, and to explanations that account for the observed configuration 
of dishonest practices in Europe. 
1.2: The social and economic effects of consumer fraud 
Consumer fraud has received less public attention than other types of crimes, such as 
white collar crimes or street crimes committed towards individuals and households 
(e.g., homicide, robbery and sexual offences). The emotional and physical impact that 
violent crimes inflict on their victims or the quantifiable financial losses caused by 
white collar crimes may explain the augmented salience of these types of crimes. By 
contrast, consumer fraud is seen as victimless and with low financial consequences 
(HMRC, 2010). Those who commit it tend not to see themselves as ―real criminals‖, 
because the condemnation of these practices is not as consensual as in other types of 
crimes.  
Taken collectively, the impact of fraud for society and for the economy is substantial 
and affects everyone to a greater or lesser degree. In the next paragraphs, I will explain 
how consumer fraud affects society and the economy.  
First, widespread fraud on society shifts the moral boundaries in society between what it 
is perceived as right or wrong. If fraudulent activities are common, they may tend to be 
seen as more acceptable. This idea was advanced by Durkheim (1966), who claimed 
that morality is built on social awareness rather than on static moral principles. 
Accordingly, ethical ideas would encompass social changes in society. For example, 
illegal downloading is a practice widely disseminated and seen as legitimate especially 
amongst youngers between 14-24 years old (Bahanovich & Collopy, 2009). Movements 
asserting the legalization of unrestricted downloading by revision of copyright laws 
have come into place in recent years. Lately, these movements have assumed the form 
of an international political organization with an active voice in parliament in some 
countries in Europe (Sweden, Germany, Switzerland and the Czech Republic) and 
Africa (Tunisia). In this way, the fraudulent nature of illegal downloading has been 
challenged by arguments in favor of unrestricted downloading based on the right of free 
access to culture. These arguments have started entering into public and political 
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discourse and may lead to a moral shift in direction towards the legitimization of illegal 
downloading.  
Second, improved efforts on the side of companies and governments to prevent fraud 
and catch fraudsters may lead to more controlled societies. In the UK, for example, 
some legal action to tackle illegal file sharing has been recently set into motion. The 
new legal measures allow that online contents and activities are supervised by internet 
service providers who can impose penalties to fraudsters. These measures were received 
with some resistance by consumers because they threaten personal privacy and limit 
individual action. Clearly, the impact of fraudulent activities has to be discussed in 
terms of the consequences for wider society and future generations and cannot be 
restricted to financial losses to commercial business or governments. 
It is not easy to estimate the economic impact of consumer fraud to the private or public 
sectors. First, what constitutes fraud is controversial. For social benefit fraud—for 
example—providing inaccurate information or omitting the change of circumstances 
may be considered an error less serious than lying about the basic conditions for 
receiving the benefit (e.g., employment status). The distinction between fraud or error 
rests upon in the fraudulent intention of the customer which is difficult to discern in all 
cases (HMRC, 2010). Second, the methodologies used to identify fraudulent cases by 
government agencies suffer some limitations stemming from the impossibility of 
reaching all cases. Consumer fraud can be detected only if fraudulent individuals are 
randomly picked for investigation, reported by someone, or signaled by cross-
information checks. Small scale fraud with low consequences is believed to be largely 
undetected by these methods. As a result, official figures portray an incomplete picture 
of the prevalence of the consumer fraud in a population.  
When it comes to cross-country comparisons, the non-equivalence of definitions of 
fraud and methodologies poses barriers to the direct comparison of official figures. 
Additionally, these figures may also reflect cross-country differences on the efficacy of 
the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, statistics for the nature, extent and/or impact 
of diverse types of consumer fraud are not available for the vast majority of European 
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countries
4
. The only type of fraud that has attracted considerable attention from national 
and international bodies is tax and benefit fraud, given its direct influence on the general 
state of the economy. But different definitions of fraud and different methodologies 
used to capture information make it unreliable to compare directly the existing figures 
for different countries.  
One study commissioned by European Commission on tax fraud (Reckon, 2009) and a 
report on benefit fraud commissioned by National Audit Office (NAO, 2006) to Rand 
Europe stand out as the exceptions. The Reckon (2009) study harmonises figures for the 
VAT gap
5
, based on national accounts available in EUROSTAT, and a noteworthy 
finding for this dissertation is that a lower perception of corruption from public and 
political sectors (measured by the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index) is associated with more tax compliance
6
. This result underlines the importance of 
economic morality in shaping the practices of different economic agents (e.g., 
consumers and governments). The report commissioned by the NAO (2006) is a 
benchmark study for the UK comparing fraud and error in social security systems in 
Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden and the 
USA. Despite the methodological limitations stemming from the diversity of data and 
methodologies employed in different countries, the results were compared in terms of 
losses for the social benefit system in percentage of the expenditure. The overall 
conclusion is that in those countries, total fraud and error range between 2 and 5 percent 
of the countries‘ expenditure. 
For simplicity‘s sake, statistics of consumer fraud will be presented only for the UK 
(from government agencies/departments and research institutes). Only the most recent 
and relevant figures are presented here. Overall, these figures suggest that dishonest 
practices in the UK have been mounting; that they occur more regularly than other 
crimes; and that they involve higher costs than other forms of criminality. The annual 
                                                          
4
 E.g., the only countries that provide information on tax fraud are Denmark (Danmarks 
Statistik), Germany (Info Institute for Economic Research), Italy (Italian Agenzia della Entrate), 
Sweden (Swedish NCB/NR) and the UK (HMRC). 
5 The VAT gap is estimated from the difference between accrued VAT receipts and a 
theoretical net VAT liability for the economy as a whole. It includes, but it is not limited to tax 
fraud, as it also includes also TAX not paid as a result of legitimate tax avoidance (Reckon, 
2009). 
6
 In this dissertation, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) was also found to be associated 
with acceptance of VAT fraud (cf. paper 3). 
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losses for business in the non-financial services alone parallel the combined costs of 
burglary in dwellings, theft, robbery of individuals and common assault (Dubourg, 
Hamed, & Thorns, 2005).  
The UK‘s Department for Work and Pensions (which provides UK citizens with social 
security) estimated that, in 2010, 2.1 per cent of total expenditure across all benefits are 
due to fraud resulting in £3.1bn being defrauded from the British taxpayer; for income 
support alone, the figure is £480m which corresponds to 5.7 per cent of income support 
expenditure attributed to fraud (HMRC, 2010). 
The Association of British Insurers estimated that, in 2010, insurers detected every day 
335 fraudulent claims worthing £3.2 million. Dishonest home insurance claims is the 
most common (170 cheating householders caught every day) but fraudulent motor 
claims are the most costly (£1.12 million exposed every day). The costs to private 
individuals is a £44 extra added to the average UK households annual insurance bill to 
compensate fraud costs (ABI, 2010). 
A recent KPMG
7
 report (2011)—based on the KPMG fraud barometer that examines 
fraud cases being heard in the UK court referring to charges of at least £100.00—
revealed that 2010 was the year with the highest number of cases in 23 years (when the 
KPMG fraud barometer begin). Similarly, a steep rise in the number of cases had also 
been observed in 2009 and 2008. The report (KPMG, 2011) shows that fraud is mostly 
affecting the government (in the form of tax and benefit fraud) and financial institutions 
(e.g., mortgage fraud). The perpetrators of fraud that involves higher losses are career 
criminals, but these account only for 29.3 per cent of total cases in 2010. The group of 
non-professional fraudsters contributes with the highest number of cases. According to 
this report, it is this non-professional group—formed by ordinary citizens—that is 
driving the numbers of cases up in recent years, since there is not much variation over 
time in the number of cases attributed to professional fraudsters. 
The main focus of this thesis is the class of crimes committed by respectable citizens 
with no criminal record who may occasionally break the rules. Little is known about 
who they are: their socio-demographical characteristics, their position in the social 
                                                          
7
 KPMG is a provider of professional services including audit, tax and advisory services to help 
national and international companies and organizations negotiate risks and thrive in the varied 
environments in which they do business (www.kpmg.com). 
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structure, their motivations, and their attitudes towards the economy and the social 
order. Such information is not available from official reports and, if it exists, it must be 
strictly confidential. The inexistence of harmonized official information also makes it 
impossible to compare their prevalence in European countries. In this dissertation, the 
characterization of perpetrators of consumer fraud and their prevalence in some 
European countries is attempted in paper 1, based on data from the European Social 
Survey (ESS
8
).  
1.3: Literature gaps and research questions 
The official figures for fraud highlight the economic importance of its study for 
description, prevention and detection of dishonest practices in particular countries. The 
social scientific study of consumer fraud seeks explanations for cross-country 
differences and/or dynamics of occurrence over time. Such knowledge constitutes a 
valuable input for economic and social policy-making. In this dissertation, the 
description of the phenomenon of consumer fraud in Europe is presented for the first 
time and explanations for the variability of dishonest practices between and within 
countries are attempted and tested. This section summarises the main theories and key 
studies that currently offer a basis for explaining consumer fraud and the questions that 
are left unanswered.  
Criminological literature has not devoted attention to crimes of everyday life. The only 
theoretical framework that explains consumer dishonest practices was elaborated by 
Karstedt and Farrall (2006) and tested empirically with samples from England, Wales 
and Western and Eastern Germany. The authors put forward the idea that a syndrome of 
market anomie—expressed through distrust in the market and in the economic agents, 
cynical attitudes towards the law and detachment from the economy—drives dishonest 
practices in the marketplace. Karstedt and Farrall (2006) advanced that this constellation 
of negative feelings and attitudes towards the market result from the transition to neo-
liberal economies that was observed in the late twentieth century in European countries. 
Neo-liberal policies re-balanced the weights between governments and markets in the 
economy (through the de-regulation of markets) and distributed responsibilities and 
                                                          
8
 Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) is the data archive and distributor of the ESS 
data. 
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risks between consumers and business. Some authors have noted that the neo-liberal 
reforms were accompanied by a ―cornucopia of new opportunities‖ (Shover, Coffey, & 
Hobbs, 2003, p. 490) that has facilitated dishonest practices by economic agents (see 
Ericson, Barry, & Doyle, 2000). Karstedt and Farrall (2006) claim that new 
opportunities are related to the changes in economic morality that accompany the 
transition to neo-liberal markets. 
These opportunities were created because, on the one hand, consumers are sovereign in 
making decisions and balancing the risks and on the other hand, they can be an easy 
prey for illegal and unfair business practices if they lack important skills such as 
financial knowledge and legal information (Karstedt & Farrall, 2006). Situations where 
consumers may feel defrauded by business include small print clauses, charges for 
unordered items and concealing of relevant information about products or contracts. The 
perception of consumers about the fairness of the economy is inevitably affected by 
those experiences in the marketplace. Empirical evidence (Karstedt & Farrall, 2006) 
gives support to the idea that consumers who are victims of unethical experiences in the 
marketplace show a lower confidence in the economic agents. In the scenario of 
generalized dishonest business practices, consumers may choose not to cooperate with 
market rules and regulations. Consumers may also take advantage of situations they 
face. From this angle, consumer fraud appears a feasible outcome of neo-liberal 
policies. 
Karstedt and Farrall‘s (2006) studies in England, Wales and Western and Eastern 
Germany confirmed that consumers who were victims of dishonest practices in the 
marketplace trust less in the market and are more likely to engage in dishonest practices 
(i.e., they reported a higher intention to engage in these practices if they have the 
chance). It was then demonstrated that reciprocity principles apply in the relationship 
between the market and consumers. Consumers who are victims of business dishonest 
practices are more likely to behave dishonestly in the marketplace. 
To sum up, changes in economic morality follow changes in the economy because new 
opportunities to cheat were created. This situation will lead to a state of market anomie 
where victimised consumers become offenders. The diffusion of dishonest practices 
amongst consumers and business will in turn impact economic morality. Fraudulent 
practices may extend beyond the economic sphere to affect the way citizens behave 
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towards government agencies and institutions (e.g., benefit fraud). Figure 2 depicts the 
current framework for economic morality and consumer dishonest practices, with the 
links between variables identified by numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
The arrow (2) that links economic morality (e.g., perceptions of legitimacy of the 
markets) and market anomie and the arrow (3) that links market anomie to fraudulent 
practices were empirically tested in Karstedt and Farrall‘s (2006) study using structural 
equation modelling. The authors analyzed the adjustment of the theoretical model to 
data (both independently for each country and in the pooled sample) founding empirical 
support for the model in England, Wales and Western and Eastern Germany. This 
dissertation seeks to apply and extend this framework to explain consumer dishonest 
practices in 26 European countries using ESS (2
nd
 round, 2005). 
 
Figure 2: Current theoretical framework for explaining consumer fraud 
 
This framework raises some problems that demand additional research. Some of these 
guide the literature review and motivate the empirical studies presented here. First, the 
assumption that neo-liberal policies impact economic morality (arrow 1) is theoretically 
grounded only as there is no empirical evidence that shows that the transition to neo-
liberal economies was accompanied by a decline in the market trust and consequently 
an increase in crimes of everyday life. It might be the case that the new opportunities to 
cheat offered by the market only contributed to diversify the range of crimes of 
everyday life (e.g., downloading illegal software), but other type of dishonest practices 
already existed in previous forms of market organization. 
Second, this theoretical framework precludes other factors—besides neo-liberal policies 
and profusion of opportunities to cheat—that may affect economic morality and 
dissemination of crimes of everyday life. It is not clear whether the rise in crimes of 
everyday life can be attributed solely to a reciprocity mechanism of ―I (as a consumer) 
was cheated by a company, so I‘m going to behave dishonestly if I have the chance‖. 
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Third, the framework explains how the cornucopia of new opportunities undermines 
trust in the markets and economic agents through the effect of victimisation 
experiences. However, the model is weak at explaining how distrust in the market 
originates consumer fraud (arrow 3). A psychological mechanism is needed to account 
for why consumers with similar experiences in the marketplace may differ in the 
likelihood of engagement in consumer fraud. The next section explains how these three 
research questions may refer to the global social mechanism for consumer fraud. 
 
1.4: Social mechanisms and research questions 
Based on the gaps identified in the literature so far, three research questions motivated 
the empirical studies presented in this dissertation. The first research question is 
whether the transition to neo-liberal markets was accompanied by changes in economic 
morality and a rise in consumer fraud. The second research question explores the 
country factors (social, economic and cultural) that may affect economic morality and 
dissemination of consumer dishonest practices. The third research question relates to the 
identification of a psychological mechanism that explains how a state of market anomie 
contributes to the emergence of consumer dishonest behaviour. The three research 
questions can be regarded as parts of a broader social mechanism of consumer fraud that 
were not explored in previous research. 
A social mechanism for consumer fraud—which accounts for the motivations and 
structural forces that contribute to the initiation and maintenance of consumer fraud— 
explains how psychological, social and economic factors interact to create different 
figures of consumer fraud in European countries. Explanations based on social 
mechanisms involve variables and explanations from different levels of analysis 
integrated in a coherent structure. The social mechanism for consumer fraud presented 
in this section incorporates and expands the current theoretical framework for Karstedt 
and Farrall (2006) based on the research questions outlined in the previous section.  
The social mechanism follows the structure of Coleman‘s (1986) macro-micro scheme, 
which conceptualizes social action through the integration of different theories defined 
at different levels. This typology constitutes the grid of analysis of this dissertation, 
within which theories, research questions and findings will be framed and discussed. 
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Three kinds of processes are considered: (1) the impact of the wider social and 
economic context in shaping beliefs and facilitating dishonest consumer behaviour 
(contextual processes); (2) the cognitive processes that sustain dishonest behaviour 
(individual processes); and (3) the way consumer practices are combined to create an 
economic ethos (transformational processes). These processes are illustrated through a 
diagram known as ―Coleman‘s boat‖. Figure 3 depicts ―Coleman‘s boat‖, which 
articulates the three possible processes that constitute a social mechanism. 
A                 D                    (Macro) 
 
           B    C                                               (Micro) 
        
Type I 
Type II 
Type III 
 
Figure 3: Coleman‘s macro-micro model 
Coleman‘s (1986) scheme considers relationships between variables (A, B, C and D) 
defined at different levels of analysis (macro and micro). Elements A and D are macro-
level variables, referring here to countries‘ characteristics. Elements B and C are micro-
level variables referring to individuals‘ characteristics. The arrows between them refer 
to associations between these variables, explained by processes or partial mechanisms 
denoted by numbers (Type I, II and III). These processes are linked together to bring 
about the macro-level association A → D. The social mechanism refers to the three 
processes that together explain the observed macro level association A → D. 
The establishment of a macro-level association, by itself, does not go beyond the 
description of the phenomenon, unless a social mechanism can be demonstrated. This 
dissertation aims to establish a social mechanism that accounts for the description and 
explanation of different patterns of consumer fraud in Europe, using cross-national data. 
Applied to the social mechanism of consumer fraud, the initial framework proposed by 
Karstedt and Farrall (2006) provides an initial account for how the transition to neo-
liberal markets (A) leads to the dissemination of dishonest practices in the marketplace 
amongst consumers (D). This constitutes the macro-level association A → D which can 
be subdivided into the three mechanisms explained below. The links in Figure 1 
(Current theoretical framework for explaining consumer fraud, p.20) and mechanisms in 
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Figure 2 (Coleman‘s boat of social mechanism, p.22) are connected in the next 
paragraphs. 
Type I (contextual process) is a macro-micro situational mechanism that explains how 
the transition to neo-liberal markets (A) affects market anomie (B). Neo-liberal markets 
create new opportunities for unethical business practices. The landscape of dishonest 
practices by business impacts the fairness of the economy (economic morality) and 
promotes market anomie. Arrows 1 and 2 in Figure 1 define the Type I mechanism in 
Figure 2. 
Type II (individual process) is a purely psychological micro-mechanism that links the 
indicators of market anomie (distrust in the market and economic agents and cynical 
attitudes towarsd the law) to consumer dishonest behaviour. This psychological 
mechanism needs further elaboration, as it is not entirely clear how distrust generates 
dishonest behaviour. In this respect, Karstedt and Farrall‘s (2006) framework evokes a 
reciprocity mechanism that turns victimization experiences into offending behaviour. It 
is worth noting that although in the initial scheme, the arrow that links elements B and 
C is unidirectional, from a psychological perspective, the impact of behaviour on 
cognition should also be taken into account. The bidirectionality of the arrow would be 
more consistent with psychological approaches that underline the mutual impact of 
cognition and behavior, such as cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and self-
perception theories (Bem, 1972).  However this mechanism does not explain how 
individuals with the same experiences in the marketplace may engage differently in 
dishonest practices. Arrow 3 in Figure 1 encapsulates the Type II mechanism in Figure 
2. 
Type III (transformational process) is a micro-macro action formation mechanism 
which describes how isolated individual actions, such as individual dishonest practices, 
combine to generate collective dishonest behaviour. This mechanism points to the effect 
of social norms. The macro-level variable D refers to specific patterns of consumer 
fraud in different countries. Arrow 4 in Figure 1 corresponds to the Type III mechanism 
in Figure 2. 
The three research questions identified in the previous section can be mapped onto the 
macro-micro mechanism scheme. This structure will guide the theoretical chapter and 
the empirical papers. 
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The first research question—to test whether the transition to neo-liberal markets was 
accompanied by a change in economic morality and a rise in consumer fraud—overlaps 
with the macro-level association A → D. There is no direct empirical evidence that 
states this association apart from official data that point out a rise in consumer fraud 
over time (in countries where such information exists). However if Type I, II and III 
processes are theoretically and empirically established, the macro-level association can 
be logically inferred (Opp, 2011). 
The second research question—which country contextual factors (social and cultural) 
lead to market anomie—refers to the identification of a general Type I mechanism. The 
specific mechanism of how the neo-liberal transition leads to a state of market anomie, 
through the dissemination of unethical opportunities for business that impact economic 
morality, is well articulated in Karstedt and Farrall‘s (2006) framework. There is also 
empirical evidence that supports the association between (1) neo-liberal transition and 
spread of unethical business opportunities (Shover, et al., 2003) and (2) perception of 
fairness of the economy and market anomie (Karstedt & Farrall, 2006). The question 
here is whether neo-liberal transition inevitably leads to market anomie and which other 
economic or social contexts would also promote market anomie. In other words, the 
second research question investigates whether the neo-liberal transition is a sufficient 
and necessary condition to the state of market anomie. 
The third research question relates to the identification of a psychological Type II 
mechanism that explains how distrust in the market (market anomie) facilitates 
dishonest practices in the marketplace. This mechanism is not directly addressed in the 
existing literature. 
Type III mechanism posits that dishonest practices can combine with each other to 
create collective behaviour through the effect of social norms if opportunities to cheat 
are available. The transformational mechanism of consumer fraud is dealt with only 
from a theoretical perspective in this dissertation. It will not be tested given the 
impossibility of tracing the processes over time given the cross-sectional nature of the 
cross-national data available.  
The general social mechanism proposed here is founded in classical theories from 
political science, sociological and social psychology presented in the theoretical chapter 
and tested in three empirical papers. 
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Overall, the social mechanism for consumer fraud postulates that the neo-liberal 
transformation of markets impacts economic morality if this transition was not 
accompanied by a sustained evolution of the social institutions (political, educational 
and religious). A rapid economic development implies the disembeddedness of the 
market with social institutions (Roland, 2004; Rosenfeld & Messner, 1997) which lead 
to an overemphasis of market material values (Rosenfeld & Messner, 1997). In extreme 
situations of disembeddedness, a syndrome of market anomie may take place. This 
syndrome encapsulates distrust in the market and political agents and cynical attitudes 
towards the law.   
A general level of perception of corruption in public and political sectors also has 
serious implications to economic morality. First, as citizens perceive that private rather 
than public interest prevail in government decisions and policy-making, the trust in 
political agents and public officials becomes undermined (TI, 2010). Second, corruption 
in the public sector is associated with lower judicial/legal effectiveness (Kaufman, 
2004). By relaxing legal barriers which prevent fraudulent practices, law compliance 
diminishes and fraudulent activities propagate.  
Besides the rapid transition to neo-liberal policies and a higher level of corruption, a 
high level of social inequalities can also triggers fraudulent behaviour. First it has 
shown that using international surveys (e.g., the World Values Survey) that the way 
resources are distributed in society is the major determinant of trust in other people 
(Uslaner, 2002). Trust in others or generalized trust is assumed to underlie trust in social 
institutions (Offe, 1999). Second, social inequalities signal a strained social structure 
with deep boundaries between social classes. The upward mobility in these societies is 
associated with material success that can be achieved by legitimate means (such as a 
high level of education and a reputable job) or by illegitimate means (such as dishonest 
behaviour). Individuals from lower classes may perceive their way to social ascension 
to be blocked by restricted access to education and well-paid jobs (Merton, 1957). 
Lower-class individuals are more likely to feel relatively deprived, especially in strained 
social structures. Relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966) then fuel illegitimate ways to 
achieve material success, such as fraudulent practices. Relative deprivation is a valid 
motivation for consumer fraud in societies where consumer fraud is uncommon, as it 
applies to behaviour with a deviant nature (Merton, 1957). Individual attitudes towards 
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fraud and opportunity would determine the extent to which relative deprivation would 
materialize in dishonest behaviour (Beck & Ajzen, 1991).  
In societies where consumer fraud is widespread, social norms that are favorable to 
dishonest behaviour explain the occurrence of fraud. Neutralization processes in the 
form ―Everybody does it‖ (Gabor, 1994) legitimate and help individuals to accept and 
to perpetuate dishonest behaviour. The gradual emergence of social norms results from 
conformity processes (Elster, 1994). When social norms are favorable, opportunity 
seems to be the major obstacle to behaviour (Beck & Ajzen, 1991). As such, economic 
context, institutional landscape and social structure are macro-level factors that either 
prevent or facilitate fraudulent behaviour in the marketplace. The behaviour 
materializes when attitudes and social norms are favorable and the opportunity arises. 
In the next section, a brief overview of the empirical studies presented in this 
dissertation, the research questions that motivated them and the main findings is 
offered. 
 
1.5: Research questions and empirical studies 
This dissertation seeks to both describe and explain patterns of consumer fraud across 
Europe. Paper 1 accomplishes the descriptive task. Papers 2 and 3 test a theoretical 
framework that gives coherence to findings from paper 1. Because paper 1 lacks 
explanation, papers 2 and 3 test a social mechanism that explains the variability of 
consumer fraud between and within countries. 
The empirical studies depart from two assumptions. First, the variability in countries‘ 
economic and social circumstances encapsulates differences in economic morality. 
Second, economic morality shapes the practices and habits in the economic sphere. In 
this way, economic morality plays the role of intervening variable in the relationship 
between countries‘ economic and social context and practices in the economic sphere. 
These two assumptions were not tested in this dissertation because economic morality 
itself was not operationalized as it involves ideas about the economy that are expressed 
not only in terms of consumers‘ perception of fairness of economic practices, but also in 
terms of the way business, political organizations and governments operate, as well as 
existing regulations, their implementation, their enforcement and their effectiveness. In 
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this dissertation, the position that survey data cannot capture all the richness of 
economic morality is assumed. 
The research questions were addressed through the lens of cross-national European 
survey data gathered from the European Social Survey (2
nd
 wave, 2004/5) and the 
European Values Study (4
th
 wave, 2009). These surveys provide individual information 
about attitudes and/or dishonest practices. Additional information was gathered from 
other surveys, such as the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) and the World Values 
Survey (WVS), but their role in this dissertation is only secondary. These surveys were 
used to inspect the quality of ESS and EVS data, since they contain some common 
questions
9
. Detailed information about all these surveys will be provided in the relevant 
papers (papers 1 and 3). Statistical information about the level of corruption in the 
countries (Corruption Perceptions Index), control of corruption (Control of Corruption 
Index) and income inequality index (Gini index) and the GDP gathered from the 
Transparency International, the Eurostat and World‘s Bank, were also used to test 
specific research hypotheses. 
Paper 1 (using ESS data, 2004) describes the patterns of occurrence of dishonest 
practices and the characterization of fraudsters is attempted. This paper empirically 
supports the distinction between active and passive fraud to define situations where the 
consumer actively initiates the behaviour or situations where he/she merely takes 
advantage of a situation he/she faces. Paper 1 shows that dishonest practices are 
widespread across Europe. In the 26 European countries considered, nearly half of the 
population has engaged at least one of the seven dishonest practices considered in the 
last five years. Countries‘ specificities are also observed, as certain practices are more 
common in some countries than in others. Country variations on levels of consumer 
fraud can be best summarised in terms of differences between developed and emerging 
markets (MSCI/Barra, 2010). The results indicate that passive fraud is more common in 
developed than in emerging markets, whereas active fraud is more common in emerging 
compared to developed markets. This paper also shows that in all countries considered, 
                                                          
9
 ―Cheating on taxes if you have a chance is never justifiable (1) always justifiable to (10) never 
justifiable‖ (EVS and WVS); ―Someone accepting a bribe in the course on their duties is (1) 
always justifiable to (10) never justifiable‖ (EVS and WVS); and ―In the past 5 years/12 
months/, have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe to a public official/in any 
form? (ESS and GCB). 
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active fraud is not linked to social class, but passive fraud is more common in higher 
classes. Additionally, consumer fraud is more common amongst men and young people. 
The first research problem considers whether economic dynamics such as the transition 
to neo-liberal economies lead to changes in economic morality and to the increase of 
crimes of everyday life. Despite its social and scientific importance, this problem was 
not tested directly in this dissertation because longitudinal data on economic morality or 
consumer fraud is not available. The answer was only partially addressed in paper 2 
(using ESS data, 2004), which explores whether a rapid expansion of the market 
(indicated by economic growth) is accompanied by higher levels of fraudulent practices 
amongst consumers.  
Paper 2 (ESS data, 2004/5) explores the effect of a rapid economic growth (growth in 
GDP) on the general level of consumer fraud in 26 European countries. The theoretical 
underpinnings of research hypotheses are presented in the theoretical chapter and in 
paper 2. Drawing on Institutional Anomie Theory (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2010; 
Rosenfeld & Messner, 1997), Theory of Anomie and Social Structure (Merton, 1957) 
and Theory of Institutional Change (Roland, 2004), the rationale for this paper is that a 
rapid economic growth leads to a state of anomie because the values of the market 
(materialism and pursuit of self-interest) surmount the power of social institutions that 
help to regulate and sanction dishonest practices. As a result, consumer fraud seems to 
proliferate. The results indicate that, controlling for GDP, a rapid economic growth is 
associated with a higher level of fraud. This result offers support for the initial 
hypothesis that the expansion of the economy in neo-liberal markets is associated with a 
dissemination of fraudulent activity amongst consumers. As predicted by Karstedt and 
Farrall (2006), the transition to neo-liberal markets seems to generate new opportunities 
for dishonest practices and fraudulent practices will spread.  
Paper 3 (EVS data, 2008) addresses the second research question, which seeks to 
identify some of the country contextual factors (social and cultural) that may affect 
economic morality and fraudulent activity. This paper tests whether the level of 
corruption in public and political sectors (measured by Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index) is associated with more acceptance of fraud amongst 
consumers, as suggested by previous research (Reckon, 2009). The response variable is 
acceptance of fraud, not actual fraudulent behaviour, because acceptance of fraud does 
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not depend on opportunities to cheat and other environmental factors that may inhibit 
the behaviour. Perception of corruption in the country is associated with lower 
judicial/legal effectiveness (Kaufman, 2004) and is consequently associated with 
economic morality. The results support the hypothesis that countries with higher levels 
of corruption in the public sector also show higher levels of acceptance of fraud (VAT 
fraud only). 
Paper 3 tests the effect of income inequality (Gini index) on justification of fraud. The 
hypothesis states that countries with greater income inequalities are associated with 
more acceptance of fraud amongst consumers. The results support this hypothesis 
(controlling for GDP and level of corruption in public sector), as countries with greater 
income inequalities are associated with more acceptance of fraud (specifically, cheating 
on taxes). Paper 3 identifies the perception of corruption in public sector and income 
inequality as two variables that possibly influence economic morality as they are 
associated with acceptance of specific types of fraud. 
Papers 2 and 3 address the contextual mechanism (Type I mechanism). Together, they 
show that the neo-liberal transition and the cornucopia of new opportunities are not 
necessary and sufficient conditions to change economic morality. Economic 
development sustained in non-economic institutions contend unethical practices (neo-
liberal transition is not a sufficient condition) and other country economic and cultural 
circumstances such as income inequality and perception of corruption in the 
government shape economic morality (neo-liberal transition is not a necessary 
condition).  
The third research question requires the identification of a psychological mechanism 
(Type II mechanism) that explains how a state of market anomie contributes to the 
emergence of consumer dishonest behaviour. The current framework for explaining 
consumer dishonest behaviour does not provide a direct answer to the question of why 
some consumers are more likely to engage in fraudulent practices than others. Karstedt 
and Farrall (2006) suggest that those who have been exposed to unethical business 
practices would be more favorable to dishonest behaviour. These authors conclude that 
since middle class individuals are the target for business unethical practices, dishonest 
practices should be more usual in the middle classes. A related explanation for 
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individual differences in engagement on dishonest practices directs to different levels of 
trust in the economic agents (due possibly to different experiences of victimization). 
Paper 1 explored the distribution of dishonest behaviour across social class, drawing on 
the third research question. Paper 3 tests whether the lack of trust in political institutions 
triggers dishonest behaviour. The results of these two papers indicate that crimes of 
everyday life are widespread across social classes (paper 1 using ESS data 2004), even 
though passive fraud is more common among higher classes and distrust in political 
institutions is associated with justification of fraudulent practices (paper 3, using EVS 
data, 2008).  
Additionally, it has been also advanced that relative deprivation theory (Runciman, 
1966) explains individual differences in consumer fraud. A feeling of economic 
deprivation was suggested by Merton (1957) as being at the basis of deviant behaviour. 
The hypothesis that relative deprivation fuels a perception of the unfairness of the 
economy and motivates dishonest practices is tested in paper 2 (using ESS data, 2004). 
It is revealed that, in countries where social norms restrain fraudulent practices, 
relatively deprived consumers are more likely to engage in these practices. But in 
countries where social norms are favorable to fraud, less deprived consumers are more 
likely to engage in fraudulent activity. These results highlight—in line with Merton 
(1957)—that fraudulent activity is triggered by feelings of relative deprivation, but only 
if these behaviours are deviant. If they are common, social norms and opportunity 
dictate the likelihood to engage in fraudulent activity, rather than deprivation feelings. 
The results suggest that trust in institutions underlies dishonest behaviour. This finding 
was also stressed in Karstedt and Farrall‘s study (2006). But on its own, it doesn‘t 
explain why some individuals have more propensity to engage in fraudulent practices 
than others. Relative deprivation doesn‘t provide an answer to all situations since 
relative deprivation is associated with dishonest practices only in countries where these 
practices are deviant. In a systematic way, the three papers presented here allow to 
answer the following questions: 
- Who are the consumers that engage in fraudulent practices in terms of their 
socio-demographical characteristics? (paper 1) 
- Where are they located in the social structure? (paper 1) 
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- What is their distribution across Europe? (paper 1) 
- What are their motivations and attitudes towards political institutions and the 
economy? (papers 2 and 3) 
- How do country characteristics facilitate the emergence of fraudulent practices 
amongst consumers?  (paper 2 and 3) 
The answers for these questions are integrated into one social mechanism that 
incorporates and extend the current knowledge about consumer dishonest practices. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
 
This dissertation contributes to our understanding of consumer fraud across Europe by 
proposing and testing a social mechanism that accounts for cross-national differences in 
its prevalence. This chapter first introduces and discusses the theories that motivate the 
current integrative perspective on individual-, national- and cross-level variation in 
consumer fraud. These contributions are linked according to a social mechanism that 
extends the current knowledge about consumer fraud and allows generating hypotheses 
that are tested in the empirical papers.  
Based on the gaps identified in the literature so far, three research questions motivated 
the empirical studies presented in this dissertation. The first research question is 
whether the transition to neo-liberal markets was accompanied by a change in economic 
morality and a rise in consumer fraud. The second research question explores other 
country contextual factors (social, economic and cultural) that affect economic morality 
and the dissemination of consumer dishonest practices. The third research question 
relates to the identification of a psychological mechanism that explains how a state of 
market anomie contributes to the emergence of consumer dishonest behaviour. In this 
chapter, the theoretical perspectives that contribute to clarify these three research 
questions are reviewed and hypotheses derived from the theories are formulated 
throughout the chapter. At the end of the chapter, a social mechanism— to be tested in 
the empirical papers—is formulated. 
This dissertation revolves around three domains: market, morality and society. A major 
challenge to consumer research is to integrate those domains of empirical investigation 
(see Caruana, 2007). In this chapter, the theoretical elaboration of links between these 
three domains is attempted. Theories that explain how morality shapes and it is shaped 
by the market and society are reviewed. Theories that explain consumer fraud through 
different processes are integrated at different levels. Inevitably, different theories 
employ different levels of analysis of the phenomenon. The focus can be placed on the 
role that consumers play in shaping economic morality, or on the impact of economic 
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morality on consumer‘s practices. Economic morality and consumer morality are two 
key concepts that are assumed to be in correspondence. 
The exposition of the theoretical framework follows the four levels of analysis proposed 
by Doise (1986): societal (broad social context), positional (position of individual in a 
group or society), interpersonal (interaction between individuals) and intrapersonal 
(merely psychological). Relevant theories from cognitive psychology, social 
psychology, sociology and political science are then considered. At a societal level, 
consumer fraud is linked to economic morality and characteristics of the market (liberal 
vs coordinated economy). At a positional level, consumer fraud is linked to anomie and 
its impact on class structure. The theories classified at societal and positional levels 
refer to contextual processes (Type I mechanisms) that explain how country 
characteristics impact individual beliefs, attitudes and values. Intra and interindividual 
levels allude to cognitive processes and individual characteristics, such as relative 
deprivation, trust, human values and attitudes towards dishonest behaviour, as well as 
neutralization processes that sustain dishonest behaviour. Theories classified as being at 
intra-individual and interindividual levels refer to psychological mechanisms that relate 
cognition to behaviour (Type II mechanism). It is important to note that understanding 
the social mechanism underlying consumer fraud through such a multi-disciplinary 
framework has never before been attempted and tested empirically.  
 
2.1: Societal level: Moral Views of the market and economic morality 
 
2.1.1: Moral view of market societies 
The link between market and morality has been a recurring debate in economics, 
sociology and political science. In this dissertation it is assumed that the market 
encapsulates a moral dimension that gives meaning to consumer experiences and shapes 
consumer practices. These moral ideas are incorporated into consumers‘ values and 
attitudes; they can be extended to other spheres of action and contexts, such as 
relationship with governments and social relations.  
The point of departure of this dissertation is the idea that the market and morality cannot 
be seen as separate entities since the market is a moralizing agent is. This theoretical 
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position is well established in the literature by Fourcade and Healy (2007) and concurs 
with four alternative positions of market society. The four positions will be discussed in 
the next paragraphs. At the end of this section, the idea of economic morality is 
presented and the link between market and morality with the theoretical position 
endorsed is made clear. 
There are different perspectives on the beneficial or harmful effect of the market on 
social order are more or less openly articulated in benchmark theories and schools of 
thought that shaped the evolution of the social sciences. Resulting from different visions 
of human nature, social organization and ideal institutions, the rival views of market 
society can be grouped  into three broad categories (Hirschman, 1982): the market can 
have a civilizing effect on social order, politics and culture; the market can have a 
destructive effect on social order, politics and culture; and the market can have a feeble 
effect on social order, politics and culture. Despite the fact that these ideas appeared in a 
historical progression, all may be encountered in contemporary literature. A fourth 
position recently advocated by Fourcade and Healy (2007) is endorsed in this 
dissertation. This position considers that ―markets are cultural phenomena and moral 
projects in their own right‖ (p. 285). 
The thesis that market has a civilizing and positive effect on society has been termed by 
Hirschman (1982), the doux commerce dissertation. More recently, Fourcade and Healy 
(2007) used the expression ―liberal dream‖. This optimistic perspective prevailed in the 
eighteenth century and persists nowadays in mainstream economic thinking. From a 
individual perspective, it is asserted that personal virtues such as gentleness, cordiality, 
integrity, honesty and responsibility are assumed to be fostered by the communicative 
dimension that commerce transactions between strangers promote. From a social 
perspective, the coordination of interests of all agents involved in the exchange are 
believed to generate cooperation and social harmony. 
The doux commerce dissertation is based on the idea that the well-being of individuals 
is guaranteed as long as the market satisfies individual needs and wants through an 
efficient allocation of resources (Frey & Stutzer, 2002). Accordingly, wealth, 
satisfaction of wants and economic welfare inevitably lead to happiness. Lane (1991) 
goes further, claiming that the efficiency of the market should be evaluated by two 
criteria: happiness and human development. The happiness derived from the satisfaction 
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of needs and desires is considered not to be the only aim of the market; the satisfaction 
derived from experience with the market should be also considered.  Lane (1991) 
considers that production and distribution processes are also sources of well-being in a 
way that they stimulate cognitive complexity, self-esteem and self-control. In Lane‘s 
words, ―the market should be judged by the satisfaction people receive as a consequence 
of their market experiences and by what they learn from them‖ (p.5). The goods and 
services provided by the market are only intermediate goals subordinated to the ultimate 
goals of happiness and human development.  
Another virtue attributed to the market is the promotion of personal freedom and choice 
that spread to the political and cultural spheres (Friedman, 1962). As Fourcade and 
Healy (2007) put it: ―consumer sovereignty is political freedom in another guise‖ (p. 
289). In the cultural sphere, the beneficial effect of the market relates to the 
commodification of cultural goods and the creation of incentives to creativity and 
innovation.  
A radical shift from doux commerce dissertation to a rather pessimistic view of the 
market may is credited to Marx and Veblen‘s thinking. The self-destructive dissertation 
(Hirschman, 1982) or commodified nightmare (Fourcade & Healy, 2007) challenges the 
moral merit of capitalism based on the belief that it contains the seed of its own 
destruction and promotes conspicuous consumption. From this perspective, capitalism 
corrodes personal character and moral values by stimulating competition and envy of 
others lifestyles, ignoring the origin of desires and distorting social relations (Polanyi & 
MacIver, 1957). Contemporary authors (e.g., Galbraith, 2004) tend to contest the 
existence of consumer sovereignty, based on the firm belief that industries and 
advertising control and manipulate consumers, in that they cultivate the demand for 
products.  
In face of these new developments, the doux commerce dissertation was revised. A 
morally neutral tone was adopted largely by economic sociologists. This was achieved 
by attributing less deterministic power to market forces. Rather than assuming a strong 
direct link from the market to the social order, whether beneficial or prejudicial, the 
emphasis turned to the other direction. Instead of being a dependent variable, the moral 
order is a factor that shapes the structure of the market and economic development. A 
classical author who stressed the role played by cultural and institutional legacies in 
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raising and sustaining market systems was Weber (1930) who focused on the way 
religious doctrine is associated with economic organization. In his view, each religion 
encloses an economic ethic that supports or reproves certain economic practices in 
everyday life.  
This third view is reinforced by factual evidence of distinctive paths of capitalism in 
different countries or regions (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Two distinct varieties of market 
economies—liberal (LME) and coordinated (CME)—resulted from the interaction of 
markets with cultural and social milieu. In LME, firms coordinate their activities via 
hierarchies and competitive market arrangements and the equilibrium outcomes of firm 
behaviour are usually given by demand and supply conditions (Hall & Soskice, 2001, p. 
8). In CME, firms depend more heavily on non-market relationships to coordinate their 
endeavors with other actors and to construct their core competencies (Hall & Soskice, 
2001, p. 8). 
LME and CME may also be seen as two archetypes of two contrasting poles of a 
continuum along which all countries may theoretically be positioned. The authors 
identified empirically clusters of countries included in this dichotomy based on two 
indicators of institutional practices: stock market capitalization (ratio of market value of 
listed companies to GDP) and employment protection (composite index of ease of 
hiring and firing). The distinction between LME and CME has been evoked to explain 
technological specialization patterns (Akkermans, Castaldi, & Los, 2009) and specific 
legal systems (Pistor, 2006). 
In this dissertation, the distinction between LME and CME will be used to describe 
patterns of dishonest behaviour in each one of the market economies (cf. paper 1). This 
is done only with the descriptive purpose of characterising the patterns of consumer 
fraud in Europe. Considering that different market economies are rooted in different 
cultural values, it can be assumed that different patterns of dishonest behaviour would 
emerge in countries classified as CME or LME. This constitutes the first research 
hypothesis in this dissertation. 
H1: CME and LME differ in respect to patterns of consumer dishonest behaviour (paper 
1). 
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A fourth position, not considered in the original Hirschamn‘s (1982) scheme, has been 
recently advocated by Fourcade and Healy (2007). This position is central to the current 
dissertation. The authors consider that ―markets are cultural phenomena and moral 
projects in their own right‖ (p. 285). This perspective considers that markets and 
morality should not be regarded as separate entities, since the market is a moralizing 
agent. This is the core of the idea of economic morality. As part of culture, markets 
participate in the process of conveying moral meaning to economic practices. 
The morality of markets is more or less explicit in daily exchanges, advertisement and 
economical discourses. On the one hand, moralizing ideas might be abstracted from 
expressions such as creditworthiness of nations, countries level of corruption, fair trade 
and corporate and environmental responsibility that are immersed in the economic 
world. On the other hand, practices and discourses centered on efficiency and social 
responsibility, aimed at conferring credibility to markets, align with prevailing moral 
ideas (Fourcade & Healy, 2007). Thus, economic practices are framed in economic and 
social principles with a prescriptive function for behavioural and cognitive systems 
(Fourcade & Healy, 2007). In this dissertation, consumer fraud is assumed to be 
associated with moral ideas about the economic world that determine the illegitimacy of 
illegal behaviour. 
The market system becomes a moralizing institution to the extent to which market 
principles penetrate other institutional domains. Broader market principles—such as 
efficiency, productivity and social responsibility—may develop into socially shared 
values such as material satisfaction and the pursuit of well-being. Messner and 
Rosenfeld (1994) refer to the culture of the ―American Dream‖ to express the 
configuration of values that emerges in capitalist societies characterized by achievement 
orientation, competitive individualism and monetary success. The morality of the 
market is derived from this constellation of values in market societies. In capitalist 
societies, the wrongness of certain practices is evaluated against the shared values of 
achievement, individualism and materialism.  
The perspective of the market as a moralizing agent is also shared by Baudrillard 
(1998), who proposed a definition of consumption that includes, amongst other ideas, 
the one that consumption is itself morality, i.e. a system of ideological values. In his 
view, consumption takes the form of a structural organization that is external and 
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imposes itself upon individuals. In Baudrillard‘s (ibid) words, consumer society is a 
―new objective situation governed by a new morality‖ (p. 175). Braudillard‘s definition 
of consumption is central to this dissertation: consumer behaviour is linked to ideology 
and morality and cannot be detached from the cultural context in which within which 
acquires meaning. 
Baudrillard (1998) also claims that ―consumer society is at one and at the same time a 
society of solicitude and a society of repression‖ (p. 174). Assuming that the common 
goals of happiness and well-being are not naturally-driven desires, Baudrillard considers 
that these goals are embedded in the morality of the market, in its rationality and in its 
illusion that everything has a purpose. The market is repressive to the extent that people 
need to adapt to these externally imposed goals. The existence of a whole range of 
criminal behaviours that may be observed in economic developed countries reinforces 
the idea that adaption is not always an easy process. For Baudrillard, these deviant 
behaviours express resistance and demand freedom. This idea suggests that the market 
can be better understood as a system of psychological and moral constraints that fosters 
more or less enforced adaptation to new types of behaviour, collective restrictions and 
norms (p.176). Here rests the contradiction of market: its affluence and, at the same 
time, its limitation. 
This understanding of the morality of markets echoes Durkheim‘s thinking that moral 
boundaries are sociological phenomenon. For Durkheim (Durkheim & Catlin, 1966), a 
moral fact can be recognized if, when it is violated, a sanction takes place. As Durkheim 
sees it, it is the whole society and, more specifically, the authority coming from 
―common awareness‖ (Durkheim & Catlin, 1966), that dictates what is legitimate or 
inappropriate rather than some static and universal ethical standards. As such, the 
ethical standards will differ not only between different societies but will also encompass 
social or institutional changes within a given society. As such, the ethical dimension of 
consumer behaviour cannot be judged by an external criterion, but should be regarded 
according to the moral standards of society regarding consumer behaviour. 
Braudillard and Durkheim‘s positions suggest that fraudulent behaviour should be 
considered deviant only in relation to a system of norms and restrictions that drive 
behaviour to a prescribed direction. It follows that in societies where consumer fraud is 
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widespread, social norms to behave dishonestly are entrenched in the morality of the 
market. 
 
2.1.2: Economic morality and consumer dishonest behaviour 
Economic morality captures the moral dimension of the economy and practices of 
economic agents.  Economic morality can be defined as ―a particular set of justice 
perceptions and the moral order of the economy‖ (Karstedt & Farrall, 2006, p. 4), in 
which ―the mutual rights and obligations of the governing and the governed are 
collected and condensed‖ (Svallfors, 2006, p. 36). The vision of the market as having a 
morality is ingrained in the idea of economic morality. 
The expression ―economic morality‖ was first coined by Thompson (1971) in order to 
explain corn riots in eighteenth century Britain formed by consumers battling for 
surplus and fair prices on basic provisions. The riots were recognized as manifestations 
of grievance, resulting from a clash in expectations, framed on an embedded economy 
submerged in social relations and reciprocity principles and the demands of a more 
advanced, autonomous market (Booth, 1994). An embedded economy is defined by 
(Polanyi & MacIver, 1957) as immersed in social relations and cannot be separate of 
society as a whole. The moral indignation of pre-market people when faced with a more 
modern economic order was then expressed through opposition and conflict. This 
historical moment was recognized by some (e.g., Trentmann, 2004) as a first step 
towards the recognition of consumer authority in economic and political realms. In 
political science, economic morality still relies on the distinction between non-market 
and market societies and it is linked to the resistance resulting of the inclusion of non-
market people in market-based societies (see Arnold, 2001). 
This classic example spread into political science literature, and other applications of 
the study of economic morality were considered.  Different approaches to economic 
morality revolve around the idea that when a clash between consumers‘ expectations 
and actual events takes place, consumers react with moral indignation and the 
questioning of market or governmental legitimacy. In extreme cases, resistance and/or 
rebellion may occur. 
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Karstedt and Farrall (2006) use the expression ―syndrome of market anomie‖ to refer to 
the constellation of feelings and beliefs about the market that derives from the clash of 
expectations between ethical principles and actual practices. The syndrome of market 
anomie is described by distrust related to market and market agents and cynical attitudes 
towards the law. Resistance and non-compliance with market principles are assumed to 
be at the basis of crimes of everyday life. Crimes of everyday life hold, according to 
Karstedt and Farrall (2006), the same meaning and deep motivations than food riots in 
the eighteen century. In a similar way, they express resistance and grievance towards 
the market. 
Karstedt and Farrall (ibid) claim that ―the crimes of everyday life reflect the changes of 
the economy at the late twentieth century‖ (p. 1012).  This idea has resonance in 
Thompson‘s approach to economic morality. Similarly, in Thompson‘s example, the 
rebellions were explained through changes in economic conditions regarded as 
illegitimate by pre-market people. This suggests that the new economic order has to be 
perceived by consumers as fair to be assimilated by consumers in terms of new practices 
or adjustment to old ones. Applying these ideas, global economic changes (such as 
economic reforms) shift economic morality. Perceptions of fairness and justice about 
the economic world would then encompass economic dynamics and influence the 
emergence of dishonest practices in the marketplace. 
 
Karstedt and Farrall (2006) consider that if consumers don‘t recognize changes in the 
economy as fair and legitimate, a syndrome of market anomie sets the stage for 
dishonest practices. The association between perceived fairness of the market, a 
syndrome of market anomie and the intention to behave dishonestly was tested in 
samples from England, Wales and Western and Eastern Germany. The authors justify 
the choice of these regions by assuming that all four regions are macro-units that have 
undergone different economic and social trajectories. As such, different market 
characteristics and welfare regimes characterize these regions: England and Wales 
represent an advanced market with fewer state-provided services, Western Germany 
corresponds to a market society with strong protective state provision and Eastern 
Germany is an example of a ready-made market society in transition from a communist 
regime (p. 1015).  The theoretical framework proposed by Karstedt and Farrall was 
corroborated in the four regions using structural equation modelling. 
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Drawing on the idea that perceived unfairness of the economy support dishonest 
practices, it is not clear whether other country contexts bring about a poor economic 
morality and consumer dishonest practices. Besides an economic reform seen as 
illegitimate, an unequal distribution of wealth in society may also be associated with 
beliefs of unfairness of the economy among consumers. In societies with a weak 
distributive justice, individuals would trust less in the economy and in economic agents, 
in line with the syndrome of market anomie. Consumer fraud is then be more likely to 
occur in unequal societies. This is the rationale for the second research hypothesis: 
H2: There is more acceptance of fraud in countries with greater income inequalities 
(paper 3). 
Additionally, corruption in public sector may impact economic morality. This variable 
has been shown to be associated with VAT fraud (Reckon, 2009). The rationale for this 
association is that corruption in the public sector is associated with lower judicial/legal 
effectiveness (Kaufman, 2004). By relaxing legal barriers which sanction fraud, law 
compliance diminishes. The framework of economic morality also predicts that 
corruption in the public sector and consumer fraud may be associated because the 
perception of corruption diminishes the trust in government and impacts economic 
morality. As such, fraudulent practices are more likely to occur in countries with 
perceived level of corruption economic morality is poor and law is not effectively 
enforced. The third research hypothesis states that: 
H3: There is higher acceptance of fraud in countries with countries with higher levels of 
corruption in the public sector (paper 3). 
 
2.1.3: Economic morality and institutions 
Economic morality is shaped by public policies and institutions through a process of 
normative feedback that passes on to citizens the message of which rights and 
responsibilities are expected from them as members of a wider community (Svallfors, 
2006). Economic morality is assumed to have some stability in a particular society since 
a definite change in the way consumers perceive the economy is not the direct result of 
the establishment of new policies. Such a transformation presupposes an extensive and 
slow-moving mechanism of socio-cognitive adjustment to new ideas in people‘s minds, 
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in which psychological processes intervene, such as the information‘s diffusion and 
management, cognitive assimilation of changes, accommodation of new ideas with old 
ones and feedback loops based on consumers‘ actual experiences and expectations. A 
gradual change would emerge from the dialogue between innovative ideas and existing 
collective attitudes, systems of beliefs and values embedded in the culture. 
This idea is stressed by Roland (2004), who proposed a useful distinction between slow 
moving and fast moving institutions in order to develop a framework for understanding 
institutional change, illustrating the limitations associated with the transplantation of 
best-practice institutions. North‘s (1990) definition of institutions is adopted: 
―institutions include any form of constraitn that human beings devise to shape human 
interaction‖ (p. 3). An example of a slow-moving institution is culture understood as a 
constellation of values, beliefs and social norms. Slow-moving institutions progress at a 
slow, incremental and continuous pace. Conversely, political institutions (e.g., regime 
type, electoral rules, degree of federalism) may change more quickly and abruptly. They 
are classified as fast moving institutions (Roland, 2004).  
Roland‘s (2004) macrosystemic approach to institutions is assumed here, in that 
institutions are interdependent and function in a complementary way. Along these lines, 
successful institutional change depends on the degree of congruence of new and existing 
institutions. On the one hand, incremental changes in culture will gradually create 
inconsistencies in fast moving institutions, creating pressure towards change. On the 
other hand, a reform in a fast-moving institution is condemned to failure if it does not 
respect the stage and specificities of slow moving institutions. Therefore, the cultural 
milieu is a fundamental determinant of whether a new input will succeed or fail. It may 
be legitimately concluded that the more irreconcilable the new and old ideas appear to 
be the more non-compliance and grievance manifestations can be expected from 
members of society. 
Roland‘s (2004) idea that successful changes in fast moving institutions such as 
economic systems should taking into account the cultural values to be successfully 
implemented is also stressed by Institutional Anomie Theory (Messner & Rosenfeld, 
2010). This theory maintains that institutional anomie is driven by structural forces 
derived from the economic dominance in the institutional structure, i.e., by market 
forces that are not balanced by the values of social institutions. In a market society, the 
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power of economic institutions may surmount to different degrees the power of non-
economic institutions (family, education, welfare, religious and political institutions). In 
extreme situations, a cultural ethos where the competition and materialism values are 
overemphasized can be created. As a result, the normal functioning of non-economic 
institutions is disrupted, especially social control is worsened.  In Messner and 
Rosenfeld‘s words (1994), ―non-economic institutions have a limited capacity to offer 
incentives and penalties for socially prescribed or proscribed behaviour‖ (p. 87).  
The authors consider four conditions for economic dominance over social institutions 
(Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997): (1) economic goals are assigned high priority in 
comparison with noneconomic goals; (2) the claims of economic roles are typically 
honored at the expense of those of noneconomic roles when conflicts occur; (3) social 
standing tends to be more highly dependent on the performance of economic roles than 
of noneconomic roles; and (4) the calculating, utilitarian logic of the marketplace 
penetrates other institutional realms‖ (p.1396). 
Thus, according to the Theory of Institutional Anomie, the prevalence of economic 
values in market societies and the lack of power of social institutions are conducive to 
perceptions of injustice and cynical attitudes towards the law amongst consumers. 
Crime is facilitated under these conditions, especially ―criminal behaviour with an 
instrumental character, behaviour that offers monetary rewards‖ (Messner & Rosenfeld, 
1994, p. 68, 85). 
Roland‘s (2004) and Messner and Rosenfeld‘s (1994) ideas can be summarised in the 
following way: rapid changes in the economy that do not respect the cultural stage lead 
to the disembeddedness of the market with social institutions and institutional anomie 
arises, facilitating dishonest behaviour. This idea can be conciliated with Karstedt and 
Farrall‘s (2006) framework to shed some light on the first research question in this 
dissertation of whether the transition to neo-liberal economies was accompanied by a 
change in economic morality and a rise in consumer fraud. 
Roland‘s (2004) differentiation between fast and slow moving institutions suggests that 
the emergence of unfair practices in the marketplace may be facilitated by a transition to 
neo-liberal markets (fast moving institutions) if these changes are not accompanied by a 
concomitant movement from the slow moving institutions. A rapid economic 
development may lead to the disembeddedness of the market with social institutions and 
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to the suffocation of the values of social institutions by the market values of 
achievement and materialism. This scenario configures a state of institutional anomie 
(Messner & Rosenfeld, 1994; Messner & Rosenfeld, 2010; Rosenfeld & Messner, 1997) 
or market anomie (Karstedt & Farrall, 2004, 2006). If, by contrast, the economic 
expansion proceeds at a gradual pace, the market values can be progressively absorbed 
and incorporated in the values of social institutions. Additionally, a rapid economic 
development brings a cornucopia of opportunities to unethical behaviour that 
accompany neo-liberal markets (Karstedt & Farrall, 2006; Shover, et al., 2003). An 
over-emphasis on materialistic values coupled with augmented opportunities to cheat 
inflames dishonest practices (both from business and consumers). This suggests the 
fourth research hypothesis to be tested with cross-national data:  
H4: Countries with markets economies with higher rates of growth show higher 
prevalence of consumer dishonest practices (paper 2) 
 
2.2: Positional level: Anomie 
A central idea in Karstedt and Farrall‘s (2006) framework is that a syndrome of market 
anomie—expressed by distrust in the market, in the law and in economic agents—drives 
consumer dishonest practices. Anomie is closely connected to the position that 
individuals hold in the social structure as, asserted by the theories of anomie reviewed 
in this section.  
Anomie grasps the idea of failure of social forces to regulate the behaviour of 
individuals in the prescribed direction (Bernburg, 2002). In the next paragraphs, 
theories of anomie by Émile Durkheim (1930) and Robert Merton (1938) are presented. 
The application of anomie to market contexts is discussed within these classical theories 
at the end of this section. 
 
2.2.1: Classical approaches to anomie: Durkheim and Merton 
The main difference between Durkheim‘s (1930)  and Merton‘s (1938) anomie theories 
is that, for Durkheim anomie was generated by industrialization and rapid economic 
growth not accompanied by an adequate progression in social morals able to constrain 
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individual desires. For Merton anomie was driven by an overemphasis on the goal of 
economic success compared to the institutionalized means to attain this goal.  
Durkheim (1930) claims that industrial societies sustain a chronic state of normative 
deregulation of social ends that may lead to anomie of its members. Anomie was 
defined here as the sense of marginality that may be felt within ―normal‖ society 
(Durkheim, 1930). Anomie is seen by Durkheim as the condition for deviant behaviour. 
The state of anomie, which comprises the feelings of alienation and emptiness, was the 
direct result of capitalism in Durkheim‘s assertions. Mechanical solidarity—promoted 
by the division of labor—not only characterized the nature of work, but also defined 
human action in capitalist societies. This situation leads individuals to lose the sight of 
the whole meaning of life. Life-goals become ill-conceived in this way and human 
desires unlimited according to Durkheim. 
Along these lines, the hypothesis that a rapid economic growth would facilitate 
dishonest practices (H4) is partially supported by Durkheim‘s thinking. However, the 
rationale for this hypothesis is provided by Institutional Anomie Theory (Messner & 
Rosenfeld, 2001, 2010) which considers that market values expand to other institutions 
creating a state of anomie. Durkheim and Institutional Anomie Theory diverge in that 
anomie is derived from an over-emphasis on materialistic values, or from unattainable 
materialistic goals, respectively.  
In his seminal study of suicide, Durkheim (1930) gave extensive evidence for the 
hypothesis that economic prosperity (as well as economic recession) would lead to an 
increase in the rates of suicide. He concluded that any other disturbance in the collective 
order would have the same effect. This intriguing finding was explained through the 
concept of anomie generated by disturbance in the social order. Durkheim (1930) 
asserted that if individuals for some reason move upwards or downwards in the social 
structure, the scale of needs and desires would be at odds with the resources available in 
this new condition. Social goals (or economic ideals) are more or less explicit for 
individuals according to the place they are located in the social hierarchy. Here lies the 
positional nature of anomie.  
Individuals whose needs and desires cannot be fulfilled in their current social position 
experience anomie since they would be pursuing ends that are not attainable. Anomie of 
ends would lead individuals to pursue unattainable goals which results in a permanent 
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sense of frustration. The human existence turns out to be, in this situation, a torment. 
Durkheim (1930) used this rationale to explain a different incidence of suicide rates in 
different countries and amongst social groups (Durkheim, 1930).  
For Merton (1957), the source of anomie derived, not from the anomie of ends as 
asserted by Durkheim, but from anomie of means to achieve social ends. Social ends are 
―culturally defined goals, purposes and interests held out as legitimate objects for all or 
for diversely located members of society‖ (p. 186). Merton (1957) considers that market 
economies value self-interest, competition and materialism. As such, individual 
realization is associated with economic success for all individuals, irrespective of their 
position in the social structure. Institutional means, in turn, ―define, regulate and control 
the acceptable modes of reaching out these goals‖ (p. 187).  In his way, both social ends 
and institutional means are determined by society. 
Merton (1957) asserts that if too much emphasis is placed on the social goals, compared 
to the ways these goals can be attained, a state of anomie (or normlessness) arises. 
Anomie drives criminal behaviour because the ―end-justifies-the-means‖ principle 
prevails in anomic societies.  
Institutional Anomie Theory is an extension of Merton‘s anomie theory (1938). 
Drawing on Merton‘s idea of a means and ends incongruence, Messner and Rosenfeld 
(Messner, 1988; Messner & Rosenfeld, 2010) go beyond it to specify the elements of 
culture that originate the imbalance characterized by an over-emphasis on (materialistic) 
goals, that is the disembeddedness of market from social institutions. 
Another idea in Merton‘s framework is that the social structure dictates the extent to 
which deviant behaviour is likely to occur. Because the range of possible institutional 
means is limited by the social structure, individuals in disadvantaged social positions 
aspire for goals difficult to achieve by institutional means. Lower educated or unskilled 
employers, for example, have their way to material success somewhat blocked in market 
economies because they cannot achieve well-paid jobs. Consequently, particularly in 
these social groups, non-institutional strategies to achieve material success would be 
employed. 
Applying Mertonian thinking to market anomie, one can expect that individuals in 
different positions in the social structure would experience anomie differently. The 
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strong emphasis that is placed on material goals in market societies compared with the 
institutional means can lead individuals from disadvantaged positions to engage in 
illegitimate practices.  
 
2.2.2: Moral economy of class 
Contrasting with Mertonian thinking, there is a widespread belief in the literature that 
fraudulent consumers belong to the middle classes. A major example is a study by 
Wilkes (1978), who sought to assess consumer attitudes towards various fraud 
situations, surveying only middle-class respondents. The author justified his choice by 
―general community orientations and indications that certain fraudulent practices are 
most associated with middle-class consumers‖ (p.69). Intuitively, the idea that main 
offenders would be those at the centre of consumer societies seems appealing. But if 
one considers that in most capitalist countries 85 to 90 percent of population falls into 
the middle class (Wright, 1997), this statement remains vague.  
Karstedt & Farrall (2004) also asserted the idea that everyday crimes are concentrated 
among the middle classes
10
 since middle class consumers are at the centre of consumer 
societies. As such, they are the main target for dishonest business practices, as it was 
empirically shown in their study in England, Wales and Eastern and Western Germany 
(Karstedt & Farrall, 2006). Given that victimization referred to business unethical 
practices may result in offending behaviour Karstedt & Farrall (2006) concluded that 
crimes of everyday life would be more prevalent in the middle classes. Middle class 
consumers would also perceive more unfairness about the economy as they feel more 
victimised. Therefore, it can be legitimately concluded that market anomie is more 
ingrained in the middle classes.  
In the same direction, Svallfors (2006) claims that the moral economy may hold 
different perceptions of unfairness of the economy across the social structure. Taking a 
positional perspective, Svallfors (2006) elaborated on the idea of moral economy of 
class to refer to ―ideas held by different classes on the reasonableness and fairness of a 
certain distribution of resources or the ways certain institutions (such as the market) 
                                                          
10 Karstedt & Farrall (2007) used also the expression ―middle class crimes‖ to refer to crimes of 
everyday life. 
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operate‖ (p. 6). These ideas are anchored in common experiences, goals, interests and 
social standards. Aligning with Karstedt and Farrall (2004), it can be predicted that the 
middle classes are more prone to dishonest behaviour because they feel more 
victimised. 
It is not however clear whether consumer fraud is more likely to occur among lower 
class or middle class individuals. Confusion between motivation to behave dishonestly 
and opportunity to do so may also obfuscate the current discussion. Mertonian thinking 
predicts that the motivation to fraudulent behaviour would be higher in the lower 
classes, because individuals would be more exposed to anomie of normative means. 
Karstedt and Farrall (2006) argue that middle class individuals are the target of 
unethical practices by  business and also have more opportunity to behave dishonestly 
(than lower class individuals). 
Empirical studies that directly examine this question are scarce, due possibly to the non-
availabiliy of representative samples in the past. ESS representative samples of 
European countries provide definite answer on this controversy. A fifth hypothesis of 
different rates of consumer fraud in the social structure linked to different economic 
moralities will be tested in this dissertation: 
H5: The prevalence of consumer fraud varies with social class membership (paper 1). 
Merton‘s Theory of Anomie and Social Structure (1938) is formulated at three levels of 
analysis: societal, positional and individual. Anomie is conceptualized at a societal level 
if it is seen as a property of social systems. In anomic societies, the social structure does 
not allow individuals to reach culturally approved goals through normative means. 
Merton names such social structure a ―strained social structure‖. A strained social 
structure explains why some societies are more prone to deviant behaviour than others. 
The de-legitimization of norms resulting from the over-emphasis of goals compared to 
the means to achieve these goals. 
The idea that pressures to behave outside the rules have different intensities across the 
social structure because the lower classes face more restrictions in attaining socially 
valuable goals corresponds to the positional level of analysis. In the next section, a 
theory of deviant motivation based on relative deprivation is presented. This constitutes 
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the individual level of analysis in Merton‘s (1957) Theory of Anomie and Social 
Structure. 
 
2.3: Individual and interindividual level: Consumer morality and dishonest 
behaviour 
 
2.3.1: Relative deprivation 
According to Merton (1957), social forces to disobey the rules rests on the feelings of 
frustration and deprivation that individuals facing restricted opportunities may 
experience. As such, different feelings of deprivation would account for different rates 
of deviant behaviour across social classes. However, this rather simple motivational 
explanation hasn‘t survived to empirical refutation and alternative explanations for 
deviant behaviour have been put forward. For example, control theories tried to explain 
the spreading of deviant behaviour by the attenuation in the strength, effectiveness and 
scope of institutional controls (cf. Messner, 1988). However control theories fail to 
explain different rates of deviant behaviour across social structures. Possibly, relative 
deprivation offers an explanation for deviant behaviour only in strained social 
structures, i.e., in societies where individuals cannot reach institutional goals by 
normative means due to a social structure with fixed boundaries in terms of social 
mobility. The cross-national study of the effect of relative deprivation on deviant 
behaviour and its interaction with country social characteristics would help to clarify 
this question. 
Applying Merton‘s ideas for consumer fraud, it can be hypothesized that relative 
deprivation would fuel dishonest practices in the marketplace. This psychological 
explanation is particularly suited to societies where consumer fraud is uncommon, as it 
applies to deviant behaviour (Merton, 1957). This constitutes the sixth research 
hypothesis in this dissertation. 
H6: Relatively deprived individuals are more likely to engage in fraudulent practices 
(especially in countries where dishonest practices are uncommon) 
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The third research question in this dissertation refers to the identification of a 
psychological mechanism that explains how market anomie would translate into 
fraudulent behaviour. Relative deprivation offers a partial answer as relatively deprived 
individuals, according to Merton (1957), would experience feelings of anomie in market 
societies with strained social structures. But relative deprivation would constitute only a 
motivation for behaving dishonestly. Opportunity and psychological characteristics such 
as attitudes and human values would determine the extent to which motivation would 
materialize in dishonest behaviour. In the next paragraphs, it is provided an account of 
the effect of trust and attitudes in dishonest consumer behaviour. 
 
2.3.2 Trust in institutions 
Fukuyama (1995) defines trust as ―the expectation that arises within a community of 
regular, honest and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the 
part of other members of that community.‖ (p. 26). The positive effects of trusting other 
people on countries‘ political and economic performance are well documented in the 
literature (Fukuyama, 2005; La Porta et al., 1999; Rothstein and Uslaner 2006; Uslaner, 
2002). Countries with higher levels of trust in other citizens show lower levels of state 
corruption (La Porta et al., 1999), lower income inequality (Uslaner, 2002) and higher 
economic development (Fukuyama, 1995). A growing body of literature agrees that 
social trust influences good outcomes in economy and democratic phenomena. Delhey 
and Newton (2005), Fukuyama (1995), Offe (1999), Sztompka (1999), Uslaner (2002) 
and others believe that trust in fellow citizens strongly influences economic success and 
democratic performance.  
Trust in others implies that we assume that other people share our moral principles 
(Uslaner, 2002). We don‘t necessarily have to share the same political ideology or 
religion, we trust others simply because we believe in a common human fate and in a 
synergy of interests. Trust goes beyond identification with the groups we belong, but as 
a supergroup of human beings, trust is what ties us together. By facilitating cooperation 
between strangers (Putnam, 1993), trust simplifies the social world providing that trust 
overrides decisions about cooperation with others. Trust can be built on experiences 
according to the rule that if the others have been trustworthy, we should trust them. But 
as we can trust people we do not know, trust it is not necessarily based on past 
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interaction with others. Rather, it is closer to a cultural value or as Uslaner (2002) puts 
it, a moral foundation.  
Trust in others can assume two basic forms: trust in particular individuals, including 
family and friends and generalized trust in fellow citizens. Uslaner (2002) refers to the 
two types of trust as strategic and moralistic trust and Putnam (1993) refers to these 
types of trust as thick and thin trust, respectively. 
Interpersonal trust lies at the basis of trust in groups, organizations and institutions 
(Offe, 1999). Providing that interpersonal trust facilitates social interaction (Luhmann 
1979, p.28), trust also fosters collective behaviour. By engaging in community and civic 
affairs, citizens look for public interest and build the social institutions upon which 
democracy rests (Zmerli and Newton, 2008). In this case, interpersonal trust transforms 
into institutional trust. Institutional trust refers to legitimate power (e.g., in the 
Parliament), authority (e.g., in the government) or economy (e.g., in the mode of 
production).  
The phenomenon of declining political trust in advanced industrial democracies since 
the last third of the twentieth century is well documented in the literature (e.g., Dalton 
2005). Trust in institutions reflects major events in society such as a war or a political or 
economic crisis. Recent data from Eurobarometer (2010) suggest that trust in markets 
and in political institutions has been undermined as a consequence of the current 
economic crisis in the Eurozone, particularly in the countries more affected such as 
Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal (Roth 2011). As the political and economic 
discourses were directed to the avoidance of a sovereign default to protect the European 
banking sector, the trust in democracy and political institutions was damaged especially 
in these four peripheral countries. The detachment of civic affairs may lead citizens to 
overlook common interest and consumer deviant behaviour may arise. 
H7: Individuals who distrust more in political and economic institutions are more likely 
to engage in fraudulent practices. 
 
2.3.3: Theory of planned (dishonest ) behaviour 
So far, relative deprivation and institutional trust are seen as isolated determinants of 
behaviour. A solution to integrate various individual determinants of behaviour is 
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offered by the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1985). The Theory of Planned 
Behaviour constitutes a psychological mechanism to explain consumer dishonest 
behaviour and can shed light on the third research question of this dissertation—the 
identification of a psychological mechanism to explain consumer dishonest behaviour. 
Based on concepts of attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control and 
intention, the theory captures within the same framework cognitive and motivational 
processes, social influence and contextual specificities. The Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Ajzen, 1985) offers a grid for any kind of intended behaviour, i.e. behaviour 
preceded by intention. As such, it may be efficiently used to explain consumer dishonest 
behaviour. The theory of Planned Behaviour has been successfully used to predict 
dishonest behaviour such as cheating, shoplifting and lying (Beck & Ajzen, 1991). 
Figure 4 depicts the framework for the Theory of Planned Behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1985) 
Attitude is the central element in the theory. Attitude refers to ―a psychological 
tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or 
disfavor‖ (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). In the context of dishonest behaviour, attitude is 
rooted in human values that dictate whether the behaviour is right or wrong.  
The subjective norm is closely linked to the ―perceived social pressure to perform or not 
to perform the behaviour‖ (Beck & Ajzen, 1991, p. 286). In the context of consumer 
dishonest behaviour, it refers to the perceived acceptance of the behaviour by significant 
others and refers to social norms to behave dishonestly. 
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Perceived behavioural control is the ―ease or difficulty of performing the behavior and it 
is assumed to reflect past experience as well as anticipated impediments and 
obstacles‖(Beck & Ajzen, 1991, p. 286). Perceived control of dishonest behaviour is 
related to the existence of psychological or physical barriers to engaging in such 
behaviour. It includes the avoidance of trouble and opportunity. This variable is 
predicted to have an impact on behaviour through its contribution to the formation of 
intention, but is also expected to have a direct impact if the perceived capability 
corresponds to an actual control over the behaviour (Beck & Ajzen, 1991). Perceived 
behavioural control assumes higher importance in the case of dishonest behaviour since, 
it involves elements (such as opportunity) over which the individual has very limited 
control. As noted by Beck and Ajzen (1991), the Theory of Planned Behaviour has a 
good predictive power for the intention to behave dishonestly, but cannot be used 
efficiently for the behaviour itself, as the opportunity is crucial to whether the behaviour 
will take place or not.  
Intention is the immediate antecedent of the behaviour and captures the motivational 
factor of the behaviour (Beck & Ajzen, 1991). According to the theory, contextual 
specificities (e.g., time, money, skills and resources) would determine the extent to 
which intention will materialize in actual behaviour. In the context of dishonest 
behaviour, intention relates to sanction to behaviour and with the likelihood of being 
caught. It can be assumed that if the likelihood to be caught is null, the intention and 
behaviour would correspond.  
Perceived unfairness is not considered in the original Theory of Planned Behaviour but 
it was mentioned by Fukukawa (2002) as an important determinant of ethically 
questionable behaviour. The author defines perceived unfairness as ―the extent to which 
an actor is motivated to redress an imbalance between firms and costumers that is 
perceived as unfair‖ (p. 105). This variable assumes particular relevance in this 
dissertation, as it provides a basis to explain how experiences of victimization turn into 
offending behaviour. This link was empirically tested and supported in Kasrtedt and 
Farrall‘s (2006) study. 
However, the relationship can be in the other direction. Perceived unfairness of 
companies may be exacerbated in order to neutralize the negative feelings arising from 
dishonest behaviour. Neutralization consists of mental strategies to deal with cognitive 
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dissonance in which people downplay the consequences of their behaviour when they 
think back about it (McGregor, 2009). In the same way, the subjective norm can also be 
used as a neutralization strategy of the type ―it is wrong, but everybody does it‖, when it 
comes to reducing cognitive dissonance (Gabor, 1994).  
Another determinant of intention particularly relevant for dishonest behaviour is the 
personal feeling of moral obligation. This variable was added by Beck and Ajzen (1991) 
to the model in the particular case of prediction of dishonest behaviour. This adds a 
moral dimension to the behaviour in terms of its consequences. 
In this dissertation, the Theory of Planned Behaviour is not directly tested, as there is no 
data available for all determinants of behaviour. In this dissertation, is assumed that (1) 
the correlation between attitudes towards consumer fraud (measured by acceptance of 
fraud in paper 3) and the actual behaviour is positive (2) the opportunity to behave 
dishonestly and the perceived likelihood of being caught are powerful determinants of 
consumer fraud. Considering that opportunity and efficacy of legal systems varies 
across countries, a measure of attitude is more accurate than a measure of actual 
behaviour to identify individual level determinants of fraud without the confounding 
effect of opportunity and perception of efficacy of the legal system. 
The position that the Theory of Planned Behaviour is restricted in its explanatory power 
to the actions that involve rational choice is endorsed in this dissertation. When it comes 
to consumer fraudulent behaviour, automatic processing of information should not be 
neglected (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) as it lies beneath quick and therefore 
automatic decisions, for example, whether to keep the extra change from a shop 
assistant. By contrast, other dishonest behaviours such as falsely claiming a government 
benefit may be the outcome of a planned behaviour route of cognitive processing in 
which the motives, the circumstances and the consequences of the behaviour are 
carefully scrutinized.   
 
2.3.4: Moral intensity 
The perspective asserted in this dissertation is that all forms of consumer behaviour 
imply moral decisions. Consumer dishonest behaviour implies, to a greater or lesser 
degree, adverse consequences for business, governments, or other consumers. The 
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moral implications of the particular behaviour may therefore vary. For example, 
keeping the extra change from a shop assistant may be judged as morally neutral: it does 
not bring any major consequences as it is usually a small amount of money nor does it 
directly affect other people. Falsely claiming state benefits may be considered more 
serious, on the other hand, as it implies misappropriation of public money and affects 
the wider society. The concept of moral obligation (Beck and Ajzen, 1991) varies along 
this dimension that grasps the implication of the behaviour for others.  Dishonest 
behaviours that imply more serious consequences, elicit stronger the feeling of moral 
obligation to behave honestly. 
The degree to which a consumer perceives that a purchase/practice demands the 
application of ethical principles is referred to as moral intensity (Izzo, 1997). This 
concept explains why some goods are more prone to ethical consumption than others 
and some unethical practices are less acceptable than others (Vittel & Patwardhan, 
2008).  
Moral intensity depends on a vast array of factors. Moral intensity is higher the more 
time has passed between the action  and the manifestation of consequences of this 
action; the more the consumer expects that the impact will be negative; the more the 
consumer believes that the consequences will actually take place; the closer the 
consumer feels to those who will be affected; the more the consumer believes that a 
large number of people are going to be harmed; and the higher the level of agreement in 
society that that particular behaviour is unacceptable (Jones, 1991; McGregor, 2009). 
The factors affecting moral intensity apply to decisions leading to dishonest consumer 
behaviour. The higher the moral intensity of the behaviour, the higher the moral barriers 
for it and the less likely it is that the behaviour will be performed. 
Moral intensity affects not only actual behaviour, but also judgments of certain 
practices. The Consumer Ethics Scale (Muncy & Vitell, 1992) accesses the seriousness 
of dishonest practices by consumers and business. Based on successive applications to 
various samples, Muncy and Vittel (1992) proposed a typology of consumer ethical 
judgments grouped into four categories: actively benefiting from an illegal activity, 
passively benefiting at the expense of the seller, actively benefiting from a questionable 
action and no harm/no foul. The conclusion of these studies is that consumers judge as 
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more serious practices that fall into the category of actively benefiting from an illegal 
activity (high moral intensity) and less serious those with no harm (low moral intensity).  
The moral intensity is captured in this dissertation by the dimension of active versus 
passive. This categorisation distinguishes between situations in which the individual has 
deliberately initiated the behaviour or merely took advantage of a situation he/she faced. 
The intentionality of the behaviour implies higher moral intensity (intentional 
behaviours are evaluated as more serious). The distinction also brings different 
theoretical and empirical scenarios and its relevance is highlighted in different parts of 
this dissertation. 
In this dissertation, it will be tested whether dishonest practices can be grouped into 
passive and active fraud depending on the occurrence of the behaviour, providing that 
consumer dishonest practices which involve lower moral intensities (passive fraud) are 
more likely to occur. 
This is the eighth research hypothesis:  
H8: Consumer dishonest practices can be grouped into passive and active in all 
countries considered. 
The distinction between active and passive fraud is useful in this dissertation for 
describing the patterns of dishonest behaviour in Europe. Some regularity is observed 
across European countries (cf. paper 1). For example, in developed markets, passive 
practices are more common than in emerging markets. By contrast, in emerging markets 
active fraud is more common than in developed markets. 
From a mere theoretical perspective, it can be predicted that different psychological 
mechanisms underlie passive and active practices. For example, the perceived moral 
obligation (Beck & Ajzen, 1991) appears to determine the behaviour in the case of 
active rather than passive fraud. Active fraud is more linked to deviant nature and all the 
active practices covered in this dissertation are condemned by law in all countries 
(bribing public officials, social benefit fraud, padding insurance and misusing a 
document).  
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2.4: Social mechanism for consumer fraud 
In sections 2.1 to 2.3, the current theoretical framework that explains consumer 
dishonest behaviour and seminal studies were presented; the gaps in the knowledge 
provided by this current framework have been identified; the research questions 
motivated by those gaps have been formulated; and research hypotheses have been 
derived from theoretical and empirical literature. In this section, a summary of research 
questions and corresponding hypotheses is offered and the social mechanism for 
consumer fraud is also presented. 
Based on the gaps identified in the literature, three research questions motivated the 
empirical studies presented in this dissertation. The first research question is whether 
the transition to neo-liberal markets was accompanied by a change in economic morality 
and a rise in consumer fraud (macro-level association). The corresponding hypothesis 
is: 
H4: Countries with market economies which higher rates of growth show higher 
prevalence of consumer dishonest practices (tested in paper 2, ESS data). 
 
The second research problem questions which country contextual factors (social, 
economic and cultural) affect economic morality and the dissemination of consumer 
dishonest practices (transformational mechanism). The corresponding hypotheses are: 
H2: There is acceptance of fraud among consumers in countries with greater income 
inequalities (tested in paper 3, EVS data). 
H3: There is acceptance of fraud among consumers in countries with more perceived 
corruption in the government (tested in paper 3, EVS data). 
 
The third research question relates to the identification of a mechanism that explains 
how a state of market anomie contributes to the emergence of consumer dishonest 
behaviour (psychological mechanism). 
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H6: Relatively deprived individuals are more likely to engage in fraudulent practices, 
especially in countries where dishonest practices are uncommon (tested in paper 2, ESS 
data) 
H7: Individuals who distrust more in political institutions are more likely to engage in 
fraudulent practices (paper 3, EVS data) 
Three additional hypotheses that do not directly test the social mechanisms for 
consumer fraud, but are suited to descriptive purposes, are: 
H1: CME and LME differ in respect to patterns of consumer dishonest behaviour (tested 
in paper 1, ESS data) 
H5: The prevalence of consumer fraud varies with class membership (paper 1, ESS 
data) 
H8: Consumer dishonest practices can be grouped into passive and active behaviour in 
all countries (paper 1, ESS data) 
Integrating diverse theoretical perspectives using European Social Survey and European 
Values Study data predicts that the emergence of unfair practices in the marketplace is 
facilitated by the transition to neo-liberal markets, if these changes are not accompanied 
by a parallel evolution of social institutions.  
This idea is supported by Roland (2004) and Messner and Rosenfeld (2010), who assert 
that a rapid economic development promotes the disembeddedness of the market with 
social institutions. Gradual economic development is built on existing cultural values, as 
materialistic market values are progressively absorbed by values from social 
institutions. If the changes are too quick, they cannot be accommodated by existing 
cultural values and market values will prevail. This leads to an overemphasis on 
materialistic values in society. Sanctions for dishonest behaviour are usually imposed 
by non-economic institutions. As non-economic institutions lose power, moral restraints 
related to dishonest behaviour are lifted by market values. This situation may configure 
a state of market anomie (Karstedt & Farrall, 2006) characterized by distrust in the 
economy and in the economic agents and cynical attitudes towards the law. A rapid 
economic development also brings a cornucopia of opportunities to unethical behaviour 
that encompass neo-liberal markets (Karstedt & Farrall, 2006; Shover, et al., 2003). An 
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over-emphasis on materialistic values, coupled with augmented opportunities to cheat, 
trigger dishonest practices (both from business and consumers). 
A general level of perception of corruption amongst public sector may also lead to 
changes in economic morality. Corruption in public sector is associated with lower 
judicial/legal effectiveness (Kaufman, 2004). By relaxing legal barriers, law compliance 
regarding fraud diminishes. Fraudulent behaviour will be more common in all sectors 
and perceptions of unfairness of the economy will be fostered in society. Thus, there is 
higher acceptance of fraudulent practices in countries with higher levels of corruption, 
because economic morality is poor and law is not effectively enforced. 
Besides the rapid transition to neo-liberal policies and a higher level of corruption, a 
high level of social inequalities can also impact the perception of fairness of the 
economy.  In unequal societies, individuals trust less in the economy and in the 
economic agents, in line with the syndrome of market anomie. As a result, consumer 
fraud is more approved in unequal societies. 
The common denominator of the effect of macro-level factors (disembeddedness of the 
market with social institutions, corruption in the public sector and social inequalities) is 
that by impacting economic morality, the syndrome of market anomie—comprising 
distrust in the economy and economic agents, fear of victimization and cynical attitudes 
towards the law—may arise. Not all individuals hold this constellation of negative 
feelings towards the market to the same extent and those who feel victimized by 
unethical business practices are more likely to experience anomie. Market anomie sets 
the stage for dishonest practices by impacting individual morality and attitudes towards 
dishonest behaviour. 
Social inequalities signal a strained social structure with deep boundaries between social 
classes. Lower class individuals are more likely to feel relatively deprived, especially in 
unequal societies (Merton, 1957). Relative deprivation derives from the impossibility of 
attaining material success by legitimate means (such as high level of education and a 
reputable job). Individuals from lower classes can perceive their legitimate way to 
social ascension blocked by restricted access to education and well-paid jobs. Relative 
deprivation more linked to the lower classes fuel illegitimate ways (such as 
dishonest/criminal behaviour) to achieve material success. This psychological 
mechanism is particularly suited to societies where consumer fraud is uncommon, as it 
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applies to behaviour of a deviant nature (Merton, 1938). Relative deprivation offers an 
account for the emergence of fraudulent behaviour, especially in societies where social 
norms dictate its deviance. 
In societies where consumer fraud is widespread, social norms to behave dishonestly 
dictate practices in the marketplace. The pressure to conform to social norms appears to 
be a sufficient explanation for the occurrence of consumer fraud. When social norms are 
favorable, opportunity seems to be the major obstacle to the behaviour. Social norms 
explain especially the process of expansion of fraudulent behaviour. 
Relative deprivation and social conformism offer an account for the motivation of 
dishonest practices. Opportunity and psychological characteristics such as human values 
(Schwartz, 1992), attitudes (Beck & Ajzen, 1991) and perception of moral obligations 
(Beck & Ajzen, 1991) determine the extent to which motivation materialize in dishonest 
behaviour. Neutralization processes in the form of ―Everybody does it‖ (Gabor, 1994) 
and ―business is unfair‖, legitimate and help individuals to integrate dishonest 
behaviour and determine its continuation.  
In the next chapter, the methodology for testing hypotheses referring to the social 
mechanism with cross-national data is explained. 
61 
 
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
 
A fundamental objective of the social sciences is to describe, explain and predict 
individual and group action and its consequences, as well as the contexts of its 
emergence. Different disciplines such as sociology, psychology, political science, 
anthropology and economics contribute to this sphere of knowledge, mapping the social 
world and informing public policy. 
In the previous theoretical chapter, the theories that offer a contribution to explain 
consumer fraud were discussed and hypotheses derived from those theories were 
presented. The exposition of the theories followed the levels of analysis of Doise (1986) 
of societal (broad social context), positional (position of individual in a group or 
society), interpersonal (interaction between individuals) and intrapersonal (merely 
psychological). These theories belong to the domain of sociology (e.g., Institutional 
Anomie Theory), social psychology (e.g., Theory of Planned Behaviour), psychology 
(e.g., relative deprivation) and political science (e.g., economic morality). 
These disciplines are particularly interested in linking individuals to their broad context. 
For example, sociology has been defined as the ―study of human social life, groups and 
society‖(Giddens & Griffiths, 2006); social psychology is ―the scientific attempt to 
explain how the thoughts, feelings and behaviours of individuals are influenced by the 
actual, imagined, or implied presence of other human beings‖ (Allport, 1985); and 
political science is the ―study of governments, public policies and political processes, 
systems and political behaviour‖ (APSA, 2010). The common denominator of these 
definitions is the mutual effect of individuals and the social contexts formed by other 
individuals, social norms, institutions or political systems. The main distinction between 
them rests on the way individual (micro) and societal (macro) factors are combined to 
explain human action and its manifestations. 
Some of the most famous theorists have straddled different disciplines. Wundt (1904), 
who is one of the founders of modern psychology, wrote a collection of volumes 
(Völkerpsychologie) covering language, society, art, myth and religion, morals and 
culture and also leaded research on experimental physiology. However, the evolution of 
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the social sciences has been marked by the deepening of boundaries between 
disciplines. Nowadays, the scope of each social scientific discipline is well delimited, 
with each having its own theories, topics, methods and institutional traditions.  
The explanatory power of social disciplines is somewhat restricted to the section of 
social reality they focus on. Social phenomena may be analysed through diverse angles 
and their determinants may allude to individual motivations and values, social forces, 
institutional characteristics and economic dynamics. As social disciplines fragment 
social reality, they cannot autonomously provide a complete picture of how individuals 
and social contexts interact. A transdisciplinary approach is therefore desirable, albeit 
more difficult in theory and in practice. 
The theoretical and empirical approaches of this dissertation rest on the assumption that 
theories the social sciences should be integrated in order to provide a better account for 
the phenomenon under analysis, specifically consumer dishonest behaviour. The 
questions of how consumer dishonest behaviour is originated and maintained would be 
better understood if motivational forces that lead to dishonest behaviour (micro 
processes) and social and institutional forces that facilitate or constrain its occurrence 
(macro processes) were combined into a coherent framework.  
The main focus of this dissertation is the integration of these determinants to explain the 
emergence and maintenance of consumer dishonest behaviour by taking into account all 
levels of analysis is. This is done by proposing a social mechanism that explains an 
observed macro-level association with cross-national data. Such macro-level association 
refers to the description of prevalence of consumer fraud in different countries, regions, 
or particular groups, such as social classes. In this dissertation, a social mechanism that 
explains differences in the prevalence of consumer fraud in European countries is 
suggested.  
So far, the social mechanism for consumer fraud considers that social economic context 
(type of market economy and economic growth), level of corruption in the government 
and income inequality are macro-level factors that either prevent or facilitate fraudulent 
behaviour in the marketplace by impacting the individual‘s perceptions of fairness of 
the economy. A syndrome of market anomie comprising distrust in the economy and the 
economic agents and cynical attitudes towards the law predisposes consumers to behave 
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dishonestly. The behaviour materializes when values, attitudes and social norms 
towards it are favorable and opportunity arises (cf. section 2.4.) 
In this section, the methodological approaches to test social mechanisms are discussed. 
The chapter starts by introducing the levels of analysis in the social sciences and 
discusses social mechanisms as a solution to articulate levels of analysis. An example of 
a social mechanism for deviant behaviour is offered by the Theory of Anomie and 
Social Structure (Merton, 1957). This theory is discussed in the context of Coleman‘s 
(1986) proposal for social mechanisms as being the integration of three distinct 
processes (contextual, psychological and transformational), involving variables at 
different levels of analysis. Problems with data and statistical analysis to test social 
mechanisms are discussed and the methodology of the papers included in this 
dissertation is presented. 
The results suggest that social research based on cross-national data is contributing to 
theoretical advancement only within the boundaries of disciplines with very low 
fertilization between theories from different levels of analysis. By bridging theories 
from different disciplines and levels of analysis, an approach based on social 
mechanisms would be more desirable, as it contributes to holistic explanations of social 
phenomena. 
3.1: Levels of analysis in the social sciences 
The diversity of theories and approaches in the social sciences can be classified 
according to the main focus of analysis of social reality. As outlined in the theoretical 
chapter, Doise (1986) identified four types of explanations or levels of analysis in social 
psychology: intrapersonal (merely psychological), interpersonal (interaction between 
individuals), positional (position of individual in a group or society) and societal (broad 
social context). The objective of this systematization is to give some order to the 
multitude of different results produced by socio-psychological experiments and to show 
how some classic studies knit together the four levels.  
Citing classical examples: the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger, 1962) is 
clearly at the individual level; The Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 1977) at the 
interpersonal level; whereas The Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1982) refers to the 
positional level and social representations (Moscovici, 1975) occupies the societal level. 
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Doise (1986) takes a clear multi-disciplinary perspective. He holds that the gulf between 
psychology and sociology—or explanations based on individual or society—may be 
shortened through a clear articulation between levels.  
It is difficult to think about a societal theory that excludes all the other levels.  Social 
representations theory, for example, involves the integration of intra-individual, 
interpersonal and positional levels, given that social representations are knowledge 
structures located in individual minds, that organize individual experience and direct 
individual action (Moscovici, 1975). They are social in the sense that they result from 
communicative processes through the interaction between individuals and they are 
shared by—and give identity to—social groups. They can be abstracted outside 
individual minds to have a collective existence; they are not only anchored in social 
groups, they also establish social cleavages. In this way, the societal level appears to be 
a holistic level that implies the articulation of other levels. This would be the 
appropriate level for a transdisciplinary approach in the social sciences. 
Doise recognized serious epistemological problems concerning the articulations 
between levels. As Doise (1986) puts it, ―some way of articulating these levels needs to 
be invented because social processes can only occur via processes in the individual‖ and 
―the contributions of the individual are affected by the social structure which generates 
and guides individual activities‖ (p.4). He went further, to assert that the articulation of 
levels of analysis should be a topic of research in its own right (p.vii). However, no 
clear general theory of the articulation of explanations was advanced. Doise considered 
that there are as many ways of articulating theories as existing ones. 
Doise‘s levels of analysis draw a rough line between micro and macro analysis of social 
phenomena. Micro analysis employs a bottom-up approach, putting individuals as the 
centre of social reality, whereas macro analysis relies on a top-down approach, starting 
from groups and societies to contextualize human action. Micro theories refer to 
psychological processes. For example, relative deprivation theory (Runciman, 1966) 
explains how the perceived economic situation depends on the positioning of the 
individual in relation to close others and fosters collective behaviour. Macro theories, in 
turn, rely on social forces and institutions that constrain collective behaviour. One 
example is anomie theory (Merton, 1938), which explains deviant behaviour based on 
the concordance of shared materialistic goals and the instrumental ways that are 
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available to individuals to achieve these goals. When societal pressures to achieve 
material goals clash with limited ways to achieve them, a state of anomie arises. Micro 
and macro theories may be intuitively combined: relative deprivation can be the 
motivational force that fosters anomie amongst individuals in the deprived strata of 
society. These types of macro/micro theories are not common in social thinking. Yet, 
macro theories imply certain assumptions about psychological functioning—usually in 
terms of rational action. 
3.2: Bridging the individual and societal levels using social mechanisms 
It is an ambitious task to test hypotheses that combine psychological (micro) and 
sociological (macro) mechanisms integrated through adequate linkages. Within 
sociology, methodological individualism postulates that the ultimate unit of analysis of 
social phenomena is a purposive individual and as such ―social science explanations 
should always include explicit references to the causes and consequences of their 
actions‖ (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998, p. 12). Rather than reducing social science to 
the study of individual processes or attributing an outstanding place to psychology, 
methodological individualism advocates that psychological theories should not be 
disregarded when it comes to explain higher order phenomena such as collective 
behaviour. 
Contemporary analytical sociology (Hedström & Bearman, 2009) also elaborates the 
idea that social facts can be better addressed through the combination of micro and 
macro theories that can be linked together into a coherent framework. This is redolent of 
Merton‘s notion of middle-range theories that explain a class of events instead of 
isolated social facts. The most cited example is the self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 
1957), which explains how a false definition of a situation may cause the expected 
situation to be brought about. If a person expects something to happen, he/she will 
behave in accordance to their expectations, contributing to the definition of the situation 
and provoking involuntarily the anticipated situation. This is an example of a 
psychological mechanism that can be applied to educational, organizational and 
economic contexts. For example, economic growth of a nation may be brought about by 
consumer confidence in the economy. If consumers‘ confidence in the overall state of 
the economy is high, they will spend more, what effectively boosts the economy.  
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The discovery of social mechanisms is an important focus of the social sciences. Social 
mechanisms are defined as ―plausible hypotheses, or sets of plausible hypotheses, that 
could be the explanation of some social phenomena, the explanation being in terms of 
interactions between individuals, or individuals and some social aggregate‖ (Schelling, 
1978, p. 32). A theory may encapsulate several social mechanisms, or several theories 
may summed up into one single mechanism. A social mechanism is expected to be 
found inside a black-box when one moves beyond mere associations between variables 
to explanations for the observed association. In this perspective, hypotheses should refer 
to social mechanisms and statistical testing serves to decide between alternative 
mechanisms, or part of mechanisms, providing an assessment of the underlying theory. 
Social mechanisms articulate explanations across different level of analysis. Coleman 
(1986) proposed a macro-micro typology that conceptualize social action through the 
integration of different social theories defined at different levels. The rationale for this 
model is that effects at the macro-level can be accounted for by how macro-states at one 
point can influence the behaviour of individual actors and how these actions generate 
new macro-states at a later time (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). The figure below depicts 
―Coleman‘s boat‖ (cf. Figure 2) that represents three possible mechanisms. 
A                 D 
 
           B    C   
 
Type I 
Type II 
Type III 
 
Figure 2: Coleman‘s macro-micro model 
 
Element ―A‖ refers to the normative environment (actions of others or environmental 
social conditions); ―B‖ refers to individual norms, beliefs, desires, opportunities or 
habits; ―C‖ refers to individual actions; and ―D‖ refers to emergent social outcomes 
(aggregation networks, extent of action or typical beliefs). Elements ―A‖ and ―D‖ are 
macro-level variables whereas elements ―B‖ and ―C‖ are micro-level variables.  
The arrows between the elements describe associations between those variables that can 
be explained by mechanisms. The association A→B is conceptualized only in 
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descriptive terms. The explanation of the association implies the formulation of the 
three mechanisms (contextual, psychological and transformational). The integration of 
the three mechanisms constitutes the social mechanism that explains why A lead to B. 
Type I (macro-micro) is a situational mechanism that explains how macrolevel 
conditions (e.g., culture or economic dynamics) affect the behaviour of individuals. 
Situational mechanisms have been studied extensively by cultural psychology. For 
example, the transition to neo-liberal markets (A) affects individuals‘ perception of 
unfairness of the economy (B) because the de-regulation of markets implies a 
cornucopia of new opportunities for unethical business practices (Karstedt & Farrall, 
2006). Consumers who are victims of consumer practices feel more victimized and trust 
less in the market and perceive the economy as not being fair. 
Type II (micro) is a purely individual mechanism and evokes beliefs, attitudes, desires 
and opportunities as antecedents of action. It is called action-formation mechanism. 
Social and cognitive psychology occupies this niche of research
11
. Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Beck & Ajzen, 1991) considers that attitudes towards dishonest behaviour 
(B) can predict the behaviour (C) as long as the individual perceives that significant 
others will approve the behaviour (subjective norm) and if the individual‘s moral 
constraints do not impede the behaviour (perceived moral obligation). If these three 
determinants are favorable to the behaviour and if opportunity (low chance of being 
caught) arises, dishonest behaviour will take place. 
Type III (micro-macro) describes how isolated individual actions generate collective 
outcomes, intended or not and it is called transformational mechanism. Amongst the 
social sciences, the discipline most appropriate to unfold transformational mechanisms 
is economics. In its simplest form, a transformational mechanism may refer to the direct 
extrapolation from the individual to the aggregate. In situations where the behaviour of 
individuals depends on the behaviour of other individuals, the pattern of 
interdependencies may originate unintended and not so obvious outcomes.  
The market is the prime example of the outcome of a transformational mechanism: the 
decisions and actions of millions of people (C) seem to be coordinated to create an 
                                                          
11
 It has been noted that in sociological theorizing, micro-level hypotheses are commonly 
justified by a theory of rational action (Opp, 2011), signalizing that insufficient elaboration has 
been devoted to micro mechanisms in sociological theories. 
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economic system characterized by order (D).  Adam Smith (1861) looked at this system 
as if an invisible hand was in command of all the operations. This metaphor 
encapsulates a transformational mechanism (or multiple transformational mechanisms). 
George Katona‘s (1975) efforts to predict economic behaviour at the macro-level based 
on consumers‘ decision-making constitute a remarkable example of theory seeking 
transformational mechanisms. 
In sociology, the issue of how individual norms and preferences translate into culture 
may also be approached by transformational mechanisms. However, the interplay 
between individual and culture tends to be studied in one direction, emphasizing how 
culture influences behaviour (Adamopoulos, 2008). One possible explanation for this is 
that available conceptual models do not offer methodological guidelines as how the 
interaction between individual and society may be studied (Vijver & Leung, 2000).  
By considering the different levels of phenomenon covered by several disciplines within 
the social sciences and the possible articulation between them, the mechanism approach 
takes a step further towards a unified and multidisciplinary approach of the social 
sciences. 
3.3: An example of a social mechanism 
The idea of social mechanisms is illustrated here by the example of the Merton‘s Theory 
of Anomie and Social Structure (Merton, 1957). This theory was formulated at three 
different levels of analysis—societal, positional and intra-individual. Some authors 
(Messner, 1988) assert that this theory comprises two distinct and apparently 
independent theories: a theory of social organization and a theory of deviant motivation. 
Each of these theories encapsulates different mechanisms, as will be explained below. 
In the theory of social organization, Merton (1957) describes a strong social structure as 
one in which the ―social structure allows individuals to reach the cultural approved 
goals through the normative means‖ (Messner, 1988, p. 37). Contrasting with a strong 
social structure, a strained social structure is more prone to deviant behaviour. In this 
context, element ―A‖ in Coleman‘s (1986) scheme is the type of social structure (strong 
vs strained) and element ―D‖ is the rate of deviant behaviour in the lower classes in a 
given society (cf. Fig. 5). The theory predicts that a strained social structure is 
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associated with a higher prevalence of deviant behaviour in the lower classes. This 
constitutes a macro-level association and it is formulated in descriptive terms only. 
 
                  
 
                  
 
Type I 
Type II 
Type III 
 
Figure 5: Social mechanism for deviant behaviour 
The Type I mechanism (contextual mechanism) considers that in a strained structure, 
individuals in disadvantaged positions aspire for goals imposed socially (e.g., material 
success) that are not available by normative means (e.g., a well-paid job). The 
opportunities for achieving the goals are limited by social structure. As such, 
individuals who perceive their way to material success blocked by restricted 
opportunities would feel relatively deprived compared to individuals in more 
comfortable positions. This explanation of how in strained societies individuals may 
feel relative deprivation is an example of a contextual mechanism. This contextual 
mechanism corresponds to the Theory of social organization (Merton, 1957). 
The Type II mechanism (psychological mechanism) explains how individuals violate 
the norms and engage in deviant behaviour.  In market societies, goals are more valued 
than the means that individuals use to pursue them, i.e., the ―end-justifies-the-means‖ 
prevails.  Individuals who feel deprived look for non-normative means to achieve 
material success, such as dishonest practices (deviant behaviour). This mechanism 
corresponds to the theory of deviant motivation (Merton, 1938). 
The Type III (transformational mechanism) explains how individual deviant behaviour 
gives rise to collective deviant behaviour, especially amongst the lower classes. This is 
explained by the idea that the pressures to behave outside the rules are generated at 
different levels across the social structure. Individuals from lower classes are more 
likely to feel relatively deprived due to the feelings of frustration and deprivation that 
individuals facing restricted opportunities experience. Individuals from lower classes 
are then more motivated to violate the norms. This explains different rates of deviant 
Type of social structure 
strong vs strained  
Lower classes‘ 
deviant behaviour 
 Relative deprivation  
 
Deviant behaviour 
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behaviour in the social structure. Deviant behaviour will be fostered in lower classes, 
accounting for this pattern of collective deviant behaviour. 
The next sections discuss various empirical approaches to test social mechanisms. 
3.4: The promise of comparative research 
The importance of comparative research for social sciences has been widely recognized 
in the literature (Hantrais & Mangen, 1996; Harkness, Van de Vijver, & Mohler, 2003; 
Øyen, 1990). The phenomenon of globalization re- shaped the social, economic and 
cultural spheres and thereby expanded social issues and research methodologies beyond 
national borders. As Livingstone (2003) puts it, ―the choice not to conduct a piece of 
research cross-nationally requires as much justification as the choice to conduct cross-
national research‖ (p. 478).  
In a broad sense, comparative research studies particular issues or phenomena in two or 
more countries. This vague notion is associated with the early stages of comparative 
research in which ―ex post harmonized survey agglomerates‖ (Gauthier, 2002) covering 
demographic and behavioural data were analysed for country-contrasts purposes mainly 
by international institutions. Comparative research gained visibility in the 1960‘s 
through the creation of Vienna Centre of Comparative Research, the holding of an 
international conference on comparative research and the publication of the World 
Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Gauthier, 2002). A decade later, a new 
type of cross-national surveys emerged in which the comparative logic was extended to 
research design, implementation, and analysis. 
The more recent methodological literature recommends a more precise definition of 
comparative research confining it to studies in which the comparative aim is explicit in 
all stages and decisions of research. According to Hantrais and Mangen (1996), a study 
can be said to be comparative if particular issues or phenomena are studied in two or 
more countries ―with the express intention of comparing their manifestations in 
different socio-cultural settings, using the same research instruments, either to carry out 
secondary analysis of national data or to conduct new empirical work‖ (p. 1). 
Diverse concepts have been utilized interchangeably with comparative research such as 
cross-country, cross-national, cross-societal, cross-cultural, cross-systemic and cross-
71 
 
institutional, or their equivalents with the prefix ―trans‖ in order to emphasize macro-
level structures. Nevertheless, cross-national research is commonly regarded as one type 
of comparative research in which the nation is used as explanatory unit (v.g. Kohn, 
1987). The legitimacy of the nation as a unit of comparison has been debated from a 
number of perspectives but most specifically, in terms of recognizing cultural or ethnic 
groups (Dowley & Silver, 2005) or even cities and regions (Cheshire, Furtado, & 
Magrini, 1996) as more valid aggregates for comparison. But strong pragmatic 
justifications minimize the debate. Many comparative projects rely on secondary 
national statistics collected by national governments and the interests of research-
funders and policy makers are directed to cross-national comparisons (Livingstone, 
2003). 
In dealing with comparative method it is important to recognize its possibilities. These 
are systematized by Kohn (1987) who mapped a typology of cross-national research 
according to their primary goals. Thus, a nation could be regarded as ―object of study‖ 
when it is focused on the understanding of one country against the backdrop of other 
countries; as ―context of study‖ if the aim is the generalization of theories or within-
country findings; as ―unity of analysis‖ when it seeks a universal theory based in 
systematic relations among measurable dimensions along which countries variy, and 
finally as ―component of a larger international or transnational system‖ if some 
underlying global process is evoked for explaining interrelations of national systems. 
This typology offers a framework for justifying methodological approaches and 
analytical strategies. A useful distinction is highlighted by Van de Vijver (2003): 
structure-oriented studies address questions of equivalence of constructs across cultures 
whereas level-oriented studies are directed at the comparison of average scores.  
It has become a truism that comparative research is not different from other social 
research whose nature is comparative as a matter of principle. From a narrower 
perspective, cross-national research is simply regarded as a more complex kind of social 
research. Kohn (1987) asserts that in cross-national research, ―a much broader range of 
comparisons can be made involving political and economic systems, cultures and social 
structures‖ (p. 725). One of the arguments put forward by those who advocate this 
position is that the rules of inferential statistics apply everywhere and the analytic 
strategies are identical. Others, most notably Grimshaw and Armer (1973) take the 
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position that the complexity of problems posed by cross-national research constitutes a 
qualitative difference that distinguishes it from other types of social research.  
Fragilities of comparative research are assumed by researchers and are largely discussed 
in the specialized literature. The validity of cross-national studies could be seriously 
threatened either by issues of standardization and functional equivalence of measures 
and by generalization constraints due to country selection criteria and within country 
differential sampling procedures.  
In this light, cross-national research stimulates new epistemological challenges and 
encourages the development of specific theories, methods and analytic techniques. Øyen 
(1990) summarized the different possible positions on the topic in a categorization in 
which the individuals that endorse the former position were labelled purists and those 
agreeing with the latter were comparativists. Adopting the comparativist perspective 
requires an awareness of the difficulties in doing comparative studies and recognizing 
the importance of raising questions about the distinctiveness of comparative 
methodology to further developments in the area. 
Methodological advances in comparative research can offer solutions to ever-present 
issues that might be able to be overlooked in national surveys such as conceptual 
variability (Suessbrick, Schoeber, & Conrad, 2000) and non-response rates (Couper & 
De Leeuw, 2003). In turn, developments in cognitive psychology applied to survey 
methods such as cognitive interview techniques (DeMaio & Rothgeb, 1996) and the 
nature of context effects (Schwarz & Sudman, 1995) could be extended to cross-
national research. However, as Harkness et al. (2003) pointed out, findings on cognitive 
survey methods have gone largely unnoticed in cross-national research as well as 
interdisciplinary exchange across other disciplines. At this stage, technical 
improvements and proliferation of international datasets contrast with the lack of 
theoretical frameworks for comparative social research. According to Øyen (1990), this 
state of affairs could be explained through the history of comparative research that is 
traced on commercial and political enterprises distant from academic interests.  
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3.5: Chief problems of bridging data, tools and theory 
Survey data collected in more than one country constitute a fertile ground for testing 
social mechanisms, as it relies on a rich repertoire of multilevel processes and variables 
that account for similarities and differences between countries. In an essay about 
comparative method, Kohn (1987) wrote that: 
 ―Research that treats nations as the unit of analysis requires that one 
be able to discern which of the many differences between countries 
are the pertinent analytic variables; that one be able to formulate 
meaningful hypotheses at the appropriate level of abstraction: and - if 
one is ever to test such interpretations - that one have at hand or have 
the potential to collect data from a sizable sample of countries. It also 
requires much better data than are generally available in multination 
data sources. I hope that an essay on cross-national research written 
ten or twenty years from now will be able to focus much more on such 
research than I believe is warranted today‖ (p. 715). 
International datasets that accumulate information for a number of countries in various 
domains has become widely available over the last decade. The dissemination of 
statistical software and data analytic tools such as multilevel and structural equation 
modelling has contributed to give a new impetus of cross-national research. Different 
disciplines benefit from these advancements, most notably, sociology, social 
psychology and political science. 
Methodological practices related to cross-national research have been discussed and 
improved, with a special concern about achieving and testing measurement invariance. 
Other methodological advancements are the translation of multi-lingual questionnaires, 
sampling from diverse countries, the improving response rate and harmonizion of 
response styles. 
Yet, the recognition of the potential of cross-national data for social research has not 
been fully explored, despite the considerable developments of recent years. The 
hierarchical nature of cross-national data demands models that link individual and 
contextual variables in an explicit theoretical and empirical way. The examination of 
social mechanisms that generate and explain observed associations between variables or 
events should be the desirable approach. But the rule in cross-national studies seems to 
be a variable-oriented approach, with limited explanatory power, that is guided by the 
selection of variables to statistical models (see section 3.6).  
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The modest progress that has been recorded at theoretical and conceptual domains 
within the social sciences contrasts sharply with the increasing sophistication of 
statistical tools, based on the fair belief that they will increase the quality of cross-
national research. But as Van de Vijver & Leung (Vijver & Leung, 2000) noted, there is 
no reason to expect that fundamental theoretical problems are likely to be solved by 
statistical innovations. Theoretical innovations are paramount to exploring the 
interaction of individual and cultural factors, lending support to the claim that the 
building of theory-based empirical models is still a major challenge of cross-national 
research. 
To summarize, we entered in a new era of comparative research, characterized by the 
availability of comparable micro-quantitative cross-national datasets and the 
development of new statistical methods and software for analysing multilevel data. 
Therefore, an alternative methodological approach that combines detailed information at 
an individual level with macro and/or mesovariables at a regional and nation level 
should be adopted in cross-national studies
12
. Thinking multi-dimensionally can 
improve the understanding of within and between countries differences on individual‘s 
choices, opportunities and decisions. The possibilities of interdisciplinary exchanges are 
promising towards a universal social science. 
3.6: Developing tools for testing social mechanisms with cross-national data  
Multilevel modelling is of crucial interest in this dissertation, as it involves statistical 
modelling to examine the relative influence of predictors, considered at different levels 
of analysis, on individual-level variables. Multilevel models are commonly designed 
hierarchical linear models rely on regression modelling of data clustered in any way, for 
example, individuals nested in countries. As multilevel statistical techniques deal with 
the hierarchical structure of the cross-national data, they often considered the most 
suitable statistical tool for this type of research. 
Multilevel models were applied primarily in educational research and extrapolated later 
to organizational and cross-national research. But fundamental differences between 
                                                          
12
 Traditional methods of comparative research are dichotomized in ―case oriented‖ and 
―variable oriented‖ approaches, mirroring qualitative vs. quantitative methods distinction within 
a country. 
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fields of application demand some caution. Whereas random sampling of 
schools/classes or organizations/teams is more or less common, the selection of 
countries depends of convenience criteria. Even if random sampling of all countries 
(about 195 countries in total) was possible (and necessary), the samples exceeding 30 
countries were needed in order to achieve meaningful conclusions.  
Additionally, whereas in educational research the focus is placed on pupils‘ 
characteristics whereas school or class characteristics are secondary, the opposite holds 
for countries. The unit of interest is the country and individual characteristics are 
downplayed. Conclusions about the country are usually more informative to research 
objectives. And, pupils grouped by classes/schools tend to be more homogeneous than 
citizens in countries. Larger theoretical distances between country and citizens (e.g., a 
country is more than the sum of all the citizens) is also expected than between pupils 
and classes/schools. 
Despite all their virtues, the application of multilevel techniques on the domain of cross-
national research poses a number of statistical and methodological problems. Some of 
these problems were already raised by Goldthorpe (1997), in the context of macro-
quantitative research. The statistical requirement of a sufficient number of cases to get 
unbiased estimates is not appropriately met when the units often refer to no more than 
30 countries (the small-N problem). In the globalization era, countries are affected by 
the same external influences and historical paths may overlap, threatening the statistical 
assumption of independence of units (the Galton problem). Also convenience criteria 
are used to select countries instead of random sampling. As a result, country-level 
statistical inference implied by multilevel models is to a certain extent biased and a huge 
debate about this is currently feeding methodological literature.  
The most relevant problem in this dissertation was termed by Goldthorpe (1997), the 
―black box‖ problem. This is the case when there is a direct correspondence between 
statistical and theoretical models. Often, only inputs and outputs are known and 
processes ignored in statistical analysis. A social mechanism is expected to be found 
inside a ―black-box‖ when one moves beyond mere associations between variables to 
explanations for the observed associations.  
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A systematic literature review of the ESS carried out in the context of this dissertation 
(see Annex 1, p.186) with the objective of examining how social mechanisms are 
addressed and generated by cross-national research (based on ESS data) puts in 
evidence the relevance of social research that uses theories from different levels of 
analysis integrated in social mechanisms. The results of this study reveal that cross-
national research is not being efficiently used to develop and test social theories that 
explain how macro-level conditions impact on psychological variables and processes 
and how individual actions combine to give rise to societal phenomena. There is a 
tendency to test theories that involve only one level of analysis, as it is demonstrated by 
the over-emphasis placed on testing psychological mechanisms. The combination of 
different mechanisms (e.g., contextual and psychological) is not a common practice in 
cross-national studies. Transformational mechanisms are not covered by cross-national 
survey research, possibly due to some resistance to test hypotheses using longitudinal 
data. As more waves of ESS are launched, it can be expected that longitudinal studies 
and possibly transformational mechanisms gain terrain in ESS based research. 
Research based on secondary analysis of cross-national data should ideally rest on 
hypotheses derived from social mechanisms and statistical testing should help to decide 
between alternative mechanisms, or parts of mechanisms, providing an assessment of 
the underlying theory. In this dissertation, a social mechanism that accounts for the 
motivations and structural forces that contribute to the initiation and maintenance of 
consumer fraud is suggested. As it is shaped by economic contexts, constrained by 
social forces and expressed through fraudulent behaviour, consumer fraud appears to be 
a suitable topic to explore social mechanisms. 
The social mechanism addressed in this dissertation derives from theoretical reflections 
and empirical testing. In this dissertation, the contextual (macro-micro) and the 
psychological (micro-micro) mechanism were tested based on data from ESS and EVS. 
The effect of macro variables (growth in GDP, perception of corruption and income 
inequality) on the frequency and acceptance of fraud was tested in paper 2 using a 
graphical approach that allows visualizing the effect of relative deprivation on 
frequency of committing fraud; in paper 3 using multilevel modeling (random slopes) to 
test the effect of trust, perception of corruption and income inequality on acceptance of 
fraud. The transformational mechanism (micro-macro) was formulated only in 
analytical terms based on the idea of a critical mass model (Schelling, 1971, 1978). 
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3.7: Methodological approach to the empirical studies 
The empirical studies of this thesis used data from two well-known cross-national 
surveys: the European Social Survey (ESS) and the European Value Study (EVS). A 
brief description of each one of these surveys is offered is the next paragraphs. 
The ESS is a bi-annual repeated cross-national survey. This survey is academically-
driven and it designed to describe and explain ―the interaction between Europe's 
changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of its diverse 
populations‖ (ESS, 2011). All national surveys are based on face-to-face interviews of 
citizens aged 15 or over residents in private households regardless of nationality, 
language, and citizenship. Detailed rules are strictly followed by all national teams, such 
as study-wide targeted response rates of at least 70 per cent and rigorous probability 
sampling. The core modules of this survey include media; social trust; political interest 
and participation; socio-political orientations; social exclusion; national, ethnic and 
religious allegiances; health and care seeking; economic morality; demographics and 
socio economics; family, work and well-being. The following countries participated in 
the survey: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom. Data was captured using computer assisted data interview (CAPI) and 
pen or pencil questionnaire interview (PAPI). A continuing line of research on data 
collection mode has been carried out by the ESS coordinating team, aiming at the 
optimization of the response rate and the quality of data. 
In its second round (2004/05), the ESS provides a rotative module with  questions 
devoted to economic morality, where representative samples of Europeans were asked 
about the frequency of some dishonest practices in the marketplace and government, 
attitudes towards main economic agents, the perception of fairness of the economy and 
victimisation experiences (14203 respondents). Keeping in mind the shortcomings of 
official reports (non-coverage of all cases, underestimation of low-scale fraud, limited 
socio-demographical information and non-comparability across countries), ESS data 
constitutes a valuable contribution to the advancement of the knowledge of consumer 
fraud both from a national and comparative perspective. The survey uses face-to-face 
ESS data was used in Papers 1 and 2. 
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The EVS is a cross-national repeated survey research program on basic human values‖ 
providing ―insights into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values, and opinions of 
European citizens‖ (EVS, 2011). EVS consists of the first attempt to survey EU citizens 
as part of the World Value Study in 1981 and it has been repeated every nine years in an 
increasing number of countries. This survey is intended to shed light on the cultural and 
social changes that are associated with socio-economic development and historical 
factors (EVS, 2011). There are only fixed modules on religion and morality, politics, 
work and leisure, primary relations. 
The EVS uses a multi-state sampling strategy based on regional stratification variables. 
In France, a quota sampling was also used in combination with a random sampling and 
in East Germany a stratified disproportional sampling to allow inclusion in the sample 
of particular groups (EVS, GESIS, 2010). In round four, respondents are 18 or over in 
nearly all countries except Armenia where respondents are aged 15 or over and in 
Finland where respondents are aged between 18 to 74 years. The method of data 
collection was face-to-face interview in nearly all countries expect Finland (internet 
panel) and Sweden (postal survey).  Data was captured using computer assisted data 
interview (CAPI) and pen or pencil questionnaire interview (PAPI).  
Paper 3 uses data of the fourth wave in 2008 covering 47 European countries/regions (in 
total 70,000 people). EVS contains a set of questions related to the fairness of dishonest 
behaviour ranging from not paying a bus fare to a public official accepting a bribe. The 
cross-national differences in the means of law-abiding attitudes were explored in 
relation to trust in political institutions and country level variables (corruption 
perception index and income inequality index) in Paper 3. 
3.8: Methodological issues of survey questions on illegal behaviour 
A primary concern in self-report illegal behaviour is whether the respondents are telling 
the truth. The virtues of self-reporting measures of crime have been highlighted in a 
number of studies (see Thornberry and Krohn, 2000 for a revision) and have been 
considered by Krohn et al. (2010) ―one of the most important methodological 
developments for the last ten years‖ (p. 510). Studies that compare self-reports with 
official data have consistently found high correlations between these two sources of 
information (e.g., Farrall, 2005, Thornberry and Krohn 2003). Other studies (e.g., 
Tourangeau and Smith, 1996), comparing different modes of administration of surveys 
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(face-to-face, telephone, self-completion questionnaire, computer assisted interview), 
have consistently found that the self-administered computer-assisted interviews (CAPI) 
return higher rates of illegal behaviour. Regarding consumer fraud, given the 
acknowledged bias in official records, there is no way to check the truthfulness of 
answers. But considering that the ESS (2
nd
 round) mode of administration involves 
mainly face-to-face interviews and in some countries, ESS teams used CAPI (Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and UK) there are reasons to think that the validity of answers of the 
module of economic morality had benefited to be self-administered (Schwartz‘s Human 
Values Scale is self-completion).  
The measurement validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994; Reis 
& Judd, 2000) of the ESS answers was assessed with comparison with other sources of 
data. The convergent validity of ESS—the degree scores of different operationalizations 
of the same construct converge—was assessed using external measures of other 
questionnaires answering the same questions. In the module of economic morality, the 
questions of ―in the past five years, how often have you bribed a public official‖ was 
compared with a similar questions drawn from the Global Corruption Barometer 
(Transparency International). The predictive validity of this question—the extent to 
which the item can predict a measure external to the scale based on theoretical 
grounds—was also assessed by looking at its association with cross-national indices 
such as Transparency International Perception Corruption Index and World Bank‘s 
Control of Corruption Index (cf. Table 3 in Paper 1). The correlations are significant 
and moderate (ρ(24)=.53/.54) giving some support for convergent and predictive 
validity of this question. 
Despite the virtues of self-reporting of criminal behavior compared with other methods 
of obtaining information, response effects pertaining questions involving recall and 
social desirability should be taken into account. The ESS questions require counting 
events for a reference period of time (5 years).  Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have 
shown that respondents use an availability heuristic to judge the frequency of events 
based on the ease that those events come to their minds. The use of this heuristic does 
not necessarily imply inaccurate answers as more frequent events are indeed easier to 
retrieve from the memory. However, other factors such as the emotional intensity 
attached to the event, and the temporal dimension may also influence the easiness to 
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recall with possible biases in answers (Sudman, Bradburn & Schwarz, 1996). 
Additionally, respondents may forget events or some details (omission) or even may 
recall events that did not happen (comission) (Gaskell, Wright, & O‘Muircheartaigh, 
2000). 
A well-documented bias in survey answers is telescoping, i.e., a temporal displacement 
of an event that it will be reflected into reporting an event as happened earlier than 
actually did (backward telescoping) or more recently (forward telescoping) (Gaskell, 
Wright, & O‘Muircheartaigh, 2000). The highly salient events as temporal markers used 
in survey are called ―landmark events‖ and they can assume the form of ―how many 
times has the target event occurred since ___?‖. The problem with this question is that 
the events outsides the boundary may be telescoped into the mentioned period (see 
Gaskell, Wright, & O‘Muircheartaigh, 2000 for a revision). However, this bias does not 
appear to be problematic in a cross-national study aimed at explanation as opposed to 
description. Considering that telescoping is a psychological phenomenon that does not 
depend on culture, there are reasons to think that it has a uniform effect across countries 
either by overestimating or underestimating the answers. 
Social desirability is a source of bias in surveys, originated by the preference for 
answers that conform to the social norms. Social desirability has been studied in a wider 
range of sensitive topics from drugs-abuse, deviant behavior, sexual behavior or 
financial behavior (see Wentland, 1996 for a revision). From a cross-national 
perspective, social desirability is an issue because it stems from cultural differences in 
response styles. If respondents in some countries are more prone to social desirability 
compared with other countries, differences in country averages may reflect this 
tendency rather than actual differences in behaviour or attitudes. Response styles can be 
defined as ―consistent and stable tendencies in response behaviour that are not 
explicable in terms of question content or what a given question is aimed to measure‖ 
(Harkeness et al., 2010). Response styles include response patterns characterized by the 
mid-point of an answering scale (middle category responding), and endpoints of the 
scale (extreme responding), usually the positive one (acquiescence).  
The response styles are believed to be dependent on cultural factors affecting 
communication and cognition processes. The empirical literature aimed at identifying 
cultural differences in response styles provides inconsistent findings. Despite the 
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contradictory results in a large number of studies, some factors affecting the response 
styles appear to have a robust effect. For example, acquiescence appears to be 
negatively correlated with education and positively correlated with age (Winkler et al., 
1982: Greenlaf, 1992, Watsom, 1992). Extreme response categories seem to be picked 
by respondents who seek clarity and precision and are willing to express their opinions 
(Johnson et al., 2005). From a societal level, a study from Hemert, Vijver and Georgas 
(2001) found that the likelihood to lie measured by the Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire (Lie Scale) was negatively correlated with the Gross National Product 
and other wealth indices. Other authors (Baumgartener and Steenkamp, 2001) have 
pointed to a clear divide between Northern and Southern Europe with higher tendency 
to acquiescence and extreme responding in the South. Studies employing Hofstede‘s 
cultural dimension of individualism vs. collectivism (Smith, 2004; Smith and Fisher, 
2008) suggested that countries low in individualism show more acquiescence especially 
in questions addressing personal issues (for a review, see Harkness, 2010). 
Response bias cannot be eliminated but it should be taken into account by improving 
the wording of questions, instructions, and answering scales in order to minimize or 
even quantify the manifestations of the tendencies to answer in a certain way. For 
example, acquiesce and extreme response may be detected by balancing positive and 
negative items or mixing items from non-related topics and middle category responding 
may be dealt with by using even point scales (De Beuckelear, Weijters, &Rutten, 2010 
for a revision). A desirable option would be to quantity the effect of response styles by 
developing measures to detect them. For example, social desirability may be measured 
by introducing some items in the questionnaire related to lying and managing positive 
impressions, for example drawn from the Lie Scale of the Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire (1975) or a Self-presentation scale (Lee et al. 1999). The stylistic 
response could be in this way quantified and partialled out from the analysis, adjusting 
the country averages. Certainly more investigation is needed in the field of cross-
national variations of response styles to assess the impact of bias and enhance the 
quality of cross-national data.  
The development of cross-national indicators of response styles would be a significant 
undertaking. However, given the number of cross-national surveys and the range of 
topics in focus, a collective effort in this direction would have longer term value.  
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
The three papers are included in this dissertation: 
Paper 1: Crimes of everyday life across Europe. 
Lopes, C. A. (2009). Economic morality and crimes of everyday life. In L. Sousa (Ed.) 
Ethics, the state and the economy: Attitudes and practices of Europeans. Lisbon: 
Institute of Social Sciences (available in Portuguese).  
 
Paper 2: Consumer morality in times of financial hardship: Evidence from the European 
Social Survey. 
Lopes, C.A. (2010). Consumer morality in times of economic hardship: Evidence from 
the European Social Survey. International Journal of Consumer Studies, 34(2), 112-
120.  
 
Paper 3 Revisiting the inequality trap: A multilevel model for the acceptance of fraud 
against the state. 
 
In Table 1, the structure of the empirical work is presented, with the relevant links 
between the initial questions, the research problems, the social mechanisms, papers and 
databases used to address the initial questions. The distinction between initial questions 
and research questions lies in the nature of the problem, as initial questions include 
description (first three initial questions) and research questions are limited to 
explanation. 
The research questions are linked together in a social mechanism. Specific research 
problems overlap with the particular mechanism that composes the overall social 
mechanism. The first research problem is whether the transition to neo-liberal markets 
was accompanied by a change in economic morality and a rise in consumer fraud. The 
second research problem questions which country contextual factors affect economic 
morality and the dissemination of consumer dishonest practices. The third research 
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problem relates to the identification of a psychological mechanism that explains how a 
state of market anomie contributes to the emergence of consumer dishonest behaviour. 
Table 1: Correspondence between theoretical problems and empirical studies 
Initial questions Research questions Mechanism Paper Database 
Who are the consumers that 
engage in fraudulent 
practices in the marketplace? 
Description No mechanism  1 ESS 
Where are they placed in the 
social structure? 
Description No mechanism 1 ESS 
Which is their distribution 
across Europe? 
Description No mechanism 1 ESS 
Which are their motivations, 
social values and attitudes 
towards institutions, social 
order and the economy? 
Research question 3 Psychological 
mechanism 
 
2, 3 ESS and EVS  
 
Which country 
characteristics facilitate the 
emergence of fraudulent 
practices amongst 
consumers? 
Research question 1 
and 2 
Contextual 
mechanism 
 
2, 3 EVS and ESS 
How these characteristics 
interact with specific 
individual motivations and 
attitudes to give rise to 
fraudulent practices? 
Research question 2 Contextual 
mechanism 
 
2 ESS 
84 
 
PAPER 1 
Crimes of everyday life across Europe 
Evidence from the European Social Survey 
Abstract 
The broad distinction between street crime and white-collar crime leaves unexplored the 
terrain occupied by crimes committed by common and law abiding citizens in the 
course of their everyday lives. Our knowledge based in the prevalence of everyday 
crimes is weak, partly because until recently self-report statistics for the occurrence of 
everyday crimes in Europe were non-existent and partly because official statistics 
provided by national bodies and agencies suffer from serious methodological problems. 
Drawing upon survey data of everyday crimes was available for the first time only in 
the second round of the ESS (2004), this paper constitutes the first attempt to map the 
occurrence of crimes of everyday life in Europe based on ESS probabilistic samples of 
26 European countries. Comparable figures for the frequency and types of crimes of 
everyday life in particular countries, clusters of countries (developed vs emerging 
market economies) and social classes are presented. The results indicate that European 
citizens occasionally engage in crimes such as paying cash in hand to avoid VAT and 
keeping extra-change from a shop assistant. In the countries considered, nearly half of 
the population has engaged in any sort of dishonest practice in the last five years. A 
major distinction between active and passive fraud separating dishonest practices 
initiated or not by the person emerges for all countries, comprising the same core 
practices (H8). Cross-country comparisons reveal that passive fraud is more common 
than active fraud in all countries, albeit countries differ in respect to the prevalence of 
specific practices. Considering clusters of countries, passive fraud is more common in 
developed compared to emerging market economies. By contrast, active fraud is more 
common in emerging compared to developed market economies (H1). A multilevel 
regression for modelling the likelihood of committing passive and active fraud suggests 
that passive fraud is linked to higher classes but active fraud does not vary with social 
class (H5). Directions of research aimed at explaining these patterns are proposed and 
discussed. 
Keywords: crimes of everyday life, consumer fraud, cross-national research, European 
Social Survey 
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Introduction 
Just as in social and political debate about crime, the focus in criminological theory is 
often on crimes of the street and crimes of the suite (Karstedt & Farrall, 2006): this 
focus , on sensational and volume crimes (e.g., murder, burglary, rape) and white-collar 
crimes (e.g., corruption), leads to a false polarity between law-abiding citizens and 
criminal offenders. Attention is diverted away from the more complex reality in which 
we are all capable of committing relatively low-level criminal acts (Karstedt and Farrall, 
2006). Practices as ‗padding‘ an insurance claim, or paying cash to avoid VAT for 
services, or illegal downloading are part of everyday lives; they may be committed by 
respectable citizens that occasionally break the law (Karstedt and Farrall, 2006).  
This paper constitutes the first assessment of the patterns of everyday crime in European 
countries. Relying on data from European Social Survey (ESS, 2
nd
 round, 2004/05), this 
paper aims to (1) characterize the patterns of occurrence of consumer fraud in European 
countries; (2) test whether a distinction between active and passive fraud can be 
generalized across countries (H8); (3) characterize the patterns of occurrence of 
consumer fraud in clusters of countries with different market economies (H1); and (4) 
provide cross-country evidence to establish a link between class membership and crimes 
of everyday life (H5) as suggested by previous studies (e.g., Karstedt & Farrall, 2007). 
The novelty of this study lies in the attempt to draw inferences— based on random 
samples of 26 European countries—about the extent to which different social groups, 
countries and clusters of countries report different levels of offending behaviour. 
The results presented here clearly indicate that crimes of everyday life are widespread in 
Europe. In the 26 countries considered, nearly half of the population has engaged in any 
sort of dishonest practice in the last five years. The configural equivalence (Fontaine, 
2008) of the distinction between active and passive fraud for all countries was 
established using latent class analysis on items which assess the frequency of everyday 
crimes in the last five years. Active fraud includes practices where the individual 
actively initiated the dishonest behavior (e.g., false insurance claim) whereas passive 
fraud relates to practices where the individual was faced with a situation (e.g., giving 
extra change) and took advantage from it (keeping extra-change from a shop assistant).  
Drawing on results from latent class analyses, three groups/clusters of consumers were 
identified for all countries. The first cluster corresponds to no/low offenders who show 
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a low propensity to engage on passive fraud (active fraud is unfeasible); the second 
cluster groups passive offenders who show a moderate to high propensity to engage in 
passive fraud, but active fraud is very unlikely; and the third cluster consists of 
offenders with a moderate propensity to engage in active fraud and a high propensity to 
engage in passive fraud. 
In all countries, the group of low frequency offenders is the largest (between 68.1 and 
83.9 percent of population), suggesting that the majority of Europeans only occasionally 
engage in some type of passive fraud but are very unlikely to engage in active fraud. 
The group of active offenders is the smallest in all countries (4.1 percent maximum in 
Ukraine) and it delimits career criminals that commit the heaviest offences repeatedly 
(e.g. falsely claiming benefits or insurance). 
The results also suggest that passive fraud is more common in developed than in 
emerging market economies. By contrast, active fraud is more common in emerging 
compared to developed market economies. The results also put in evidence that larger 
economies, i.e., with a higher GDP, are more vulnerable to passive fraud. Finally, this 
paper shows that in all countries considered, active fraud is not linked to social class but 
passive fraud is well disseminated in higher classes.  
This paper starts by definitional issues of crimes of everyday life, providing some 
examples and a typology for crimes. Available figures for everyday crimes drawn from 
official sources and from the study of Karstedt and Farrall (2007) are compiled. A brief 
presentation of the ESS (round 2, 2004) and evidence for validity of ESS data based on 
comparison with other surveys is presented. The results disclose the patterns of 
everyday life in different countries, clusters of countries (developed vs emerging market 
economies) and in social classes (service, middle and lower classes). This paper draws 
for the first time a complete picture of the occurrence of crimes of everyday life in 
countries across Europe. 
 
What Sorts of Crimes are „Everyday-Life Crimes‟?  
Following Karstedt and Farrall (2006), ―crimes of everyday life‖ are referred to as the 
type of  activities that are part of common people experiences (either as offenders and as 
victims). As such, they are often treated as mundane or  part of the routine in modern 
societies. These activities are morally dubious, running in some way counter the 
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expectations of ‗fair play‘. Often, but not necessarily, they are crimes, or they are at the 
very least, on the cusp of criminality. 
These class of crimes include—but are not limited to—paying cash in hand to 
circumvent taxes, selling something faulty in second hand and concealing its faults,  
speeding whilst driving, illegal downloading, cheating in school, or university 
coursework. All involve some form of dishonesty. All transgress criminal codes or 
breach copyright laws. The seriousness of these practices and their criminal relevance 
justify the classification into active and passive fraud, depending on whether the 
consumer actively initiated the behaviour or if he/she merely took advantage of a 
situation faced. 
The division into active vs passive fraud was inspired on research in the field of 
consumer ethical judgments by Muncy and Vittel (1992). The authors developed a scale 
of seriousness of dishonest practices in business and retail—the Consumer Ethics 
Scale—which was applied to various samples in different countries. The authors have 
empirically shown that consumer ethical judgments were based on three dimensions: the 
locus of the fault (consumer vs business), the presence of deception from the part of the 
consumer and the degree of harm caused. From the combination of different levels of 
these dimensions, the authors proposed a typology of morally dubious behaviours: (1) 
actively benefiting from an illegal activity; (2) passively benefiting at the expense of the 
seller (3) actively benefiting from a questionable action and no (4) no harm/no foul.  
In the context of the ESS data, keeping extra change from a shop assistant is an example 
of passively benefiting at the expense of the seller (passive fraud), selling something 
second-hand and concealed its faults is an example of actively benefiting from a 
questionable action (active fraud) and offering favour/bribe to public official for service, 
an example of actively benefiting from an illegal activity (active fraud). The main 
conclusion of Muncy and Vittel (1992) studies is that consumers judge as more 
acceptable benefiting passively rather than actively from an illegal activity. The 
intention determines the condemnation of behaviour: the behaviour is unethical when 
deliberately initiated by the consumer. The illegality of these practices is also a relevant 
dimension for judgement: an illegal activity is always seen as more wrong than a 
―deceptive legal‖ (Muncy and Vittel, 2005). 
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What are the figures for „Everyday-Life Crimes‟?  
The costs of crimes of everyday life are commonly underestimated. They tend to be 
seen as victimless. They also involve small sums of money compared to other types of 
crimes, but as Karstedt and Farrall (2006) note, while the average ‗law-abiding‘ citizens 
who commit them do not think of them as harmful, such acts stack up to considerable 
damage. In the UK, the estimations of the extent of fraud suggest that these activities 
are more common and involve higher costs than other types of crimes. 
For example, the UK‘s Department of Work and Pensions (which provides UK citizens 
with social security) estimated that in 2010, 2.1 percent of total expenditure across all 
benefits are due to fraud resulting in £3.1bn being defrauded from the British taxpayer; 
for income support alone the figure is £480m which corresponds to 5.7 percent of 
income support expenditure attributed to fraud (HMRC, 2010). The Association of 
British Insurers estimated that every day insurers detect 335 fraudulent claims worthing 
£3.2 million. Dishonest home insurance is the most common with 170 cheating 
householders caught every day, but fraudulent motor claims are the most costly with 
£1.12 million exposed every day. The costs for private individuals is a £44 extra added 
to the average UK‘ household‘s annual insurance bill to compensate the costs of fraud 
(ABI, 2010). 
Officially recorded data depict an incomplete figure of crimes of everyday life due mainly 
to the undecoverage of crimes with low consequences that are more likely to be filtered 
out in detection procedures. The virtues of self-report data on crime have been underlined 
in several studies (see Thornberry and Krohn 2000 for a revision) by consistently showing 
higher and more realistic figures of crimes than official records based on conviction and 
detention. Studies relying on self-report measures of crime in diverse countries are crucial 
to inform the extent to which European population engage in crimes of everyday life. A 
study by Karstedt and Farrall (2007), drawing upon data from England, Wales, East 
Germany and West Germany, stands as the only attempt so far to characterize crimes of 
everyday life from a cross-national standpoint. This study inspired the ESS module on 
economic morality which comprises a set of questions of the frequency of committing 
several crimes of everyday life in the past five years. As such, the present paper appears 
to be the first attempt to characterize crimes of everyday life from a cross-national 
perspective. 
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Who commits „Everyday-Life Crimes‟?  
Prior demographic characterization of offenders and considerations about their placement 
on the social structure has been based on studies with relatively low quality of data. These 
studies consistently depart from the assumption that the authors of fraudulent practices 
belong to middle classes. A prime example is Wilkes (1978) who, in a seminal study in 
the field, assessed consumer attitudes towards various fraudulent situations and only 
middle-class respondents were surveyed. The author justified his choice by ―indications 
that certain fraudulent are most associated with middle-class consumers‖ (p.69). This first 
study contributed to cast the unfounded belief that middle class consumers were the focal 
group of crimes of everyday life. 
The sate-of-the-art on dishonest consumer practices haven‘t changed much since Wilkes‘s 
study. The idea of middle-class offenders gained support in a study by Karstedt and 
Farrall (2006) who surveyed in 2002, 1807 respondents in England and Wales aged 
between 26 and 65. The evidence provided by Karstedt and Farrall (2006) is that 61 per 
cent of respondents had committed at least one out of a list of offences against business, 
government and/or employers at work. This group of respondents was identified as high 
social strata, well educated, with high incomes and more likely to be employed. But a 
conclusion in terms of social class is excessive since the distribution of crimes of 
everyday life across social strata was not addressed directly in Karsted and Farrall‘s 
study.  
In the second round of the European Social Survey (ESS) it is included for the first time 
self-reported data on the frequency crimes of everyday life in national representative 
samples of 26 countries. The objective of the ―economic morality‖ module was to 
describe and explain the consumer involvement as offenders in an array of illegal and 
unethical practices in different spheres of consumption (include government services).  
These unethical practices encompass keeping the change from a shop assistant or waiter 
knowing they had given you too much; paying cash with no receipt to avoid VAT other 
taxes; selling something second-hand and concealed its faults; misusing/altering 
card/document to pretend eligible; making an exaggeration or false insurance claim; 
offering favour/bribe to public official for service; falsely claiming government benefits. 
The availability of ESS data and their potential to fill the empirical gap about the 
distribution of crimes of everyday life across Europe and across social structure was the 
motivation for this paper.  
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Method 
Data 
The data used in this study is the rotative module on economic morality available in the 
second round of the ESS (2004). The ESS is ―an academically driven social survey 
designed to chart and explain the interaction between Europe changing institutions and 
attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations‖ (ESS, 2002). The 
biennial survey was established in 2002 and currently covers 30 nations. The 
methodological excellence is one of the major distinguishing characteristics of this 
survey achieved by the adoption of uniform methodological standards in all stages of 
research. All national surveys are based on face-to-face interviews of citizens aged 15 or 
over and detailed rules are strictly followed by all national teams, such as study-wide 
targeted response rates of at least 70 per cent and rigorous probability sampling. The 
questionnaire contains core modules
13
 repeated in every round and rotative modules, 
round-specific. The questions on frequency of crimes of everyday life (questions E24-
E30) were asked of 45681 respondents in 26 European countries. The samples size and 
average non-response per country are depicted in Table 1. 
Table 1: Samples sizes of ESS countries (2
nd
 Round) and average non-response 
rate (%) of items E24 to E30  
Country N Non 
resp. 
 Country N Non 
resp. 
 Country N Non 
resp. 
Austria 2256 8.5  Hungary 1498 15.1  Slovakia 1512 9.5 
Belgium 1778 2.4  Iceland 579 4.1  Slovenia 1442 4.1 
Czech Rep. 3026 11.6  Ireland 2286 5.3  Spain 1663 3.8 
Denmark 1487 11.1  Italy 1529 51.8  Sweden 1948 3.2 
Estonia 1989 34.9  Luxembourg 1635 4.6  Switzerland 2141 2.6 
Finland 2022 3.6  Netherlands 1881 0.7  Turkey 1856 17.9 
France 1806 0.2  Norway 1760 1.4  United Kingdom 1897 1.3 
Germany 2870 8.8  Poland 1716 19.2  Ukraine 2031 18.6 
Greece 2406 8.1  Portugal 2052 12.0  Total 45681 10.2 
 
The specific wordings are: 
How often, if ever, have you done each of these things in the last five years? 
                                                          
13
 The themes covered in the core modules are: trust in institutions, political engagement, socio-
political values, moral and social values, social capital, social exclusion, national, ethnic and 
religious identity, wellbeing, health and security, demographic composition, education and 
occupation, financial circumstances and household circumstances. The other two rotative 
modules in the second round are ―family work and well-being‖, and ―opinions on health and 
care seeking‖. 
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...kept the change from a shop assistant or waiter knowing they had given you too much?(E24) 
...paid cash with no receipt so as to avoid paying VAT or other taxes?(E25) 
...sold something second-hand and concealed some or all of its faults?(E26) 
...misused or altered a card or document to pretend you were eligible for something you were 
not?(E27) 
...made an exaggerated or false insurance claim?(E28) 
...offered a favour or bribe to a public official
14
 in return for their services?(E29) 
...over-claimed or falsely claimed government benefits such as social security or other 
benefits?(E30) 
The answering options are (1) never, (2) once, (3) twice, (4) three or four times and (5) 
five times or more. The additional answer categories ―no experience‖, ―don‘t know‖ and 
―refuse‖ are also available in the questionnaire.  
These questions were piloted in the UK and Poland as part of the development of ESS 
round two. These questions tap some of the most common everyday crimes in the 
market place and deal with situations in which the respondent may have offended 
against the state (i.e. taxation), private citizens (second hand sales), large firms 
(insurance claims), as well as smaller firms, with possible consequences for individual 
members of staff (shop assistants). The forms of crimes referred to include deliberate 
attempts to conceal (second hand sales), collusion (paying cash in order to avoid paying 
VAT), ‗good fortune‘ (being given too much change), deliberate attempts to derived 
financial gain (insurance) as well as attempts to gain access to services (misusing cards 
or documents and paying bribes) which one was not entitled to. In terms of the modus 
operandi of the crimes, these ranged from face to face cheating, to cheating via paper 
work, to defacing of documents. In short, almost every conceivable form of cheating in 
the market place and every commonly available technique for so doing was mentioned 
(Karstedt and Farrall, 2004).  
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Respondents were advised that ―Public officials‖ refer to government officials, such as 
custom officers and to local officials and housing/building regulators etc. 
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Results 
Quality of data 
Non-response rates by country for items E24-E30 are presented in Table 1 (p.91). Table 
2 displays descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum e maximum) and 
confidence intervals for non-response rates discriminated by item in the total ESS 
sample. 
It is clear from Table 1 and 2 that non-response rates vary noticeably among countries. 
The item E25 displays a higher non-response rate (in average, 12.0 per cent) and the 
item E27 a lower non-response rate (in average, 9.7 per cent). In Italy, the average non-
response rate surpasses 50 per cent what demands some caution in interpretation of 
results for this country. In other countries (e.g., the Czech Republic and the UK) the 
answer category ―no experience‖ was not available what may have contributed to 
increase non-response in those particular countries. 
 
Table 2: Non-response rate (%) for items E24 to E30 in the total sample [N = 45681] 
How often, if ever, have you done each of these 
things in the last five years? 
Min Max Mean SD 
Conf. Interval (95%) 
Lower Upper 
E24 
kept the change from a shop assistant or 
waiter knowing they had given you too 
much? 
0.6 52.6 9.9 
a 
2.30 5.1 14.6 
E25 
...paid cash with no receipt so as to avoid 
paying VAT or other taxes? 
0.7 53.2 12.0 
abcd 
2.46 6.9 17.1 
E26 
...sold something second-hand and 
concealed some or all of its faults? 
0.6 53.2 11.2 
fgh 
2.38 6.3 16.1 
E27 
...misused or altered a card or document 
to pretend you were eligible for 
something you were not? 
0.5 51.9 9.7 
bf 
2.30 5.0 14.4 
E28 
...made an exaggerated or false insurance 
claim? 
0.5 52.1 10.7 
bi 
2.38 5.8 15.6 
E29 
...offered a favour or bribe to a public 
official in return for their services? 
0.5 51.8 9.8 
cgi 
2.27 5.1 14.5 
E30 
...over-claimed or falsely claimed 
government benefits such as social 
security or other benefits? 
0.1 31.5 9.8 
dh 
2.25 5.1 14.4 
 Note. Means whose index holds at least one letter in common differ statistically according to 
Bonferroni test. 
 
In order to assess the validity of ESS data, the question E29 (How often if ever, have 
you offered a favour or bribe to a public official in return for their services?) was 
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compared against a similar question drawn from Transparency International Global 
Corruption Barometer (GCB, 2005: ―In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living 
in your household paid a bribe in any form? Yes/No”). Additionally, the question was 
also checked against measures of corruption, namely Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and World‘s Bank Control of Corruption Index 
(CCI). Table 3 displays the rankings of countries based on these questions and indices. 
 
Table 3: Country rankings of E29 (ESS), P5 (GCB), CPI and CCI 
Country ESS GCB CPI CCI  Country ESS GCB CPI CCI 
Austria 15 13 8 7  Luxembourg 14 13 8 11 
Belgium 6 - 14 13  Netherlands 3 - 7 7 
Czech Rep 8 18 20 21  Norway 5 18 6 6 
Denmark 20 5 3 3  Poland 23 5 23 23 
Estonia 24 - 16 17  Portugal 19 - 17 16 
Finland 10 11 1 2  Slovakia 17 11 21 20 
France 1 9 12 14  Slovenia 12 9 18 17 
Germany 16 9 11 10  Spain 9 9 15 15 
Greece 18 16 22 22  Sweden 11 16 4 5 
Hungary 21 - 19 19  Switzerland 6 - 5 4 
Iceland 3 5 1 1  Ukraine 22 5 24 24 
Ireland 12 3 12 12  UK 1 3 8 9 
ESS, GCB, CPI rankings: 1 (lowest corruption index) – 24 (highest corruption index 
CCI Ranking: 1 (highest control of corruption index) – 24 (lowest control of corruption index) 
These results provide enough evidence for good quality of data of ESS for question 
E29. Spearman correlation coefficients for testing the association between ESS question 
E29 and CPI [ρ(24)=.53] and CCI [ρ(24)=.54] are significant at 0.01 level. However, 
the Pearson correlation between the ESS question E29 and the corresponding GCB 
question is not significant [r(18)=.40, p>.05]. Association of GCB ranking with CPI 
[ρ(18)=.46, p=.056] and CCI [ρ(18)=.45, p=.063] rankings are tendencially significant 
but with slight lower magnitude than with ESS. The stronger association of ESS 
question with corruption indexes strengthens the confidence in the quality of ESS 
question. 
 
Distribution of crimes of everyday life in European countries 
The patterns of occurrence of crimes of everyday life are presented in Figure 1 and 
Table 4 separately for each practice. Figure 1 represents the means for each practice in 
every country and should be interpreted according to the rule that lighter cells mean 
lower average values and darker cells higher averages. Table 4 shows the 95 percent 
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confidence interval of the percentage of respondents in each country who admitted 
having committed each one of the practices at least once in the past five years. The last 
two columns in the table show the confidence interval for the percentage of respondents 
who reported at least one of these crimes at least once in the past five years, having 
some respondents done all sort of dishonest practices while others committed only one 
or two once or repeatedly. The complementary percentage of respondents that sums up 
to one hundred refers to those who have never engaged in these practices in the past five 
years. 
 
Figure 1: Heatmap representing the countries‘ means of keeping extra change from a 
shop assistant (kchange) paying cash with no receipt (noreceipt), cheating on second 
hand sales (shsales), misused or altered an ID card (idcard), falsely claiming insurance 
(insurance), bribing a public official (bribing) and falsely claiming government benefits 
(govbenefit). 
 
The heatmap shows a clear divide between the first two practices and the other five, 
lending support for the distinction between passive and active fraud based on empirical 
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grounds. Passive fraud is, in average, more common than passive fraud. Both column 
and row comparisons are allowed, showing the distribution of practice across countries 
and the country distribution of the seven practices, respectively. For example, paying 
cash in hand to avoid VAT is the most common offence in the majority of countries. 
The only exceptions are UK, Ireland and Switzerland, where keeping extra change of 
shop assistant is the most common, Benelux countries where both passive offences are 
the most common and Ukraine where keeping the change and bribing public officials 
are the most common. 
Given that the response scale is ordinal in nature, an interpretation in terms of country 
means may lead to misinterpretations as the scale point are not equidistant (e.g., 2: once 
and 3:twice and 4:three to four times). A more accurate picture is revealed by taking 
into account the percentages of people who have committed each one of the offences at 
least once. This is the boundary that allows the clean distinction between law-abiding 
citizens and everyday life ―criminals‖. The results are presented in Table 4. 
The most remarkable finding is that, in most of the countries, the percentages of people 
who have done at least one offence in the last five years are nearly 50 per cent and, in 
some cases, overpass it (cf. Table 4). In the total ESS sample, nearly half of the 
population (between 49.8 and 50.6) have committed at least one of these crimes in the 
past five years. The countries with the highest percentages of population being involved 
in crimes of everyday life are Italy and Estonia. In Italy, nearly two thirds (between 72.4 
and 76.6 percent) of the population have done it in the past five years. A more detailed 
analysis (not displayed here) revealed that in Italy, these figures are not the result of 
only one or two specific dishonest practice widespread in the population, but instead the 
result of acting dishonestly in a wide range of situations. In fact, approximately half of 
the population in Italy (95% CI: 48.7 to 52.9) have committed all the seven practices in 
the past five years. Estonia is a country with the same pattern of a high percentage of 
population have committed crimes of everyday life (95% CI: 55.1 to 79.9) more 
indiscriminately compared to figures obtained in other countries.  
 
Passive fraud is more frequent that active fraud as it was evidenced in Table 4. Nearly 
25 percent of European population have paid in cash to avoid VAT and 20 percent have 
kept the change from a shop assistant. Active fraud is less frequent as less than 4 
percent of European population having done it. Falsely claiming a government benefit is 
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very uncommon, as only 1.3 to 1.5 percent of population committed it. Bribing public 
officials is also uncommon, with only 1.8 to 2.1 percent of population having 
committed it the past five years. However, this figure is biased by Ukraine which stands 
far from the European average with 11.6 to 15.4 percent. The other active offences are 
smoothly distributed across countries, with percentages roughly around 2 to 4 percent. 
The results for UK follow the general pattern of nearly 50 per cent (95percent CI: 47.4 
to 50.2) of population having committed at least once crimes of everyday life but it is 
clear from the data that ―the crime‖ is, in most of the cases, keeping over-change from a 
shop assistant  (95% CI: 31.8 to 36.1). The percentage of people who have committed 
all the seven crimes is trifling (95% CI: 0 to 1.8) in the UK. 
It is worth comparing the results for UK with those provided by Karstedt and Farrall 
(2007) from the survey conducted in 2002 in Wales and England, bearing in mind that 
these figures were obtained from samples with different characteristics. Karstedt and 
Farrall‘s sample comprises individuals aged 25-65 (vs. over 17 in ESS sample) in 
England and Wales (vs. UK in ESS sample). All practices in ESS except bribing public 
officials were asked in Karstedt and Farrall (2007) survey (kept the money when over-
changed by a shop assistant, not disclosing faulty goods in second hand sales, paid cash 
in hand to avoid taxation, wrongly used identity cards for own gain and padded an 
insurance claim and deliberately misclaiming benefits for own gain).  The only result 
that coincides in the two surveys is keeping extra-change from a shop assistant: in 
Karstedt and Farrall‘s survey, 32 percent reported it, matching the confidence interval of 
31.8 and 36.1 percent found in the ESS. In the other practices, Karstedt and Farrall 
(2007) results reveal consistently higher figures that go far beyond confidence intervals 
computed from the ESS sample. The non-concordance of samples of Karstedt and 
Farrall (2007) and possible non-response rates may certainly explain the divergence of 
results between the two studies.  
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Table 4. Confidence intervals (95%) of the percentage of respondents who committed crimes of everyday life (E24 to E30) at least once in the past five years (N=45681) 
 E24 E25 E26 E27 E28 E29 E30 E24-E30 
Country Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Austria 18.7 22.5 25.4 29.6 2.7 4.5 4.1 6.2 4.9 7.1 1.0 2.2 2.0 3.6 52.8 61.2 
Belgium 29.3 33.7 31.2 35.8 2.6 4.4 1.6 3.0 1.0 2.2 0.4 1.3 0.3 1.1 50.7 57.9 
Czech Rep. 18.8 22.1 21.4 24.9 3.5 5.2 4.9 6.0 3.2 4.8 5.9 8.0 2.8 4.4 50.0 57.0 
Denmark 21.3 26.2 34.1 39.7 2.7 4.9 1.5 3.3 3.4 5.9 0.2 1.1 0.3 1.4 57.3 69.1 
Estonia 11.5 15.9 16.5 21.6 2.8 5.3 2.1 4.5 0.1 1.2 1.2 3.1 0.4 1.8 55.1 79.9 
Finland 21.7 25.6 26.4 30.5 4.5 6.6 1.7 3.1 2.1 3.6 0.0 0.3 1.5 2.8 46.2 55.8 
France 19.6 23.4 28.9 33.2 0.9 2.1 1.4 2.7 2.7 3.9 0.4 1.3 0.6 1.6 44.7 47.3 
Germany 20.2 23.6 29.6 33.4 2.4 3.9 2.9 4.4 3.3 5.0 0.3 0.9 1.0 2.0 56.5 59.1 
Greece 3.8 5.7 20.2 23.8 0.2 0.9 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.5 1.8 3.2 0.1 0.7 34.1 38.7 
Hungary 7.8 11.3 25.7 31.1 0.2 1.2 0.0 0.8 1.3 3.0 0.5 1.8 0.0 0.7 48.4 55.4 
Iceland 14.7 21.2 41.4 49.8 2.0 5.1 1.5 4.4 3.6 7.5 0.0 0.5 1.8 4.2 35.2 84.0 
Ireland 16.4 19.7 13.4 16.5 1.2 2.3 1.3 2.5 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 1.3 31.7 39.5 
Italy 14.2 19.8 30.9 38.1 2.3 5.2 1.3 3.6 1.6 4.1 0.7 2.6 1.0 3.1 72.4 76.6 
Luxembourg 28.2 33.0 28.9 33.6 2.1 3.8 1.6 3.2 2.2 4.0 0.9 2.2 0.3 1.2 38.8 75.4 
Netherlands 24.8 28.9 24.9 28.9 3.1 5.0 1.9 3.3 1.2 2.5 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.2 44.2 49.2 
Norway 21.2 25.3 25.2 29.5 1.5 3.0 1.4 2.8 0.8 1.9 0.3 1.0 1.2 2.5 40.8 50.0 
Poland 11.0 15.0 14.4 18.8 3.2 5.7 1.5 3.4 1.1 2.7 3.4 5.9 0.9 2.3 53.0 56.8 
Portugal 5.0 7.3 12.6 16.1 1.0 2.2 1.0 2.3 1.2 2.6 0.9 2.0 0.4 1.4 35.3 40.3 
Slovakia 16.9 21.5 21.6 26.6 3.0 5.3 1.6 3.4 1.0 2.5 6.5 9.7 1.8 3.7 47.9 57.7 
Slovenia 14.7 18.8 23.6 28.4 2.0 3.8 1.7 3.4 0.7 1.2 0.5 1.6 0.2 1.1 36.9 49.7 
Spain 18.0 22.1 27.4 32.1 2.1 3.9 2.5 4.3 2.3 4.1 0.6 1.7 0.6 1.7 48.9 52.1 
Sweden 23.9 28.0 28.8 33.1 2.9 4.6 1.1 2.7 2.0 3.5 0.3 1.1 0.5 1.3 49.4 57.0 
Switzerland 18.6 22.1 11.3 14.3 0.6 1.5 2.3 3.8 1.4 2.7 0.0 0.4 0.3 1.0 32.2 37.6 
Turkey 3.7 4.8 24.9 29.8 0.8 2.1 0.2 1.2 - - 0.3 1.3 0.1 0.9 50.3 53.1 
UK 31.8 36.1 17.3 20.9 3.2 5.0 2.7 4.4 1.1 2.3 0.1 0.6 1.1 2.3 47.4 50.2 
Ukraine 15.0 19.1 9.0 12.4 4.6 7.2 1.7 3.4 1.9 2.6 11.6 15.4 2.7 4.8 55.9 59.5 
Total 19.5 20.3 24.7 25.6 2.9 3.2 2.4 2.7 2.2 2.5 1.8 2.1 1.3 1.5 49.8 50.6 
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Distinction among offenders: low, (moderate) passive and (moderate) active 
A detailed analysis of offences suggests that passive and active fraud are associated 
with particular subsets of countries. For examples, bribing a public official and 
misclaiming government benefits (active fraud) is more frequent in Eastern countries 
such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine and Poland. Passive fraud, by contrast, 
appears to be more frequent in countries such as the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway.  
In order to give some structure to this multitude of results, a latent class model 
(Lazarsfeld and Henry, 1968) was performed on items E24-E30 to identify segments of 
consumers who share similar behaviours in terms of frequency and type of dishonest 
practices committed (if any). It is assumed in these models that statistical associations 
are a function of a categorical latent variable, underlying the observed survey responses, 
also categorical. In the cluster model, cases (respondents) are classified into one of the k 
possible clusters (latent/unobservable groups) based on probabilities of membership to 
each one of the clusters. The meaning of clusters is given by the loadings of each 
answer option on the relevant cluster, i.e., the measurement probabilities.  
In this model of latent classes (cluster model), country was introduced as a covariate, 
allowing the distribution of the latent variable to vary between countries, rather than 
fixing the conditional item response probabilities to be equal between countries (Stares, 
2009).  The analysis was performed first separately for each country and the same 
solution of three clusters was obtained for all the countries with some minor variations 
on item response probabilities. The concordance of this solution across countries 
legitimated the general classification of ESS respondents into one of the three groups 
according to item response probabilities, constrained to be equal between countries. 
Three clusters were selected on the basis of its interpretability in terms of the distinction 
between active and passive fraud (Table 1, Annex, p.124): low offenders (cluster one), 
passive offenders (cluster two) and active offenders (cluster three). These labels enclose 
two dimensions: type of practice (active vs passive) and frequency (low vs high). Low 
offenders show a low propensity to engage on passive fraud (active fraud is unfeasible); 
passive offenders show a moderate to high propensity to engage in passive fraud, but 
active fraud is very unlikely. Active offenders hold some propensity to engage in active 
fraud and a high propensity to engage in passive fraud. The classes do not imply any 
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sort of order between them as they are unordered categorical, but it is possible to assign 
a degree of increasing severity from class 1 (low offenders) to class 3 (active offenders). 
In the global sample, the cluster no/low offenders is the most represented. Consumers 
belonging to this cluster may occasionally keep the change of a shop assistant or pay 
cash with no receipt but active fraud is extremely unlikely. Passive offenders are likely 
to keep the change of a shop assistant and pay cash with no receipt but they are also 
very unlikely to commit active fraud. Active offenders are very likely to engage on all 
sort of dishonest behaviour. Consumers belonging to this cluster show some propensity 
to commit active fraud and passive fraud is committed on a regular basis. This cluster is 
the least represented in ESS sample. Figure 2 displays the percentage of respondents 
classified in each cluster by country
15
.   
                                                          
15
 Cluster size was based on the mean of membership probabilities per country 
(weighted by design). 
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Figure 2: Percentages of respondents belonging to one of three clusters: no/low 
offenders, passive offenders and active offenders 
Combining Table 2 and Figure 2 a clear picture of crimes of everyday life in European 
countries emerge. Roughly half of the European population have committed crimes of 
everyday life, but the offences are occasionally paying cash in hand and keeping extra 
change from a shop assistant. Between 68 percent and 83 percent of the countries‘ 
population is law-abiding or commit small offences once in a while. Passive offenders 
correspond to 15.6 to 28.2 percent of countries‘ population. Passive offenders are more 
concentrated in Austria, Belgium and Denmark. Active offenders are a minority, with 
only 0.5 to 4.1 percent of the countries‘ population. Higher percentages of active 
offenders can be found in Ukraine, Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
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Comparison between market economies 
The list of countries in Figure 2 is arranged by the type of market (Table 2, Appendix). 
A major division discriminates between developed markets (Austria, Germany, 
Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, 
Iceland, UK, Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy) and emerging markets 
(Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia). This distinction is based 
on a gross national income criterion: countries are classified into low income, lower 
middle income, upper middle income and high income. Low and middle national 
incomes are classified into emerging economies and higher national incomes are 
developed economies. The common denominator in emerging economies is the 
existence of reforms or programmes to boost economic development. However, this 
classification is not intended to express the economic growth this group as it is based 
only on the gross national income, but as a general rule, the countries classified in this 
group experience a rapid economic growth and industrialization in the direction of the 
developed market economies. 
The means of the likelihood of being an active or passive offender in different markets 
(see Annex) were compared using ANCOVA, controlling for country GDP (average 
2000-2005). A first distinction emerges between developed and emerging markets 
(MSCI/Barra, 2010): consumers from developed markets show a higher propensity to 
be passive offenders [F(1, 40283)=12.12, p=.001] whereas consumers from emerging 
markets show a higher probability to be active offenders [F(1, 40283)=21.12, p<.001]. 
However, the sizes of these effects are very small [η2 = 0.0003 (passive fraud) and η2 = 
0.001 (active fraud)]. The effect of GDP goes in the direction that passive fraud is more 
disseminated in countries with higher GDP (vs countries with low GDP) [F(1, 
40283)=140.42, p<.001, η2 = 0.003]. 
Developed markets are further arranged into three subgroups (Hall & Soskice, 2001): 
coordinated market economies (Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland); liberal market 
economies (UK and Ireland); and mixed (France, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy). At 
the basis of the classifications is the way how firms coordinate with stakeholders 
(employees, suppliers and customers). In LME, coordination is the outcome of market 
mechanisms, as firms coordinate their activities via hierarchies and competitive market 
arrangements and the equilibrium outcomes of firm behaviour are usually given by 
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demand and supply conditions (Hall & Soskice, 2001, p. 8). In CME, the coordination is 
achieved by institutions (e.g., government, trade unions) that govern and regulate the 
economy, as firms depend more heavily on non-market relationships to coordinate their 
endeavors with other actors and to construct their core competencies (Hall & Soskice, 
2001, p. 8).  
Differences between coordinated, liberal and mixed market economies (Hall & Soskice, 
2001) emerges in respect to passive fraud [F(2, 30551)=96.81, p<.001], controlling for 
GDP. Coordinated market economies are more vulnerable than liberal market 
economies to passive fraud (mean difference= 0.03, p<.001) and liberal market 
economies are more prone to passive fraud than mixed market economies (mean 
difference=0.03, p<.001). Concerning active fraud, there is also differences between the 
three market economies [F(2, 30551=13.91, p<.01], controlling for GDP. Coordinated 
market economies are more vulnerable than liberal market economies (mean 
difference= 0.007, p<.001) and mixed market economies (mean difference = 0.004, 
p<.05) to active fraud. These effects however are also weak [η2 = 0.006 (passive fraud) 
and η2 = 0.001 (active fraud]. 
Emerging markets were listed according to the FTSE (2010) subdivision into advanced 
emerging (Hungary and Poland), secondary emerging (the Czech Republic and Turkey) 
and frontier (Estonia, Slovenia and Slovakia). This classification rests in the gross 
national income and the market infrastructures. Advanced emerging are those countries 
with middle incomes and with advanced market infrastructures; secondary emerging are 
those countries with reasonable market infrastructures or upper middle income with 
underdeveloped market structures. 
By comparing developed markets with the different types of emerging markets 
(advanced emerging, frontier, secondary emerging – FTSE, 2010), it is apparent that 
advanced emerging markets are less prone to passive fraud compared to other emerging 
markets and developed markets [F(3, 41372=5.91, p<.001], controlling for GDP. 
Concerning active fraud, secondary emerging are more exposed than other emerging 
mand developed markets [F(3, 41372=15.99, p=.001], controlling for GDP. These 
effects are also weak (both η2 = 0.001 for likelihood of being passive offender and 
active offender). 
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Table 5 summarizes the results of comparisons between markets. In a nutshell, it can be 
said that (1) more developed markets enclose a higher propensity to commit passive 
fraud, especially in coordinated liberal economies (2) emerging market economies 
enclose a higher propensity to commit active fraud, especially in secondary market 
economies. The logical conclusion is that as more advanced the market, the higher the 
propensity to commit passive fraud and the lower the propensity to commit active fraud. 
Table 5: Comparisons among types of market economies 
 MSCI Barra Hall & Soskice FTSE 
Passive fraud Developed>emerging CME>LME>mixed Advanced emerg.<other emerging 
Active fraud Emerging>developed CME>LME=mixed Secondary emerg.>other emerging 
 
 
Effect of social class membership 
The effect of social class on the propensity of being a low offender, passive offender 
and active offender was tested using multilevel regression (random intercepts), 
controlling for age and gender of respondents. The response variables are probabilities 
of group membership (no/low offenders, passive offenders and active offenders) derived 
from latent class analyses and explanatory variables are at individual level only: age (in 
years), gender (1=male and 2=female) and social class membership [service, 
intermediate (baseline), working class].  
The social class scheme used was Goldthorpe/Erikson/Portocarrero (EGP, 1992)
16
 with 
major three divisions: service, intermediate and working class (Table 6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 The classes were derived using a SPSS syntax developed by Leiulfsrud, Biosn, Jensberg 
(2005) with a modification of Harry Gazenboom, adjusted for ESS variables. 
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Table 6: EGP social classes scheme (Goldthorpe/Erikson/Portocarrero) 
Service Service class I (higher grade professionals, administrators and officials; 
managers in large industrial establishments; large proprietors) 
I 
Service class II (lower-grade professionals, administrators and officials; higher 
grade technicians; managres in small industrial establishments; supervisors of 
non-manual employees). Salariat (top class)  
II 
Intermediate 
class 
Routine non-manual (routine non-manual employees, higher grade – 
administration and commerce) 
IIIa 
Routine non-manual employees, lower grade (sales and services) IIIb 
Self-employed with employees (small proprietors, artisans, etc, with employees)  IVa 
Self-employed with no employees (small proprietors, artisans, etc, with no 
employees)  
IVb 
Self-employed farmers, etc. (farmers and small holders; other self-employed 
workers in primary production 
IVc 
Manual supervisors/Lower grade technicians (lower grade technicians; 
supervisors of manual workers) 
V 
Working class Skilled workers. VI 
Unskilled workers (not in agriculture, etc.) VIIa 
Farm labors (agricultural and other workers in primary production) VIIb 
 
This scheme captures the nature of the employment relationship between type of worker 
contract (worker vs service contract) and educational skills required for a certain type of 
occupation. For this reason education and occupation were leaved out of the analysis 
due to multicollinearity with EGP. 
Table 7 shows the result for three separate multilevel model (random intercepts), one for 
each response variable (likelihood of being a low offender, passive offender or active 
offender) and social class (two dummies with middle class as baseline) as explanatory 
variable, controlling for age and gender. The results indicate that service and working 
classes do not differ from middle class on the likelihood of being a low offender or an 
active offender. Working and service classes don‘t differ from each other. However 
there is statistical evidence that shows that service classes consumers are more likely to 
be passive offenders than consumers belonging to intermediate or low classes (b=.007, 
p<.01). However, this effect is very small as service class consumers have in average a 
0.7 percent  higher probability of being passive offenders than middle class consumers. 
Males and younger people are more likely to be passive and active offenders. 
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Table 7: Multilevel models for the likelihood of being no/low, passive, or active offender (fixed 
part, N=45681)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 No/low offenders Passive offenders Active offenders 
 coef se coef se coef se 
       
service vs intermediate class -.006 .003 .007** .003 -.001 .000 
working vs intermediate class .001 .003 -.002 .003 .000 .001 
age .004*** .000 -.004*** .000 -.000*** .000 
gender .044*** .002 -.036*** .002 -.008*** .000 
cons .494*** .009 .461*** .008 .044*** .002 
    
ICC (empty model) .020 .015 .010 
*** p<.001  **p<.01 *p<.05 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
This study shows that everyday crimes are part of the experience of the majority of 
European consumer in all countries considered. These practices are widespread in the 
population as nearly half of the population has engaged in any sort of the practice in the 
last five years in the 26 countries considered. But this doesn‘t mean consumers engage 
regularly in these sorts of practices. The vast majority of the population is law abiding 
most of the time. In fact, about three quarters of European population can be classified 
as low offenders what mean that occasionally they may keep the change of a shop 
assistant or  paying cash in hand to avoid taxes. The percentage of population that do 
not comply with the law in a regular basis is very low, up to five percent of the 
population. 
Between the law-abiding and the criminals there is a considerable percentage of 
population (roughly one quarter) that engage in passive fraud if they have the chance. 
The results of this study show dishonest practices can be grouped into active and 
passive fraud in ESS countries in line with Hypothesis 8.  It is not clear from ESSS data 
whether these passive fraudsters are specialized in one type of fraud (e.g., paying cash 
in hand) or if they act dishonestly in a wide range situations they face. Certainly 
opportunity explain why paying cash in hand to avoid taxes is the most common 
practices among the passive (keeping extra change from a shop assistance and selling 
something faulty in second hand). Opportunity assumes greater importance in passive 
than active fraud because in active fraud the individual have control over the actual 
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situation, whether it will happen or not, while in passive fraud the chance plays the main 
role. 
The results of this paper corroborate Hypothesis 1 of this thesis that considers that CME 
and LMR differ in respect to patterns of consumer dishonest behaviour. A clear divide 
between advanced and market economies emerge from ESS data: passive fraud is more 
common in developed than in emerging countries. This pattern arises even when 
controlling for GDP what shows that the dimension of the market per se does not 
explain why developed economies are more prone to consumer fraud. We can conclude 
that different types of markets enclose different economic moralities resulting from 
specific economic and social trajectories. An additional explanation is the rate of 
development in emerging markets that is increasingly higher than in developed markets. 
This idea is reinforced by the finding that developed markets with different 
characteristics show a different pattern of crimes of everyday life, being coordinated 
market economies more exposed to passive fraud.  
By contrast, active fraud is more common in emerging than in developed markets 
(controlling for GDP). However, passive fraud is more common than active fraud in all 
countries showing global moral standards on the illegitimacy of active fraud. Within 
emerging countries, some differences arise in terms of advanced emerging markets are 
less exposed to passive fraud (Hungary and Poland) than other emerging and secondary 
emerging (the Czech Republic and Turkey) which are more exposed to active fraud.  
The results of this paper help to elucidate the confusion in the literature around the idea 
that main offenders belong to middle classes, giving support for Hypothesis 5 which 
says that the prevalence of consumer fraud varies with class membership. The link 
between social class and offending behaviour was encountered only in passive fraud. In 
the ESS samples, passive offenders predominantly belong to higher classes. The group 
of passive offenders is the one of the most interest in this dissertation because they are 
the ordinary consumers who take advantage of the situations and whose moral 
boundaries between right and wrong seem to be blurred, as they occasionally engage in 
active fraud. They are the main authors of crimes of everyday life as they differentiate 
from the real criminals (a minority of active offenders) and the law abiding (most of the 
time) majority (no/low offenders). As the most common passive offence consists on 
paying cash to avoid VAT, one possible interpretation for this results is that those who 
are wealthier shop more often and purchase more valuable goods what increases the 
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opportunity to face situation where they can pay cash in hand. A more fine-grained 
analysis on the motivation of consumers to engage in fraud would offer more clear 
results whether there is a moral economy specific to higher classes. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Latent class analysis (cluster model) of items E24-E30: ESS global profile (N=45681) 
 Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 
Cluster Size 0.7625 0.2254 0.0121 
E24 : Keeping extra change from a shop assistant    
Never (1) 0.8960 0.5065 0.3232 
Once (2) 0.0832 0.1910 0.1742 
Twice (3) 0.0182 0.1696 0.2212 
3 or 4 times (4) 0.0024 0.0906 0.1689 
5 times or more (5) 0.0003 0.0422 0.1125 
Mean (measurement prob. x category values) 1.1278 1.9709 2.5733 
E25: Paying in cash without receipt    
Never (1) 0.8069 0.5749 0.2849 
Once (2) 0.0810 0.0953 0.0730 
Twice (3) 0.0583 0.1133 0.1342 
3 or 4 times (4) 0.0327 0.1050 0.1922 
5 times or more (5) 0.0211 0.1116 0.3157 
Mean (measurement prob. x category values) 1.3800 2.0831 3.1809 
E26 : Selling something faulty in second hand    
Never (1) 1.0000 0.8916 0.4880 
Once (2) 0.0000 0.0819 0.1613 
Twice (3) 0.0000 0.0213 0.1505 
3 or 4 times (4) 0.0000 0.0042 0.1059 
5 times or more (5) 0.0000 0.0010 0.0943 
Mean (measurement prob. x category values) 1.0000 1.1411 2.1574 
E27: Misusing or altering a card or document    
Never (1) 0.9999 0.9074 0.5921 
Once (2) 0.0001 0.0675 0.1257 
Twice (3) 0.0000 0.0175 0.0930 
3 or 4 times (4) 0.0000 0.0050 0.0753 
5 times or more (5) 0.0000 0.0026 0.1139 
Mean (measurement prob. x category values) 1.0001 1.1279 1.9933 
E28: Falsely claiming insurance    
Never (1) 1.0000 0.9218 0.4701 
Once (2) 0.0000 0.0701 0.2426 
Twice (3) 0.0000 0.0075 0.1773 
3 or 4 times (4) 0.0000 0.0005 0.0831 
5 times or more (5) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0268 
Mean (measurement prob. x category values) 1.0000 1.0868 1.9539 
 
 
 
   
 113 
 
E29: Bribing a public official 
Never (1) 0.9982 0.9341 0.7095 
Once (2) 0.0018 0.0434 0.0808 
Twice (3) 0.0000 0.0135 0.0617 
3 or 4 times (4) 0.0000 0.0062 0.0690 
5 times or more (5) 0.0000 0.0029 0.0789 
Mean (measurement prob. x category values) 1.0018 1.1003 1.7269 
E30: Falsely claiming government benefit    
Never (1) 1.0000 0.9569 0.6355 
Once (2) 0.0000 0.0368 0.1267 
Twice (3) 0.0000 0.0053 0.0944 
3 or 4 times (4) 0.0000 0.0009 0.0857 
5 times or more (5) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0578 
Mean (measurement prob. x category values) 1.0000 1.0506 1.8035 
 
 
Table 2: Classification of European markets (Hall and Soskice, MSCI Barra and FTSE) 
COUNTRY HALL & SOSKICE  MSCI BARRA FTSE GROUP  
Austria Coordinated Market Economy Developed market Developed market 
Belgium Coordinated Market Economy Developed market Developed market 
Czech Republic - Emerging market Secondary emerging 
Denmark Coordinated Market Economy Developed market Developed market 
Estonia - - Frontier 
Finland Coordinated Market Economy Developed market Developed market 
France Mixed Developed market Developed market 
Germany Coordinated Market Economy Developed market Developed market 
Greece Mixed Developed market Developed market 
Hungary - Emerging market Advanced emerging 
Iceland Coordinated Market Economy Developed market Developed market 
Ireland Liberal Market Economy Developed market Developed market 
Italy Mixed Developed market Developed market 
Luxembourg - Developed market Developed market 
Netherlands Coordinated Market Economy Developed market Developed market 
Norway Coordinated Market Economy Developed market Developed market 
Poland - Emerging market Advanced emerging 
Portugal Mixed Developed market Developed market 
Slovakia - - Frontier 
Slovenia - - Frontier 
Spain Mixed Developed market Developed market 
Sweden Coordinated Market Economy Developed market Developed market 
Switzerland Coordinated Market Economy Developed market Developed market 
Turkey Mixed Emerging market Secondary emerging 
Ukraine - - - 
United Kingdom Liberal Market Economy Developed market Developed market 
 
 PAPER 2 
Consumer morality in times of economic hardship 
Evidence of the European Social Survey 
ABSTRACT 
This paper tests attempts to analyze empirically the association between economic 
hardship and crimes of everyday life in different cultural settings (H6) and examine the 
role that economic growth and cultural factors play in shaping this relationship (H4). A 
cross-national analysis of consumers‘ fraudulent practices was carried out, using data 
from European Social Survey (Round 2), that focuses on economic morality and socio-
economic variables in 23 countries. A formative measure of crimes of everyday life was 
modelled separately for each country, based on relative deprivation and socio-
demographical variables. The country-specific regression coefficients are mapped onto 
the broader economic and normative context of 23 European countries, given by the 
gross domestic product, the rate of economic development and the country level of 
consumer fraud. The results reveal that crimes of everyday life are driven by feelings of 
economic hardship only in countries where normative factors dictate their deviance. In 
countries where the consumer fraud is uncommon, relative deprivation plays a role: 
relatively deprived individuals are more likely to engage in fraudulent practices. In 
countries where fraudulent behaviour is more generalized, inner motivations to offend 
play a secondary role as the better-off consumers are more likely to commit fraud. One 
of the possible explanations rests in the opportunity to offend as better-off individuals 
interact more often with the market and face more opportunities to behave dishonestly. 
Normative context constrains or facilitates the impact of relative deprivation on 
consumer fraud, with normative contexts being determined by the interplay of cultural 
and economic factors. As the economy grows faster, the tendency to offend the market 
becomes more visible, but only in countries whose GDP stands above European average 
(developed markets). In countries with low GDP (emerging markets), normative 
landscape is shaped by cultural factors that seem to obfuscate the power of economic 
factors favourable to consumer fraud. 
Keywords: Economic morality; Crimes of everyday life; Market anomie; European 
Social Survey 
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Introduction 
The transformations in the European economy in the late twentieth century, particularly 
the transition to neo-liberal markets and the emergence of consumer society, gave rise to 
a ―cornucopia of new criminal opportunities‖ (Shover et al., 2003, p. 490). A new range 
of crimes—such as ripping software, making false insurance claims, or paying cash in 
hand to circumvent taxes—has burgeoned as a result. Albeit they are collectively 
regarded as morally dubious, these crimes of everyday life are part of people‘s 
experience. They tend to be committed by citizens who see themselves and are seen as 
the ―law-abiding majority‖ (Karstedt & Farrall, 2007). 
The existing figures for everyday crimes are not exhaustive; they also suffer from some 
significant methodological weaknesses. It has been estimated, based on personal 
interviews to experts in the UK, that 4 percent of social security payments made in 2002 
are based on false claims (Karstedt & Farrall, 2006) and 4 percent of household 
insurance claims made in 2000 were also fraudulent (ABI, 2000) (cf. Introduction, 
p.16,17). An extensive study lead by Levi et al. (2007) for the Association of Chief 
Police Officers, captured data on fraud in the UK from various public sources of 
information, gathered both from administrative record-keeping and sample surveys. It 
was estimated that the overall losses of fraud in 2005 amounted to: £1.0 billion for 
business in financial services sector; £0.9 billion for business in the non-financial 
services sector; £2.8 billion for private individuals; £6.4 billion or public bodies at the 
national level (excluding income tax fraud); and £6.4 billion  for public bodies at the 
local level (p.38). According to the KPMG Forensic Fraud Barometer which measures 
fraud cases in UK coming to the court
17
, the number of cases of fraud increased by 300 
percent from 2007 to 2008, mainly due to the augment of fraud committed by 
individuals (KPMG, 2009). These figures suggest that everyday crimes have been 
mounting, occur more regularly, and involve higher costs than other types of crimes. To 
illustrate this, it can be said that the annual losses for business in the non-financial 
services alone parallel the combined costs of burglary in dwellings, theft, robbery of 
individuals and common assault (Dubourg & Hamed, 2005).  
                                                          
17
 These figures refer to charges of £100,000 or more. 
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Despite the economic relevance of the topic, the occurrence of crimes of everyday life 
in a particular society is a valuable indicator for social and political analysis. The idea 
that victims of fraudulent practices in the marketplace become offenders when the trust 
on business was undermined is a commonplace in the literature (Karstedt & Farrall, 
2006). But as the roles of citizen and consumer are intertwined, the scepticism about 
economic organization may intrude social and political life. The lack of confidence in 
business and the noncompliance with market regulations may extend to social and 
political institutions, including the government. Consumer discontentment and negative 
attitudes towards the institutional framework of society lie at the core of fraudulent 
behaviour (Karstedt, 2007). Along these lines, crimes of everyday life are indicators of 
the moral stage of a particular society, perhaps much more than violent or other street 
crimes (Karstedt & Farrall, 2007).  
This paper constitutes an attempt to frame theoretically and empirically the crimes of 
everyday life standing from a multilevel perspective that integrates theories stemming 
from political science, sociology and social psychology. Two hypotheses are tested in 
the empirical part of this paper. The first hypothesis states that relatively deprived 
individuals are more likely to engage in fraudulent practices, especially in countries 
where dishonest practices are uncommon (H6 of this thesis). The second hypothesis 
considers that countries with market economies which higher rates of grow show higher 
prevalence of consumer dishonest practices (H4 of this thesis). I start by exploring the 
link between the market and social institutions, followed by the elaboration of anomie 
from a classical sociological perspective, that accounts for social organization and 
locates motivations for deviance in the social structure, to finally step down to the 
examination of the correspondence between social attitudes and behaviour, as 
postulated by the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Beck & Ajzen, 1991). 
The structure of this paper follows the four levels of analysis in social psychology 
proposed by Doise (1986) — ideological, positional, interpersonal and intra-personal. A 
guiding motivation of this study is the idea that crimes of everyday life can be 
understood through different processes articulated at different levels of analysis. At the 
ideological level, the emergence of unfair practices in the marketplace is facilitated by a 
syndrome of market anomie comprising distrust of business and market institutions, fear 
of victimization and cynical attitudes towards the law (Karstedt & Farrall, 2006), 
 117 
 
resulting from the disembeddedness of market with the surrounding cultural 
environment and social institutions. The positions that individuals hold in the social 
structure also has an impact on the approval of fraudulent practices: individuals in 
disadvantaged positions, especially in anomic societies, are more likely to experience 
the deprivation feelings that are believed to fuel deviant behaviour. As such, economic 
context, institutional landscape and social structure are macro-level factors that either 
prevent or facilitate fraudulent behaviour in the marketplace. The behaviour 
materializes when attitudes and social norms towards it were favourable, when 
individuals perceive business as an unfair game and opportunity arises. 
The empirical study draws upon on micro data from European Social Survey (Round 2), 
modelling separately for 23 European countries a formative measure of crimes of 
everyday life based on socio-demographical variables and the subjective household 
financial situation. The resulting country-specific regression coefficients are mapped 
onto the broader economic and cultural context of the European countries. This 
procedure is mainly exploratory; it relies on graphical representation of data. But 
Bowers and Drake (2005) suggest that, complementary to multilevel regression, 
researchers should look at variations in slopes and intercepts for separate ordinary least 
squares regressions. The technique allows inferences about level two effects and cross-
level interactions when level two sample is small (i.e., less than 30 units) and/or the 
sample is non-representative of population. This seems to be the case in the current 
study, since it employs samples from 23 European countries. 
The results reveal that crimes of everyday life are driven by feelings of economic 
hardship only in countries where normative factors dictate their deviance. In countries 
where fraudulent behaviour is more generalized, inner motivations to engage in 
everyday crimes play a secondary role: the more advantaged consumers are more likely 
to commit fraud as they interact more often with the market. In turn, normative aspects 
result from a dynamic interplay of cultural and economic factors. As the economy 
grows faster, the tendency to commit fraud becomes more visible, but only in countries 
whose GDP stands above the European average. In countries whose GDP is low, 
normative landscape is shaped by cultural factors that seem to obfuscate the power of 
economic factors that favourable to consumer fraud. 
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Economic morality and institutions 
Economic morality is a vital component of society that has been defined as a particular 
set of justice perceptions and the moral order of the economy (e.g., Arnold, 2001; Bates 
& Curry, 1992; Booth, 1994; Karstedt & Farrall, 2004). Economic morality should 
ideally be approached from different levels of analysis as it is shaped by economic 
contexts, constrained by cultural forces and expressed through individual behaviour. 
The idea of economic morality was first coined by Thompson (1963, 1971) in order to 
explain corn riots, in eighteenth century Britain, formed by peasants battling for surplus 
and fair prices of basic provisions. Food riots have been regarded as manifestations of 
grievance, resulting from a clash in expectations framed in an embedded economy, 
submerged in social relations and reciprocity principles and the demands of a more 
autonomous and advanced market (Booth, 1994). This historical moment was 
recognized by some authors (e.g., Trentmann, 2004) as the first step towards the 
recognition of consumer authority in economic and political realms. The moral 
indignation of pre-market people when faced a different economic order was then 
expressed through opposition and conflict. Accordingly, crimes of everyday life imply 
resistance to comply to business norms and regulations whose importance is neglected 
or not fully understood (Karstedt & Farrall, 2004). 
Public policies and institutions shape economic morality through a process of normative 
feedback that passes on citizens the message of which rights and responsibilities are 
expected from them as members of a wider community (Svallfors, 2006). Given that a 
definite shift on citizens‘ minds does not occur as a direct result of the implementation 
of new regulations, it can be assumed a certain degree of stability on beliefs of 
economic fairness in a particular society. A transformation presupposes an extensive 
and slow-moving mechanism of socio-cognitive adjustment to the new ideas, in which 
psychological processes intervene, such as information‘s diffusion and management, 
cognitive assimilation and accommodation and feedback loops based on consumers‘ 
experience and expectations. A gradual change on perceptions of the economy would 
emerge from the dialogue between the new inputs and existing collective attitudes, 
systems of beliefs and values embedded in culture.  
 The distinction between slow moving and fast moving institutions proposed by Roland 
(2004) may shed some light on this matter. This author developed a framework for 
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understanding institutional change, illustrating the limitations associated with the 
transplantation of best-practice institutions. North‘s (1990) broad definition of 
institutions is adopted, referring to ―any form of constraint that human beings devise to 
shape human interaction‖ (p. 3). Slow-moving institutions progress at a slow, 
incremental and continuous pace. An example of a slow-moving institution is culture, 
understood as a constellation of values, beliefs and social norms. Conversely, political 
institutions (e.g., regime type, electoral rules, degree of federalism) may change more 
quickly, even abruptly. They are classified as fast moving institutions. This approach to 
institutions is macrosystemic in a sense that institutions are interdependent and function 
in a complementary way. 
Along these lines, successful institutional change depends on the degree of congruence 
of new and existing institutions. Incremental changes in culture will gradually generate 
inconsistencies in fast moving institutions creating pressures towards change. By the 
same token, a reform in a fast-moving institution is condemned to failure if it does not 
respect the stage and specificities of slow moving institutions. Therefore, the cultural 
milieu is a fundamental determinant of whether a new input will succeed or fail. It may 
be legitimately concluded that the more irreconcilable the new and old ideas appear to 
be, the less receptive society members would be towards change, regarded as unfair and 
inappropriate and the more non-compliance and grievance manifestations may be 
expected. 
Moral economy of class 
Taking a strict positional perspective, Svallfords (2006) elaborated on the notion of 
moral economy of class to refer to ideas held by different classes about the way market 
operates and the fairness of a certain distribution of resources. These ideas are anchored 
in common experiences, goals, attitudes, norms and interests of individuals sharing the 
same socio-structural position. Regarding this point, McFadden (2006) observed that ―it 
is no coincidence that the support for market solutions is concentrated among the 
economically successful and opposition among the less successful‖ (p.6). 
There is a widespread belief in the literature that fraudulent consumers belong to 
middle-classes. For example, Wilkes (1978), in one of the most cited studies on this 
topic, sought to assess consumer attitudes towards various fraud situations surveying 
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only middle-class respondents. The author justified his choice by the ―general 
community orientation and indications that certain fraudulent are most associated with 
middle-class consumers (p.69)‖. Intuitively, the idea that main offenders would be those 
at the centre of consumer societies seems appealing. Indeed, Karstedt and Farrall (2004) 
used the expression ―moral maze of the middle class‖ to refer to fraudulent behaviour in 
the marketplace. Nevertheless, studies that examine directly the link between social 
class (Wright, 2003) and crimes of everyday life are scarce. Certainly the sensitivity of 
the topic poses some difficulties in obtaining representative samples. 
Anomie and deviant behaviour 
Anomie theories offer a rational for explaining the occurrence of different rates of 
deviant behaviour both among cultures and across socio-structural positions within the 
same culture. The central dissertation is that anomie or normlessness is assumed to lead 
deviant behaviour.  
Merton (1938) classified a social organization as strong if the social structure allows 
individuals to achieve cultural approved goals through normative means. If this 
condition was not met, disjuncture between cultural and social components of society 
would be obtained, setting the stage for anomie. Thus, a strained social structure 
explains why some societies are more prone to deviant behaviour than others. It is worth 
noting that the social and cultural components of society combine in an interactive way 
to produce anomie: certain structural conditions (e.g., income inequality) under certain 
cultural conditions (e.g., egalitarian value orientations) seem to explain deviant 
behaviour (e.g., Caruana, 2001; Chamlin & Cochran 1995). Merton (1938) believed that 
within the same society, the groups more exposed to deviant behaviour are those that 
faced restrictions in their way to reach social goals, such as economic success. 
Institutional Anomie Theory (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1994, 2007) offers an extension of 
Merton‘s anomie theory, by specifying the characteristics of culture that originate a 
state of anomie. It maintains that anomie is driven by structural forces derived from the 
economic dominance in the institutional structure. Drawing on Institutional Anomie 
framework, Karstedt and Farrall (2006) refer to a syndrome of ―market anomie‖ 
characterized by distrust, fear and cynical attitudes towards law and business that 
increases the willingness of respectable citizens to engage in illegal and unfair practices 
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in the marketplace. In a market society, it is assumed that the power of economic 
institutions surmount the power of non-economic institutions (family, educational, 
religious and political institutions). This creates a cultural ethos where the competition 
and materialism values are overemphasized. As a result, the normal functioning of non-
economic institutions is disrupted, especially in what refers to social control. The 
uneven distribution of opportunities in social structure encourages illegal ways to 
achieve success, because the disembedded social institutions fail to provide the 
normative links to attain those ends (Bernburg, 2002).  
However, the mechanism underlying the motivation to behave against the rules is not 
clearly stated in anomie theories that offer a rather simplistic explanation based on 
feelings deprivation and frustration. Messner (1988) clearly recognized that ―a more 
rigorous articulation of the linkages between Merton‘s system-level processes and 
individual motivations and behaviours is required for the development of a truly 
comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon of deviance
18‖ (p.50).  
Relative deprivation and deviant behaviour 
Merton‘s anomie theory suggests that the relative deprivation is the motivational 
element that fosters deviant behaviour. Relative deprivation may be defined as a 
psychological state expressed by feelings of dissatisfaction or even anger that result 
from the perceived discrepancy between current and expected economic situations 
(Brown, 1996). 
Relative deprivation is recognized in social psychology literature at being at the core of 
psychological explanations of militant collective phenomena and civil protest (Gaskell, 
1990). Ruciman (1966) differentiated between individual/egoistic relative deprivation 
and social/fraternalistic relative deprivation whether the comparison is directed to 
another person or to the outgroup, respectively. Relative deprivation may be considered 
the motivational aspect of deviant behaviour that, under certain conditions, may 
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 The type of crimes Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) are trying to explain with the anomie 
framework was the criminal behaviour with an instrumental character, e.g., behaviour that offers 
monetary rewards (pp. 68, 85). 
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materialize in actual behaviour. But the question of how relative deprivation translates 
into actual behaviour was not addressed within this framework. 
From a social psychological point of view, Theory of Planned Behaviour (Beck & 
Ajzen, 1991) may contribute to clarify the antecedents of the behaviour based on 
concepts of attitude, subjective norm, perceived behavioral control and intention. The 
subjective norm is closely linked to social influence. It refers to the beliefs of what 
important others would think of projected behavior. The subjective norm assumes a 
particular importance in the context of crimes of everyday life, as the belief that many 
others exposed to the same opportunities would behave in the same way contributes to 
normalize illegal behaviour and to inhibit the impact of social disapproval. As such, 
―everybody does it‖ constitutes a strong justification when it comes to reduce possible 
cognitive dissonance associated with dishonest behaviour (Gabor, 1994). In turn, 
perceived behavioral control is related to the existence of psychological or physical 
barriers to engage in dishonest behaviour. It includes the avoidance of trouble and 
opportunity which facilitates fraudulent behaviour.  
Perceived unfairness is not considered in the original Theory of Planned Behaviour but 
it was mentioned by Fukukawa (2002) as an important determinant of ethically 
questionable behaviour. The author states that perceived unfairness refers to ―the extent 
to which an actor is motivated to redress an imbalance between firms and costumers that 
is perceived as unfair‖ (p. 105).  In these terms, the balance could be restored if the 
consumer behaves in ways that benefits him/her at the expense of the market.  
In sum, consumer deviant behaviour could be understood through different processes 
articulated at different levels. From a societal level, grievance manifestations may occur 
if market expansion doesn‘t take into account the surrounding cultural environment and 
the characteristics of other institutions. From a positional level, the characteristics of 
social structure and the placement of the individual within that structure also determines 
the extent to which individuals experience the deprivation feelings that energize 
fraudulent behaviour. Inter and intrapersonal theories add that fraudulent consumer 
behaviour may be accounted by positive attitudes and favorable social norms. 
The theoretical integration exposed so far demands for the clarification of the link 
between economic hardship and consumer fraud and the nuances that it assumes in 
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different economic and cultural contexts. The next section offers an attempt to address 
empirically this issue guided by the following research questions, schematized in Fig. 1: 
Are deprived consumers more likely to engage in fraudulent practices in the 
marketplace (H6a)? 
a) Is this relationship stable across different economic and social contexts (H6b)? 
b) Which are the normative orientations and economic conditions that sustain this 
relationship (H4)? 
-  
Economic Growth (X Cultural Factors) 
 
Relative Deprivation Consumer Fraud 
Micro level 
Macro level 
Figure 1: Research problem considering a cross-level interaction to explain 
consumer fraud 
Method 
The nature of this study is comparative in a way that ―problems, questions and 
phenomena are studied in two or more cultures with the specific aim of comparing their 
manifestations in different contexts, using similar research tools‖ (Hantrais & Mangen, 
1996, p.1). According to the typology of cross-national studies proposed by Van de 
Vijver and Leung (1997), this study can be classified as ―structure oriented‖ since it 
focuses on the relationship between variables and attempt to identify similarities and 
differences in these relationships across cultures. 
A cross-national analysis of fraudulent practices was carried out, using data from the 
European Social Survey (ESS) that focus on fraudulent practices and socio-economical 
variables. The ESS is an academically driven social survey designed to chart and 
explain the interaction between Europe changing institutions and attitudes, beliefs and 
behaviour patterns of diverse populations (Jowell, 2005). The biennial survey was 
established in 2002 and currently covers 30 nations. The methodological excellence is 
one of the major distinguishing characteristics of this survey achieved by the adoption 
of uniform methodological standards in all stages of research. All national surveys are 
a 
b 
c 
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based on face-to-face interviews of citizens aged 15 or over and detailed rules are 
strictly followed by all national teams, such as study-wide targeted response rates of at 
least 70 percent and rigorous probability sampling. The questionnaire contains core 
modules
19
 repeated in every round and rotative modules, round-specific. This study uses 
data from economic morality module that is one of the rotative modules of the second 
round (2004/05). The other rotative modules in this round are ―family work and well-
being‖, ―opinions on health and care seeking‖. 
The total sample for the second round (N=42203 units) comprises representative 
samples of 23 European countries (Table 1). Two countries considered in the second 
round of ESS were not included in this analysis because data for some of the variables 
was not available (France and Ukraine). It is also worth noting that in two other 
countries (Estonia and Italy) the non-response rate for at least one of the questions 
(outcome variables) is extremely high. (i.e., 34.9 percent) what demands caution in the 
interpretation of results for those particular countries.  
Table 1: List of countries and sample sizes (ESS, Round 2) 
Country N  Country N  Country N 
Austria 2256  Iceland 579  Slovakia 1512 
Belgium 1778  Ireland 2286  Slovenia 1442 
Denmark 1487  Italy 1529  Spain 1663 
Estonia 1989  Luxembourg 1635  Sweden 1948 
Finland 2022  Netherlands 1881  Switzerland 2141 
Germany 2870  Norway 1760  Turkey 1856 
Greece 2406  Poland 1716  United Kingdom 1897 
Hungary 1498  Portugal 2052  Total 42203 
This study involves variables considered at different levels of analysis, individual and 
country levels. The response variable consists of an individual score of consumer fraud. 
This score was developed through factorial analysis based on the answers to items E24 
to E30 which refer to several fraudulent practices committed by consumers. The 
practices targeted consist of: ―kept the change from a shop assistant knowing they had 
given you too much‖ (E24), ―paid cash with no receipt to avoid VAT or other taxes‖ 
(E25), ―sold something in second hand and concealed some or all of its faults‖ (E26), 
                                                          
19
 The themes covered in the core modules are: Trust in institutions, political engagement, 
socio-political values, moral and social values, social capital, social exclusion, national, ethnic 
and religious identity, well being, health and security, demographic composition, education and 
occupation, financial circumstances and household circumstances. 
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―misused or altered a card or document to pretend you were eligible for something‖ 
(E27), ―falsely claimed a government benefit such as social security‖ (E28), ―made an 
exaggerate or false insurance claim‖ (E29) and ―offered a favour or bribe to a public 
official in return of their services‖ (E30). The answer scale ranges from one (never) to 
five (four times or more). The additional answer categories ―no experience‖, ―don‘t 
know‖ and ―refuse‖ are also available in the questionnaire. 
Non-response rates vary noticeably among countries what may be partially due to a 
differential country use of non-response categories. For example, in the Czech Republic 
and in the UK, the answer category ―no experience‖ was not available. Overall, item 
E25 contains a higher non-response rate (in average, 12.0 percent) and E27 a lower non-
response rate (in average, 9.7 percent).  
A factorial analysis based on the pooled country samples (weighted for national sample 
sizes) was performed and a bifactorial solution (according to scree test criterion) was 
found. Together the two factors retained explain 77.1 percent of the variability of items: 
65.7 percent and 11.4 percent for first and second factors, respectively. The first 
dimension points to an overall score of consumer fraud whereas the second directs to 
the active vs passive dimension of consumer fraud, differentiating situations where the 
individual has deliberately initiated the behaviour or he/she merely took advantage of a 
situation he/she faced (Muncy & Vittel, 1972, 1992
20
). Factor loadings and 
communalities are displayed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Loadings in first two factors and communalities for fraud items (N=42203) 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 h
2
 
E24 Kept change from shop assistant/waiter when given too much .604 .596 .720 
E25 Paid cash with no receipt to avoid VAT or tax .628 .534 .679 
E26 Sold something second-hand and concealed its faults .822 .007 .676 
E27 Misused/altered card/document to pretend eligible .888 -.162 .814 
E28 Made an exaggeration or false insurance claim .899 -.188 .843 
E29 Offered favour/bribe to public official for service .888 -.220 .836 
E30 Falsely claim government benefit: social security or other .885 -.219 .831 
                                                          
20
 The authors proposed a scale to assess consumer moral judgments (Consumer Ethics Scale, 
1972) that allowed to draw a typology of consumer ethical judgments grouped into four 
categories: actively benefiting from an illegal activity, passively benefiting at the expense of the 
seller, actively benefiting from a questionable action and no harm/no foul. 
 126 
 
Only the scores for the first factor are used in the subsequent analysis. The first factor 
corresponds to a general score of consumer fraud and its equivalence across country 
samples was tested. A procrustean procedure for testing cross-country equivalence of 
scores was used (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). To this aim, the pooled bi-factorial 
loadings were compared to the specific bi-factorial loadings found in each country 
through an index of factorial similarity. For the first factor, Tucker‘s Phi coefficient 
assumed values over 0.9, in all country-samples, showing that factor loadings are 
equivalent across countries (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). Thus, it was concluded that 
this measure of consumer fraud exhibited metric equivalence (Fontaine, 2005, 2008), 
justifying comparisons of slopes and correlations found in different national samples. 
Factorial scores for the first factor were then saved and used in subsequent analysis. 
The main individual-level explanatory variable is economic hardship, assessed by the 
―feeling about household income‖ [hincfel]. The corresponding question is ―Which of 
the descriptions comes closest to how you feel about your household‘s income 
nowadays?‖. The response options are the following: (1) ―living comfortably on present 
income‖ (2) ―coping on present income‖; (3) ―living is difficult on present income‖; and 
(4) ―living is very difficult on present income‖. Answers to this question may express a 
general state of (dis)satisfaction with the present economic circumstances and measure 
the distance between actual and desired financial situations. 
It was assessed whether the measure of economic hardship evoked the same construct in 
different countries, by examining the web of associations between this variable and 
relative income measures available or derived from ESS data. The variables used are: 
level of income [hinctnt] within a country which is the salary level harmonized for 
different countries and level of income relative to social class (using Erikson, 
Goldthorpe Portocarrero scheme, 1992) measured by the distance between the income 
and the social class median the individual belongs to.  The several within countries 
analysis performed lead to the conclusion that in all countries, the ―feeling about 
household income‖ was moderately and inversely correlated with the two relative 
income measures. Thus, functional equivalence (Fontaine, 2005, 2008) of the measure 
was assumed, allowing equivalence of meaning of the question in terms of comparison 
of the current financial situation with the financial situation of other people from the 
same social class. The label ―economic hardship‖ can thus be used to refer to the same 
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construct across countries. Other variables considered at individual level were age [age], 
gender [gndr], education [eduyrs], income [hinctnt] and degree of religiosity [rlgdg]. 
The explanatory variables at the macro-level are the aggregate index of consumer fraud 
(explained in detail in the next section), gross domestic product (GDP) and growth in 
GDP. Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of the results of economic activity in 
purchasing power standards that permits comparisons between economies of different 
sizes (Guio, 2005). Growth in GDP was measured through the difference between GDP 
per capita between two time points—2005 and 2000—i.e., the five years period 
mentioned in ESS questions. 
Results 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between financial hardship 
and consumer fraud in 23 European countries and explain how this relationship is 
sustained by normative and economic contexts. In the first step, 23 separate regression 
analysis were carried out within each country. In the second step, the association 
between the obtained estimates and macro-level variables (normative orientations, GDP 
and economic growth) was analyzed. Individual scores of consumer fraud were obtained 
through factorial analysis, combining items drawn from the scale of fraudulent 
behaviours (items E28 to E30). These scores were modelled separately for each country 
using the following regression equation: 
iiiiiiii εxβxβxβxβxβxββy +++++++= 6756453423121   (1) 
where i
y
 is the index of consumer fraud for the i
th
 consumer in a particular country, 
ix1 is the corresponding financial hardship score, i
x2 to i
x6  the scores for the ith 
consumer on variables gender (dummy for male), age (in years), education (in years), 
equivalised income (12 levels) and degree of religiosity (0-10) respectively and 1 is the 
country specific intercept and 2  to 6

the country specific slopes for explanatory 
variables. The estimates were stored and used in subsequent analysis. 
Figure 2 shows the slopes of financial hardship on consumer fraud and corresponding 
95% confidence intervals in the 23 countries. The overall picture indicates that the 
impact of financial hardship on consumer fraud is negligible in the vast majority of 
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countries. In fact, 20 out of 23 regression coefficients are not significantly different 
from zero what means that this effect is, loosely speaking, non-existent. However, the 
three countries that do not obey to this general pattern (Germany, Italy and Portugal) are 
of most interest since they may contribute to improve the understanding of the 
conditions under which financial hardship matters on consumer fraud.  
 
Figure 2: Slopes (Financial hardship → Consumer Fraud) 
Based on the obtained estimates, individual scores of a hypothetical consumer were 
computed for each country, fixing values of socio-demographical variables at ESS 
sample means and scale mid-points (male, aged 45, with 12 years of education, level 6 
of income and level 5 of religiosity). The individual scores were converted into a scale 
of 0 to100 (0=lowest fraud and 100=highest fraud) and taken as an approximate index 
of consumer fraud in each country. 
Figure 3 displays the scatterplot for the association between expected level of consumer 
fraud and effect of financial hardship on consumer fraud. Descriptive statistics for these 
estimates can be found in Table 3.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for levels of fraud and slopes in the 23 countries (N=42203) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Slopes 0.00 0.07 -0.17 0.16 
Level of Consumer Fraud 62.23 22.11 6.60 99.3 
 
As previously noted, the overall effect of financial hardship on consumer fraud tends to 
be zero. But some variation in these slopes is noticeable, not only in terms of strength 
(e.g., Germany and Italy) but also in terms of the sign (e.g., Portugal and Italy). For 
example, in Portugal (top left). The slope is positive which means that people who 
experience financial hardship are more likely to initiate fraudulent behaviour in the 
marketplace. Conversely, in Germany and Italy (bottom right in Figure 3), the effect 
goes in the opposite direction, that is, people who feel that they live comfortably are 
more likely to commit crimes of everyday life.  
 
Figure 3: Scatterplot for the association between levels of consumer fraud (0-100) and 
slopes (financial hardship → consumer fraud) 
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Figure 3 depicts a negative trend between level of fraud and slopes (r = -.82
21
, p<.001). 
This association is not dependent of values that socio-demographic variables were 
fixed, being present in all possible combinations of values for socio-demographic 
variables. 
At the first sight, it seems that financial hardship has an effect on consumer fraud only 
at extremely high and low country levels of consumer fraud. At middle levels, the 
relationship between financial hardship and consumer fraud tend to be trifling or even 
inexistent as the slopes converge around zero. Second, the relationship between 
financial hardship and consumer behaviour holds an opposite sign whether the level of 
consumer fraud is high or low. This finding suggests that, on the one hand, in countries 
where the tendency to commit fraud is more marked, people who consider living more 
comfortably are more likely to engage in fraudulent practices. On the other hand, in 
countries where the tendency to offend is less evident, those who find very difficult to 
live on present income are more likely to engage in such practices. At middle levels of 
consumer fraud, others factors may foster or hamper the tendency to commit fraud. For 
example, degree of religiosity appears to inhibit fraud in some of these countries 
(Austria, Luxembourg, Ireland, The Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey and the 
UK) while age and being male have a negative effect across all countries considered
22
.  
Figure 3 also differentiates countries whose GDP (in 2005) is high (above 100) and low 
(below 100) and it becomes apparent that the relationship between level of fraud and 
effect of financial hardship on consumer fraud remains when controlled for GDP (r = -
.83, p<.001). For countries with a high GDP, this relationship is less evident (r = -.65, 
p<.01) as Germany being the only instance where fraud is facilitated specially among 
the less deprived, while for countries with low GDP, the association is stronger (r = -
.92, p<.01), with Portugal and Italy stretching this relationship at the two opposite poles.  
Finally, one question remains unanswered: what drives levels of fraud? The answer is 
not straightforward, as combines cultural and economic factors. It can be said that in 
countries with high levels of GDP, economic growth do play a role. For countries that 
belong to this group (high GDP), the increase in GDP per capita between 2000 and 
                                                          
21
 The association holds even when Italy and Portugal were removed from the analysis (r = -
0.69, p<.001). 
22
 Education and level of income have a residual positive effect only in a very few countries. 
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2005 is positively associated with a tendency to offend the market (the relationship 
between GDP growth and level of consumer fraud is r=.75, p<.001, controlled for GDP 
in 2000). Iceland, Austria and Germany are examples of countries with a remarkable 
growth in GDP in the period between 2000 and 2005 and a high tendency to offend the 
market. Conversely, Ireland and Luxembourg whose GDP increased at a slower pace 
during that period show a lower tendency towards consumer fraud.  
For countries with low GDP, economic growth is not associated with tendency to offend 
(r = .067, p=.864). The results may suggest that within this group, cultural factors 
surmount economic factors. One prime example is Italy that, despite the low growth in 
GDP—GDP is actually declining for that period—exhibits a high tendency to offend the 
market. A country with a comparable low GDP growth is Portugal, but the tendency to 
offend is dramatically lower than Italy. Additionally, countries with emerging markets, 
namely Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Slovakia and Poland the tendency to offend is 
similar albeit the group differ considerably in terms of growth rate in GDP for that 
period (Slovakia is one of the countries with greatest GDP growth from 2000-2005).  
Discussion and conclusions 
This paper brings support for Hypothesis 6 in this dissertation which considers that 
relatively deprived individuals are more likely to engage in fraudulent practices 
especially in countries where dishonest practices are uncommon. This result may lead to 
several interpretations. The worst empirical scenario would be that the opportunity to 
perform fraudulent behaviour is confounding the relationship between financial 
hardship and consumer fraud. Logically, people who said living more comfortably may 
interact more often with the market, facing more opportunities to behave dishonestly. 
As such, the frequency of fraudulent behaviours would be higher among them. This 
could explain the negative slopes encountered between financial hardship and consumer 
fraud. But fails to explain why in some countries, with particularly low levels of 
consumer fraud, people that are struggling with finances offend more. 
At the very best, this empirical pattern points to normative forces that guide the 
behaviour. In countries where fraudulent behaviour is more likely to occur, social norms 
that are favorable to consumer fraud (descriptive norms) drive the behaviour. The 
justification ―everybody does it‖ (Gabor, 1994) acquires here a great relevance as a 
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rational for fraudulent behaviour. Fraudulent behaviour becomes less dependent on 
idiosyncratic motivations and hence less informative about the actor. Thus, it can be 
assumed that opportunity plays a determinant role in facilitating fraudulent behaviour 
especially in countries where this type of behaviour is more common.  
By contrast, in countries where the overall frequency of consumer fraud is very low, 
fraudulent behaviour is not rooted in shared norms. Thus, fraudulent behaviour becomes 
closer to its deviant nature and the social forces that regulate it amount to general forces 
that compel individuals to disrespect social norms. In this particular context, deviant 
consumer behaviour may be explained through a syndrome of market anomie (Karstedt 
and Farrall, 2006). The motivational aspect that impel deviant behaviour is believed to 
be the perceived discrepancy of current and desired economic situation, captured in this 
study by the feeling about household‘s finances. Accordingly, respondents who said 
living very difficult on present income are more likely to engage in deviant consumer 
behaviour, but only in countries where the fraudulent behaviour is uncommon.  
An additional result reveals that citizens of countries with a high GDP, growing at a 
slow pace, display a lower tendency to commit fraud, suggesting that sustained 
economic growth plays a crucial role in shaping morality in the market. This result 
offers partial support for Hypothesis 4 which states that countries with market 
economies which higher rates of growth show higher prevalence of consumer dishonest 
practices. This issue was only partially addressed in this study due to its cross-sectional 
nature, but it is believed that longitudinal studies that analyze economic trajectories and 
associated changes in economic morality would provide better insights of crimes of 
everyday life as indicators of the interplay between economy and culture. 
This paper puts in evidence the macro-level association between economic growth and 
the prevalence of consumer fraud. Countries with market economies with higher rates of 
growth show higher prevalence of fraud, as predicted in hypothesis 4. However, this 
effect only applies to countries with GDP above the EU average, coincidentally all 
market and coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001). It is suggested that 
in countries with GDP below EU average (mixed economies and emerging markets), 
other factors may play a role. In the next paper (paper 3) the role of the perception of 
corruption in the government and income inequality in acceptance of fraud is explored 
using multilevel modeling. 
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This paper also clarifies the third research question that relates to the identification of a 
mechanism that explains how a state of market anomie contributes to the emergence of 
consumer dishonest behaviour (psychological mechanism). The hypothesis tested in this 
paper is that relatively deprived individuals are more likely to engage in fraudulent 
practices (H6). The hypothesis was not confirmed as this effect does not hold across 
countries. It seems that country variables such as descriptive norms related to fraud 
moderate this relationship. However, the effect of relative deprivation seems trifling for 
the vast majority of countries. In the next paper (paper 3), the additional hypothesis that 
trust in individuals that distrust in political institutions are more likely to engage in 
fraudulent practices is tested with EVS data.  
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PAPER 3 
Revisiting the “inequality trap” 
A multilevel model for the acceptance of fraud  
ABSTRACT 
This article explores the individual and national characteristics that may explain country 
variations in the reports of acceptance of fraudulent acts such as cheating on taxes, 
accepting bribes, paying with cash in hand to avoid taxes, and falsely claiming state 
benefits. Drawing on data of 34 European countries from the fourth wave of the 
European Values Study (2008) and country-level variables, namely, the Gini 
coefficient, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
a theoretical multilevel model is tested in this article providing evidence for the impact 
of distrust in political institutions (H7), income inequality (H2), and perception of 
corruption on the acceptance of fraud against the state (H3). 
The ―inequality trap‖ hypothesis (Uslaner, 2008) is used to explain the social 
mechanism whereby income inequality and corruption in the government trigger fraud 
against the state. This theory considers that income inequality drives distrust in 
citizens—including interpersonal trust and trust in institutions—which in turn facilitates 
corruption. High levels of corruption in companies and in the public sector lead to more 
inequality, in a vicious cycle. Based on previous studies (Marien and Hooghe, 2011), 
and on the notions of market anomie (Karstedt and Farrall, 2006) and legitimacy of 
authority (Tyler, 2010), a psychological mechanism is advanced to explain the impact 
of distrust in institutions on acceptance of fraud.  Fraud is seen as a way to restore 
balance when citizens perceive the government and the economy as operating in 
morally questionable ways. 
The impact of macro and micro variables on the acceptance of fraud is tested using a 
random-intercept multilevel regression. The results show that distrust in political 
institutions is associated with acceptance of all of the types of fraud under 
consideration. At the country level, paying cash to avoid taxes finds greater approval in 
countries where government is perceived as more corrupt and cheating on taxes is more 
acceptable in countries with higher income inequalities, controlling for GDP. These 
results offer empirical support to extend the ―inequality trap‖ to the acceptance of fraud 
against the state. 
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Introduction 
Consumers differ on the perceptions of fairness of economic transactions and practices 
of different economic actors. Cultural forces and social norms shape judgements of 
fairness and dictate what constitute acceptable practices in the marketplace. Some 
authors adopt the expression ―economic morality‖ to refer to collective ideas about the 
fairness of the way the economy works (Arnold, 2001; Booth, 1993; Karstedt and 
Farrall, 2006). In this light, economic morality is seen as a cultural dimension expressed 
by the acceptance or condemnation of specific practices in the economic sphere. As 
such, the acceptance of dishonest practices is expected to vary across countries.  
The aim of this article is to advance a social mechanism (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010) 
explaining cross-country variations of the acceptance of fraud against the state such as 
cheating on taxes, paying in cash to avoid VAT, bribing public officials, and falsely 
claiming government benefits. As pointed out by Karsted and Farrall (2006, 2008), the 
idea of economic morality can also be applied to interactions of citizens with the state 
by accepting that the distinction between citizens and consumers is somewhat blurred in 
present days market societies. The social mechanism advanced in this article combines 
the societal and the individual level of analysis (Doise, 1986) to account for how 
country level characteristics (cultural and economic factors) impact on citizens‘ 
perceptions of fairness of dishonest practices. The question of whether acceptance of 
fraud may lead to actual behaviour depends on a number of other behavioural 
determinants such as the opportunity to behave dishonestly, the social norms, and the 
perceived costs of the behaviour (Beck and Ajzen, 1991).  
It has been assumed that in market societies, market values have come to govern 
consumers‘ lives playing a role in non-economic domains of their lives. The market 
economy has become a market society. This market-oriented thinking revolves around 
the idea that everything has a price and individuals weight costs and gains when it 
comes to make decisions. As Sandel (2012) puts it, ―the reach of markets and market-
oriented thinking, into aspects of life traditionally governed by non-market norms is one 
of the most significant developments of our time‖ (p.7). As the values embedded in the 
market seep into all spheres of life traditionally governed by non-market values—
health, education, procreation, environmental protection—the values of other 
institutions such as the government, family, religion, and education (Messner and 
Rosenfeld, 1997, 2010) lose their power to regulate behaviour (Sandel, 2012). By the 
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commodification of traditionally non-exchangeable goods, market promotes certain 
values and inevitably impacts the moral framework of society that sustains economic 
morality. Karstedt and Farrall (2004, 2006), refer to a syndrome of market anomie 
comprising distrust in business and governments, fear of victimisation from business 
and cynical attitudes towards the law. Anomie is used here to describe the idea that 
social institutions have failed to regulate the behaviour of individuals in the prescribed 
direction (Bernburg, 2002). This constellation of attitudes was shown to be associated to 
consumer dishonest behaviour.  
 
This article explores the link between distrust in political institutions and the acceptance 
of fraud against the state. These practices are more or less observable in all European 
countries, (Karstedt, 2006; Lopes, 2010), and their occurrence interferes with the 
effectiveness of the economy and the ability to implement legislation (Dalton, 2005). 
Two studies suggest that citizens with high levels of distrust in political institutions 
show, on average, higher tolerance for fraudulent practices. The link between distrust in 
the government and illicit behaviour in the marketplace has been empirically 
demonstrated by Karstedt and Farrall (2004, 2006) in England, Wales, West Germany 
and East Germany. The impact of distrust in political institutions on legal 
permissiveness has been demonstrated by Marien and Hooghe (2011), who used data of 
previous waves of the EVS (1999–2001). The limitation of these studies is that they 
didn‘t consider the contextual factors drive market anomie and acceptance of fraud in 
European countries. This study fills this gap by offering a model that combines 
individual and societal explanations of acceptance of fraud by looking at contextual 
characteristics that trigger feelings of distrust in the government and in the market, 
pushing them to not comply with the rules of the game.  
This article presents a theoretical model and statistical analysis—by looking at the 
literature on trust and democracy, and economic morality—constructing an argument 
based in the positive effects of institutional trust on democratic performance and 
acceptance of fraud. With this article, we aim to add a milestone to the existing 
literature on the topic, by considering the existing theories on market anomie. We 
assume that trust in market and political institutions work facilitators or inhibitors of 
attitudes towards fraud. 
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This paper aims to (1) examine the relationship between distrust in political institutions 
and acceptance of fraud (H7 in this thesis) across 34 European countries using data from 
the fourth wave of the European Values Study (2008) and (2) explore the country-level 
factors that are associated with the acceptance of fraudulent acts toward the state, 
namely, the perception of corruption in the public and private sectors (H3 in this thesis) 
and income inequality (H2 in this thesis). The results confirm, on the individual level, 
an association between the acceptance of fraud and distrust in institutions such as the 
parliament, the government, political parties and the social security system. More 
specifically, fraud against the state may be explained through a compensatory 
mechanism intended to restore moral balance when citizens perceive the government as 
operating in morally questionable ways.  
The link between the acceptance of certain types of fraud and country-level variables, 
such as corruption in the public and private sectors and income inequality, is also 
supported. Distrust in political institutions is higher in countries with large income 
disparities and high levels of corruption, in line with the ―inequality trap‖ hypothesis 
formulated by Uslaner (2008). This hypothesis considers that income inequality drives 
distrust in citizens—including interpersonal trust and trust in institutions—which in turn 
facilitates corruption. High levels of corruption in companies and in the public sector 
lead to more inequality, in a vicious cycle. Under such conditions, fraud may be seen as 
more acceptable. Because of the non-experimental nature of this study, no assumptions 
were made about the causality of the relationship among fraud, trust, corruption and 
income inequality.  
This paper is organised into three sections. The introduction covers the theoretical 
approaches of the concept of trust, with an emphasis on the syndrome of market anomie 
(Karstedt & Farrall, 2006), legitimacy of authority (Tyler, 2010) moral foundations of 
trust (Uslaner, 2008). A social mechanism to explain fraudulent practices against the 
state is proposed. The second section offers a description and results of a empirical 
study based on data of 34 European countries available in the fourth round of the 
European Values Study. The final section offers a discussion of the results and presents 
some concluding remarks. 
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Trust in institutions and acceptance of fraud 
A growing body of literature agrees that the emergence of an effective democracy and a 
prosperous economy implies that citizens trust their fellow citizens and, more 
importantly, trust their social institutions (Fukuyama, 1995; Offe, 1999; Newton, 2003; 
Sztompka, 1999; Uslaner, 2002). Sztompka (1999) emphasised that distrust has been 
the common denominator in most formerly communist societies. Thus, to establish a 
social and economic order, it is crucial that citizens identify with their political system 
and trust their institutions.  
The impact of trust in economic success and democratic performance is well 
documented in the literature (Fukuyama, 2005; LaPorta et al., 1999, Rothstein and 
Usalner, 2006).  Low levels of trust in political institutions makes citizens more prone 
to break the law as demonstrated by Marien & Hooghe (2011) using data of EVS (1999-
2001). If individuals perceive institutions (e.g., the government or the economic system) 
not to be trustworthy, they may view dishonest practices in the civic and market arenas 
as more tolerable.  
This article adopts the definition of trust proposed by Francis Fukuyama (1995): ―Trust 
is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative 
behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that 
community.‖ (p. 26). Trust in other people can assume two basic forms: (1) trust 
embedded in social relationships with particular individuals, including family and 
friends, and (2) general trust in fellow citizens. Different authors use different labels to 
refer to these two types of interpersonal trust. For example, Putnam (1993) refers to thin 
and thick trust, and Uslaner (2002) to strategic and moralistic trust.  However, they all 
agree on the core idea that trust is based in the expectation that the trustee will act in the 
way that the person who trusts expects in a given situation. 
Trust may also refer to entities that are not necessarily individuals or groups. 
Discussions of diverse forms of trust have proliferated in the literature. Institutional 
trust may refer to legitimate power (e.g., in the Parliament), authority (e.g., in the 
government) or the economy (e.g., in the mode of production). Institutional trust is 
related to procedures and basic practices more than in expectations towards reciprocity.  
Interpersonal trust is assumed to form the basis of trustworthy political institutions (e.g., 
Offe, 1999) in a way that facilitates social interaction, and promotes collective action 
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(Luhmann 1979, p.28). Citizens need to trust one another to ensure representation and 
resistance to non-democratic forms of governance (Inglehart, 1999). By engaging in 
community and civic affairs, citizens attempt to establish public interest and build the 
institutions on which democracy depends (Zmerli & Newton, 2008). In this way, 
interpersonal trust lies at the basis of institutional trust.  
Citizens start to trust institutions when they extend the trusting ties from those 
individuals that they know personally to other who they don‘t necessarily know. A 
further step towards institutional trust happens when individuals learn how to trust not 
only people they don‘t personally know but also they trust interpersonal entities, as a set 
of practices and procedures (Zmerli and Newton, 2008), such as institutions, or the 
individuals who personify them (Offe, 1999). 
Common to the various definitions of institutional trust is the idea that shared norms 
and expectations are guided by ethical principles that protect the community against the 
self-interest of certain agents. For example, Hosmer (1995) defines trust as ―the 
expectation of ethically justifiable behaviour, that is, morally correct decisions and 
actions based upon ethical principles of analysis‖ (p. 399). Thus, trust and ethics are 
intertwined. Under this light, Uslaner (2002) views trust as a moral foundation.  
On the basis of his idea, Uslaner (2002) considers that trust in others cannot be based on 
direct experience with other people because trust can be also directed to strangers. 
Therefore, presuming that strangers are trustworthy implies that individuals share with 
them fundamental principles and rights. In other words, trusting others imply that 
individuals believe that all human beings share the same core moral principles. From 
this perspective, trust is seen as an egalitarian ideal. Uslaner (2008) considers that this 
moralistic trust is acquired early in life during the socialization process. 
Seen as a moral foundation, trust alludes to ethical principles that guide all spheres of 
life. Trusting others implies creating expectations about future interactions founded on 
ethical principles that people endorse and believe they share with others. When these 
expectations are contradicted, these ethical standards are violated, and distrust in 
specific others may follow. The same rationale my also be applied to groups or 
institutions. Distrust in particular institutions or groups may arise from the violation of 
expectations of good practices based on more or less shared ethical principles. For 
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example, Catterberg and Moreno (2005) found that political trust is tied to government 
performance, and it is undermined by corruption and permissiveness.  
This article advances a psychological mechanism (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010) 
explaining the link of distrust and fraudulent behaviour based on the idea of market 
anomie (Karstedt and Farral, 2006) and legitimacy of authority (Tyler, 2010). The 
syndrome of market anomie is expressed through distrust in the market and in the 
economic agents, cynical attitudes towards the law and detachment from the economy 
and it is shown to drive dishonest practices in the marketplace (Karstedt and Farral, 
2006, Lopes, 2010). Karstedt and Farrall (2006) advanced that this constellation of 
negative feelings and attitudes towards the market result from the transition to neo-
liberal economies that was observed in the late twentieth century in European countries. 
Neo-liberal policies re-balanced the weights between governments and markets 
(through the de-regulation of markets) and distributed responsibilities and risks between 
consumers and business. Some authors have noted that the neo-liberal reforms were 
accompanied by a ―cornucopia of new opportunities‖ (Shover, Coffey, & Hobbs, 2003, 
p. 490) that has facilitated dishonest practices by economic agents (see Ericson, Barry, 
& Doyle, 2000). Karstedt and Farrall (2006) claim that new opportunities are related to 
the changes in economic morality that accompany the transition to neo-liberal markets. 
These opportunities were created because, on the one hand, consumers are sovereign in 
making decisions and balancing the risks and on the other hand, they can be an easy 
prey for illegal and unfair business practices if they lack important skills such as 
financial knowledge and legal information (Karstedt & Farrall, 2006). Situations where 
consumers may feel defrauded by business include small print clauses, charges for 
unordered items and concealing of relevant information about products or contracts. The 
perception of consumers about the fairness of the economy is inevitably affected by 
those experiences in the marketplace. Empirical evidence (Karstedt & Farrall, 2006, 
Lopes 2010) gives support to the idea that consumers who are victims of unethical 
experiences in the marketplace show a lower confidence in economic agents and cynical 
attitudes toward the law. In the scenario of generalized dishonest business practices, 
consumers may choose not to cooperate with market rules and regulations. Consumers 
may also take advantage of situations they face. From this angle, consumer fraud 
appears a feasible outcome of market anomie. 
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The consequences of market anomie may be extended to the political sphere. If 
economic agents or governments behave in illegitimate ways, trust in the economy and 
in the government will be undermined with negative effects on law enforcement 
(Marion and Hooghe, 2011). From a criminological perspective, Tyler (2004, 2010) 
advanced the idea that citizens are more likely to comply with the law if they respect 
and recognise the legitimacy of the law and authority, rather than simply fearing 
punishment. For Tyler (2010), the legitimacy of an authority (person or institution) is a 
―property that entitles the authority to have its decisions and rules accepted and 
followed by others‖ (p.34). If citizens realise that companies and governments act in 
their self-interest, trust will be undermined and the recognition of the legitimacy of the 
political and economic system will be affected. The rule of law may be distorted, and 
non-compliance with the rules that those authorities aim to enforce will arise. 
Fraudulent activities find support and moral standards in the economic sphere may shift.  
This rationale does not preclude the possibility that the relationship between distrust and 
the acceptance of fraud operates in the opposite direction. The toleration of fraud may 
also be seen as a rationalisation for dishonest behaviour. The incongruence that arises 
when individuals behave in dishonest ways is experienced by a feeling of cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger, 1957), especially by those individuals who endorse strong moral 
principles. The way this dissonance can be eliminated is adding or strengthening 
justification to the dishonest behaviour. For example, if someone does not pay their 
taxes, he/can may add some justification to their behaviour by reinforcing the belief that 
the government is corrupt and does not act in the citizens‘ best interests. In this light, 
political institutions may be seen as more illegitimate for individuals who engage in 
fraud against the state.  As such, the relationship between distrust in political institutions 
and acceptance of fraud toward the state is assumed in this article to be operating in 
both directions.  
This psychological mechanism is only part of a broader social mechanism that account 
for differences in the acceptance of fraud across countries. The explanation should 
move one level of analysis up to look at macroconditions that generate different levels 
of trust in political institutions. In this article, country characteristics such as perception 
of corruption in the government and income inequality are considering, providing an 
empirical test of the ―inequality trap‖ (Uslaner, 2008). 
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Perception of corruption and acceptance of fraud 
It has been shown that corruption in government and business is the major obstacle for 
the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals, which aspire to combat poverty, 
promote universal education, and achieve gender equality by 2015 (TI, 2010). The 
notion that economic morality underlies the behaviour of different actors suggests that 
corruption, such as accepting or asking for bribes, misappropriation of public funds, and 
kickbacks in public procurement practices, undermines the legitimacy of the 
government and promotes the acceptance of fraudulent behaviour among citizens. 
This article explores the relationship between the perception of corruption, political trust 
and acceptance of fraud. Corruption refers to the misuse of public power for private 
gain and it is measured in this article by the Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI), which provides a country‘s level of corruption based on the 
opinions of experts on several types of corruption.  
The levels of perceived corruption affect fraudulent behaviour on a number of ways. 
First, if the misuse of power by members of the political class or by officeholders 
becomes publicly known, and there are no noticeable legal penalties imposed on those 
who abuse their position, the rule of law will be perverted. In such a scenario, the 
perception of the effectiveness of the criminal justice system will be negatively affected, 
and citizens might believe that they are unlikely to be caught and prosecuted if they 
engage in fraudulent acts or corruption.  
Second, the ethical line between acceptable and unacceptable practices may be blurred 
if corruption is the norm. If these acts are simply seen as part of life, citizens become 
more tolerant of fraudulent acts. Karstedt & Farrall (2007) found in samples of UK and 
Germany that those who engage in fraudulent acts such as avoiding taxes are not seen as 
criminals by themselves or others. 
Third, corruption in the government undermines the distrust in the institutions that 
perpetuate it. Putnam (1993) explains that corruption of the government reduces the 
level of political trust among the citizenry. Considering that political and interpersonal 
trust go hand in hand, corruption in the government is associated with low levels of 
interpersonal trust. A society where citizens do not trust each other is a segmented 
society with informally delimited social groups living and working together within their 
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boundaries to achieve groups‘ common goals and interests. In such a society, dishonest 
behaviour finds fertile soil in which to grow. 
The results of this article corroborate the relationship between perceived corruption in 
the public and private sectors and the general acceptance of tax evasion. By impacting 
the level of trust in institutions, shifting a society‘s moral boundaries or by perverting 
the rule of law, higher levels of corruption in the government seem to foster citizens‘ 
tolerance for fraud. As economic and cultural factors sustain corruption, it makes it 
difficult to eradicate. This position is in sharp contrast with other positions suggesting 
that changes in government structures (such as the electoral system) or the 
strengthening of the sanctions against corruption, would deter corruption (Uslaner, 
2008). These arguments ignore the moral foundations of corruption and treat corruption 
as an outcome of a system that needs to be fixed rather than as a value ingrained in a 
citizen‘s economic morality. 
 
Income inequality and acceptance of fraud 
The distribution of resources in the economy has been related to general trust. Using 
data from the European World Survey, Brown and Uslaner (2002) found lower average 
levels of interpersonal trust in countries with higher levels of inequality. This finding 
indicates that the roots of trust are not only institutional but embedded in the values that 
societies hold and in the fair distribution of resources (Uslaner, 2002).  
The link between equality and trust has been explained by Uslaner (2002) through the 
idea of social identification. Achieving an equal distribution of wealth in a society 
causes citizens to develop a sense of common destiny and optimism that ties people 
together reinforcing social bonds. In turn, trusting societies have more efficient 
governments and institutions, leading to more spending on welfare services and more 
even income redistribution. Thus, trust and equality are in this way intertwined.  
Uslaner (2008) refers to the ―inequality trap‖ to explain the interrelated effects of 
inequality, corruption and distrust. High inequality fuels low levels of general trust, 
which in turn nurture corruption. Widespread corruption leads to more inequality, which 
then closes the vicious circle. The trustworthiness of others can hardly be directly 
reshaped by new policies but this can be achieved by reducing income discrepancies in 
a society with positive effects for government transparency and economic morality.  
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This article extends the inequality trap beyond corruption to fraudulent practices (Figure 
1). The solid lines refer to the ―inequality trap‖ (Uslaner 2008) and to the relationship 
between distrust and the tolerance of fraud as demonstrated by Marien and Hooghe 
(2011). Income inequalities and facilitate fraudulent behaviour are mediated by low 
levels of trust. Tax evasion and benefit fraud unequivocally hamper welfare services 
and redistribution mechanisms that contribute to the reduction of the inequality gap, but 
as this relation is not approached directly in this article, a dashed line is presented. 
Societies with higher levels of trust tend to have a more equal distribution of wealth and 
are also less corrupt and legitimate institutions. As a result, fraud would be more 
tolerable in countries with higher levels of inequality and corruption in the public 
sector.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical model considering the extension of ―inequality trap‖ (Uslaner, 
2008) to acceptance of fraud. 
 
The main objective of this article is to explore the characteristics of individuals and 
countries that tolerate fraud and corruption. The empirical work is guided by the 
following hypotheses: 
1) There is a positive association between distrust in political institutions and the 
toleration of fraud (H7). 
2) Fraud is accepted to a greater extent in countries that have higher levels of income 
inequality (H2).  
3) Fraud is accepted to a greater extent in countries that have higher levels of 
corruption in the government and business (H3). 
 
 
Inequality Corruption in the public sector 
Distrust in political institutions Acceptance of fraud 
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Method 
Sample 
This empirical study relies on individual and aggregate data gathered from various 
sources. Individual data regarding the toleration of fraud and level of trust in institutions 
were taken from the fourth wave of the European Values Study (2010). Data for the 
following 34 countries are available: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus (and Turkish Cyprus), the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany (with two independent samples for East and West 
Germany), Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Moldavia, Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, the 
Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Ukraine. The sampling 
strategy was a multi-state sampling with several steps of stratified random sampling 
based on regional units. In France a quota sampling was also used in combination with a 
random sampling and in East Germany a stratified disproportional sampling to allow 
inclusion in the sample of particular groups (EVS, GESIS, 2010). The number of 
respondents (valid interviews) was around 1500 for every country except Northern 
Cyprus and Northern Ireland (with 500 interviews each), Iceland (808), Cyprus (1000), 
Ireland (1013), Norway (1090), Finland (1134), Sweden (1187), Switzerland (1272) 
France (3070), Germany (East: 1004, West: 1071). Respondents are 18 or over in nearly 
all countries except Armenia where respondents are aged 15 or over and in Finland 
where respondents are aged between 18 to 74 years. 
Questionnaire and variables 
The method of data collection was face-to-face interview in nearly all countries expect 
Finland (internet panel) and Sweden (postal survey). Data was captured using computer 
assisted data interview (CAPI) and pen or pencil questionnaire interview (PAPI).  
Trust in institutions was assessed using a four-item Likert scale. The wording of the 
statement is the following: ―Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, 
how much confidence do you have in them: a great deal (1), quite a lot (2), not very 
much or (3) none at all (4)?‖ The list consists of a wide variety of institutions, including 
the parliament, the social security system, major companies, the church, the police, the 
army, and the system of justice. From that list, following certain methodological 
procedures to assure measurement equivalence across countries (cf. results section), the 
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institutions included in the analysis are the parliament, the civil service, the social 
security system, political parties and the government.  
The acceptance of fraud is measured by a series of statements contained in the EVS 
questionnaire. A list of dishonest practices is shown on a card, and for each of them, 
respondents are asked to choose a level of justification on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 
is never justifiable, and 10 is always justifiable. The wording of the question is: ―Please 
tell me for each of the following whether you think it can always be justified, never be 
justified or somewhere in between, using this card.‖ The list of acts ranges from 
euthanasia, adultery and homosexuality to behaviours such as avoiding paying the fare 
on public transportation, cheating on taxes and disposing of trash in places other than 
designated sites. For this analysis, fraudulent acts towards the state have been selected, 
namely paying cash to avoid taxes, accepting a bribe, cheating on taxes and claiming 
state benefits that one is not entitled to. 
At the country level we used a measure corruption from Transparency Internacional—
Corruption Perception Index—and a measure of income inequality from the Eurostat—
Gini coefficient. 
As a subjective measure focusing on the perception of corruption by businesspeople and 
country-specific analysts, CPI is a solid assessment of perceived corruption. Unlike the 
objective measures of corruption (e.g., number of cases coming to the court), this index 
does not depend on the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. Because it 
combines different types of information from different sources, CPI captures various 
interrelated dimensions of the same broad phenomena (e.g., incidence of corruption, 
government accountability, prosecution of corruption, existence of anti-corruption 
initiatives and perception of the impact of corruption on the business environment). A 
higher CPI means that more corruption at the country-level. 
Income inequality captures income distribution in particular countries by liking at the 
gap between higher compared to lower incomes. Eurostat defines Gini coefficient as 
―the relationship of cumulative shares of the population arranged according to the level 
of equivalised disposable income, to the cumulative share of the equivalised total 
disposable income received by them‖ (Eurostat, 2008). A higher value of this 
coefficient means that more income disparities. 
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Results 
This section is divided into three parts. In the first part, descriptive results are presented 
and discussed. A nationwide overview of attitudes towards fraud (paying cash for 
services to avoid taxes, claiming state benefits to which one is not entitled, accepting a 
bribe in the course of one‘s duties, cheating on one‘s taxes) is provided by boxplots and 
by careful examination of the descriptive statistics. In the second part, the equivalence 
of distrust in political institutions is examined. Distrust in political institutions is studied 
with respect to five institutions (the parliament, the civil service, social security, 
political parties and the government) and generated by multigroup structural equation 
modelling. Measurement equivalence of the category that was examined is presented in 
part two. In the third part, the hypotheses under scrutiny are tested. A multilevel 
analysis is performed to analyse the impact of trust and macro variables (Gini 
coefficient, GDP and national level of corruption) on the justification of fraud. 
 
Descriptive analysis 
Descriptive statistics, such as mean values and standard deviations, indicate that in all of 
the studied countries, fraud towards the state on average is not seen as justifiable. The 
average values across the four statements range between 1.29 for Turkish Cyprus (95% 
C.I.: 1.23 to 1.34) and 3.05 (95% C.I.: 2.99 to 3.10) for France on a 10-point scale. 
Countries that are more extreme in their condemnation of fraud are Malta, Bulgaria, 
Serbia and Montenegro, whereas in France, Lithuania, Latvia and the Russian 
Federation, the condemnation of fraud is less extreme on average.  
The responses to the four statements on fraud range between 1 and 10 for the majority 
of countries, and the standard deviation also varies considerably across countries (cf. 
Table 1). The results show more variability in the Russian Federation, Lithuania and 
Latvia and less variability in Cyprus, Denmark, Malta, and Kosovo. Figures 2 through 4 
present the overall representations of the justification of fraud in all EVS (2010) 
countries, as given by the boxplots (displaying the overall distribution, median, quartiles 
and outliers). It is clear from the boxplots that the distribution of the acceptance of the 
four types of fraud against the government is positively skewed putting in evidence that 
fraudulent behaviour is socially condemned across European countries. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics [mean, standard deviation, standard error, 95% 
confidence interval for the mean and non-response rate (%)] across the items of 
acceptance of fraud (EVS, 2008). 
     95% Confidence 
Interval 
 
 Country N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Non-
response   
 Albania             1533 2.61 1.72 .04 2.52 2.69 3.13 
 Armenia             1493 1.99 1.33 .03 1.92 2.05 3.87 
 Austria             1505 2.73 1.75 .05 2.64 2.82 2.48 
 Bosnia Herz. 1509 1.98 1.59 .04 1.90 2.06 1.07 
 Bulgaria            1499 1.73 1.24 .03 1.67 1.80 2.77 
 Cyprus              999 2.52 1.44 .05 2.43 2.61 4.85 
 Cyprus Turkish    498 1.29 0.62 .03 1.23 1.34 1.95 
 Czech Republic      1803 2.71 1.78 .04 2.62 2.79 3.87 
 Denmark             1503 2.04 0.98 .03 1.99 2.09 1.06 
 Estonia             1517 2.27 1.42 .04 2.20 2.34 2.78 
 France              3070 3.05 1.62 .03 2.99 3.10 0.50 
 Georgia             1478 1.88 1.48 .04 1.80 1.95 6.53 
 Germany East        1003 1.92 1.21 .04 1.84 1.99 1.99 
 Germany West        1069 2.43 1.53 .05 2.34 2.53 0.68 
 Greece              1496 2.71 1.59 .04 2.63 2.79 1.62 
 Hungary             1511 1.92 1.40 .04 1.85 1.99 0.66 
 Ireland             1009 2.43 1.58 .05 2.33 2.52 4.00 
 Kosovo              1589 1.43 1.08 .03 1.37 1.48 2.83 
 Latvia              1500 2.99 1.78 .05 2.90 3.08 2.49 
 Lithuania           1484 2.94 1.89 .05 2.85 3.04 9.95 
 Luxembourg          1608 2.84 1.68 .04 2.75 2.92 2.64 
 Malta               1499 1.65 1.09 .03 1.60 1.71 1.42 
 Moldavia            1536 2.36 1.61 .04 2.28 2.44 4.71 
 Montenegro          1504 1.88 1.37 .04 1.81 1.95 3.81 
 Netherlands         1554 2.33 1.14 .03 2.27 2.38 0.74 
 Poland              1507 2.67 1.74 .04 2.58 2.76 3.28 
 Portugal            1548 2.04 1.38 .04 1.98 2.11 2.77 
 Romania             1456 2.52 1.61 .04 2.44 2.60 7.07 
 Russian Fed.  1497 2.93 1.94 .05 2.83 3.02 6.55 
 Serbia              1501 1.73 1.31 .03 1.67 1.80 2.79 
 Slovak Rep.    1499 2.76 1.63 .04 2.68 2.84 3.58 
 Spain               1497 2.61 1.55 .04 2.53 2.69 4.93 
 Switzerland         1267 2.14 1.20 .03 2.07 2.20 1.48 
 Ukraine             1502 2.12 1.52 .04 2.04 2.20 7.96 
 Total                50043 2.34 1.58 .01 2.33 2.36 3.28 
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A comparison of the results across countries based on correlations and regression 
coefficients assumes that the same latent construct defined by the same set of indicators 
is used in the analysis. This notion is addressed by the concept of measurement 
invariance and assumes three basic forms: configural, metric and scalar invariance 
(Johnson, 1998). From a statistical point of view, configural invariance implies that 
latent variables are determined by the same indicators in multiple samples, metric 
invariance assumes that the same factor loadings of the indicators are the same across 
samples and scalar equivalence requires invariance of indicator intercepts across 
samples (Fontaine, 2008). These three basic forms of equivalence are inclusive, that is, 
the presence of the strictest invariance implies all of the previous ones. In other words, 
configural invariance per se does not allow comparisons across countries, metric 
invariance allows comparisons of correlations/effects and scalar invariance allows 
comparisons of means and correlations/effects. 
The equivalence of factor loadings across samples—metric invariance—was chosen to 
test for the variable trust in institutions by making use of multigroup structural equation 
modelling with the 34 countries studied (AMOS, v.19 was used). The same structure—
one latent variable with five indicators—was found for all of the countries/groups. 
When the factor loadings of the indicators on the latent variable trust were held equal 
across countries, the adjustment of the model to data across countries was good, as 
given by the fit indices (CFI=.914, RMSEA=.023 and pclose=1). The comparative fit 
index (CFI) indicates the ratio of the improvement of the overall fit of the model to a 
model in which the observed variables were assumed to be uncorrelated. It is generally 
assumed that a CFI greater than 0.90 indicates a good overall fit (Kline, 2010). The root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) calculation is based on the difference 
between the observed and the model covariances: the covariance residuals (correcting 
for the complexity of the model). As a rule of thumb, values of RMSEA less than 0.05 
(and pclose greater than 0.05) indicate a good adjustment of the model to the data. The 
results of fit indices confirm the establishment of measurement invariance.  
This result suggests that people in different countries perceive distrust in political 
institutions related to the same set of institutions and to the same degree. The factor 
loadings (standardised) are depicted in Figure 6, and all are significant (p<.05). Trust in 
the parliament (v211) and the government (v222) are the best indicators of trust in 
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institutions. Because the model shows a good overall fit, comparisons of correlations 
and regression coefficients across countries may be undertaken. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Multi-group SEM for distrust in political institutions [The parliament (v211), 
civil service (v212), social security system (v213), political parties (v221) and the 
government (v222)] (AMOS output) 
 
 
Multilevel model 
A multilevel regression (random intercepts) was performed on the data of 32 countries 
to test the impact of trust or distrust and macro variables (GDP, Gini and CPI) on 
attitudes towards fraud, taking into account the hierarchical structure of the data 
(individual scores nested in countries).  
In this step, different models were used, one for each of the response variables, that is, 
the acceptance of different types of fraud, controlling for age and gender (Model 1-4). 
The results (Table 2) indicate that distrust in political institutions has an impact on the 
toleration of all types of fraud, the Gini coefficient has a significant positive effect on 
the acceptance of cheating on taxes, and the perception of corruption in the government 
has a significant positive effect on the acceptance of paying cash to avoid taxes, 
controlling for all the other variables in the model. However, these effects (standardised 
coefficients) are small, ranging from .011 to .088 at the individual level and .048 to .183 
at the national level. The marked positive skewness in the distribution of the dependent 
variables contributes to the limitation of the impact of the independent variables. 
Certain conclusions can be drawn, however, even with the small effects as observed 
above.  
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Table 2: Regression coefficients, standard errors and p-values for multilevel regression 
of justification of fraud (four separate models) (N=50043) 
 Claiming state 
benefits 
Cheating on taxes Accepting a bribe 
Paying in cash to 
avoid taxes 
 coef se coef se coef se coef se 
Fixed part         
age -.017*** .001 -.017*** .001 -.012*** .000 -.021*** .001 
gender -.085*** .020 -.277*** .021 -.164*** .016 -.248*** .024 
distrust inst. .030*** .005 .063*** .005 .011*** .004 .088*** .005 
         
Gini  index .039 .030 .048*** .017 .004 .017 .017 .024 
CPI .018 .072  -.007 .040  -.040 .040 .183*** .058 
GDP .043 .073 .013 .040 .014 .040 .096 .059 
cons .587 1.885 1.178 1.040 2.286 1.050 -.402 1.522 
         
Random part         
sd(cons) .702 .088 .384 .049 .388 .049 .565 .072 
sd(res) 2.048 .007 2.083 .007 1.620 .006 2.359 .008 
         
Log likelihood -87986.347 -88995.095 -78844.74 -92926.049 
N obs 40776 41316 41430 40776 
ICC  
(empty model) 
.113 .052 .061 .091 
*p<.05  **p<.01  ***p<.001 
 
Discussion 
The central hypothesis of this paper is that people are more tolerant of fraud in countries 
where there is greater distrust in political institutions (H7). Two additional hypotheses 
considered country factors—the perception of corruption in the government (H3) and 
business and income inequalities (H2)—were considered to have a negative impact on 
the acceptance of fraud. These hypotheses were corroborated in the present study. 
The results show that contextual factors at the national level (economic and cultural) are 
associated with the toleration of certain kinds of fraud. More specifically, paying cash to 
avoid the VAT is more acceptable in countries where corruption in the public sector is 
more common. Cheating on taxes is more acceptable in countries with higher income 
inequalities. At the individual level, distrust in political institutions is associated with 
acceptance of fraud in all countries. 
The mechanism that explains how trust in institutions has an impact on toleration of 
fraud is based on a reciprocity principle. As long as other people and social institutions 
behave in expected ways, citizens comply with the ―rules of the game‖. They behave in 
accordance with the law and contribute to the common good. However, when citizens 
 157 
 
are deceived in their expectations, political institutions are seen as less legitimate, trust 
is undermined and dishonest practices are perceived as more acceptable. Additionally, 
distrust in the political institutions and in the economy is associated with cynical 
attitudes towards the law. These results are consistent with the framework of market 
anomie (Karstedt and Farrall, 2006) and legitimacy of authority (Tyler, 2010) but do not 
preclude the possibility that other mechanism linking distrust in institutions and 
acceptance of fraud can be in place. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are corroborated in this study as perceived corruption in the 
government and income inequalities are associated with citizens‘ greater acceptance of 
fraud, and these variables have an effect, even if the countries‘ average levels of trust 
remain constant. An explanation based on trust and legitimacy of the government is 
advanced, as in countries with higher levels of corruption, citizens trust less in public 
officials and government (TI, 2010). But as the effect of perception of corruption on 
acceptance of fraud holds when controlled by trust, one additional explanation of the 
main effect should be advanced. Corrupt governments shift the society moral 
boundaries and fraudulent behaviour become more accepted and possibly more 
common. This effect is consistent with the idea of an economic morality on the 
perception of fairness about the way economy (and governments) work that shape 
judgments of fairness and behaviours. Additionally, other contextual factors, such as the 
inefficacy of legal systems or an individual‘s perception of being caught, should also be 
taken into account. The perception of corruption in the government contributes to 
weaken the legal effectiveness of the criminal justice system (Kaufman, 2004). If the 
perceived likelihood of being caught is low and/or the sanction is not severe enough to 
deter crime, fraudulent behaviour spreads. 
The relationship between corruption and acceptance of fraud can also be in the other 
direction. Citizens who engage in fraudulent practices may be more likely to perceive 
the government as more corrupt as a way to reduce the dissonance that had been arisen 
by the immoral behaviour. Reinforcing the idea that the government is also behaving in 
dishonest ways may contribute to restore the cognitive balance in citizens‘ minds. 
However, as shown in Paper 1, dishonest practices against the government are 
uncommon across Europe, showing that although this rationale may apply to some 
situations do not fully explain the generalized effect on corruption on acceptance of 
fraud.   
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Overall, the results of this paper reinforce the idea that economic morality is affected by 
governments and market performance. This additional information would help to clarify 
the contextual mechanism whereby the perception of corruption and income inequality 
influence the toleration of fraudulent behaviour. This article shows that a high level of 
perception of corruption in the public sector and income inequality go hand in hand 
with fraudulent behaviour against the state. These results allow extending the 
―inequality trap‖ (Uslaner, 2008) to acceptance of fraud. This theory considers the self-
sustained effect of inequality and corruption where one leads to the other. In turn, low 
trust and inequality sustain fraudulent behaviour, impacting back on inequality in a 
spiralling mechanism.  
 
Conclusion 
The general conclusion is that equality, trust and justification of fraud are strongly 
related in all countries studied. As mentioned throughout the theory, social and 
institutional trust are important prerequisites for complying with what the so called rules 
of the game. Distrusting the rules, norms, procedures and practices of political 
institutions have a clear effect on individual‘s willingness to comply with the law, or at 
least with their attitudes to justify not complying with the law.  
The results show that in all countries studied distrust on institutions has a clear impact 
on justification of fraud. On the other hand, inequality tends to be higher in those 
countries where institutions are more distrusted. Inequality is clearly related to a higher 
justification of fraud. Finally, it is shown that perceived corruption has a positive effect 
on justification of fraud. Even if this effect is found significant for one of our four 
dependent variables (paying with cash), this is a very relevant finding since it  provides 
innovative evidences from data at the aggregate level that contextual aspects matter 
when it comes to explaining attitudes of fraud against the State. 
It may be the case that this mechanism only works in specific economic and cultural 
settings. Other studies that apply this mechanism outside Europe borders would be 
needed to test its universality. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This dissertation presented a social mechanism to explain the phenomenon of consumer 
fraud. The theoretical foundations and the hypotheses were explored in chapter 2 and 
the empirical hypotheses derived tested in the three papers. This conclusion summarizes 
the papers and the empirical results that offer support for parts of the mechanism; 
articulates the mechanism for consumer fraud; discusses the theoretical and 
methodological implications of these results. 
 
5.1 Summary of the papers 
Paper 1 provides an overview of consumer fraud in European countries. The empirical 
basis for the social mechanism of consumer fraud can be found in papers 2 and 3. In the 
following paragraphs, a summary of each paper is provided. 
Paper 1 describes the normative patterns of dishonest practices in Europe and sets the 
stage for papers 2 and 3 which provide answers to the research questions. The central 
finding that emerges from this study is striking: nearly half of the European population 
occasionally engages in crimes such as paying cash in hand to avoid VAT and keeping 
extra change from a shop assistant. Moreover, passive fraud is more common than 
active fraud in all European countries and in developed compared to emerging market 
economies. By contrast, active fraud is more common in emerging compared to 
developed market economies. Passive fraud is more common among higher class 
citizens but active fraud is not linked to social class. 
Taken together, the results from paper 1 suggest that markets comprise a morality and 
different opportunities to behave dishonestly. It is assumed throughout this thesis that 
actual practices shape and are shaped by economic morality. More opportunity 
generates more fraudulent practices, and as the number of people who engage in those 
practices increases, the boundaries of what is considered right or wrong will move 
accordingly. 
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It was empirically shown in paper 2 that countries with a rapid economic growth have 
high levels of consumer fraud. This result offers incomplete support for Roland‘s (2004) 
macrosystemic approach to institutional change as well as Messner and Rosenfeld‘s 
(1994) Institutional Anomie Theory, which considers that a rapid expansion of the 
economy results in the desimbednedness of social institutions. In this scenario, the 
values of the market prevail over the values of the other institutions. Materialism values 
derived from business are endorsed by consumers; in extreme cases— where the social 
and political institutions are not robust enough to compete with materialism values—a 
situation of market anomie may arise. Due to the cross-sectional nature of the present 
research, Roland‘s theory was not fully tested in this thesis: longitudinal data would be 
needed; and to test the effect of the economic growth on the prevalence of consumer 
fraud, the independent variable should be the economic growth in a certain period (for 
one or more countries) rather than levels of different countries‘ economic growth. The 
limitations of the cross-national approach are obvious, arising from the impossibility of 
isolating the main effects of cultural and economic factors. 
Paper 3 shows that a high level of perception of corruption in the public sector and 
income inequality go hand in hand with consumer fraud. In countries with more 
(perception of) corruption by government and public officials, fraud is seen as more 
acceptable. An explanation based on trust and legitimacy of the government is 
advanced, as in countries with higher levels of corruption, citizens trust less in public 
officials and government (TI, 2010). But as the effect of perception of corruption on 
acceptance of fraud holds when controlled by trust, one additional explanation of the 
main effect of perception of corruption on acceptance of fraud is that corruption 
diminishes the legal effectiveness of the criminal justice system (Kaufman, 2004). If the 
perceived likelihood of being caught is low and/or the sanction is not severe enough to 
deter crime, fraudulent behaviour spreads. The findings of paper 3 provide evidence for 
including fraud in the ―inequality trap‖ (Uslaner, 2008) that considers a self-sustained 
effect of inequality and corruption where one leads to the other. Inequality fosters low 
trust that underlies corruption. Low trust and inequality sustain consumer fraud, 
impacting back on inequality, in a spiralling mechanism.  
5.2 Empirical evidence for hypotheses and answers to the research questions  
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The papers presented in this dissertation are motivated by three research questions with 
appropriate hypotheses for each research questions advanced and tested in the three 
papers. Next the questions, hypotheses and results that support or do not the hypotheses 
are presented. 
First research question: Was the transition to neo-liberal markets accompanied by a 
change in economic morality and a rise in consumer fraud (macro-level association)? 
The corresponding hypothesis is H4: 
H4: Countries with market economies with higher rates of growth show higher 
prevalence of consumer dishonest practices (tested in paper 2, ESS data). 
This hypothesis was partially verified in paper 2, as only in the group of countries with 
a high GDP (above European average), is the growth in GDP positively associated with 
a rise in consumer fraud. Countries with a higher development rate and a high GDP 
display a higher tendency to commit fraud, suggesting that sustained economic growth 
plays a crucial role in shaping morality in the market. For countries with low GDP, 
economic growth is not associated with the tendency to commit fraud. The results may 
suggest that in the low GDP group, cultural factors surmount the effect of economic 
factors. Given the limitations of using cross-sectional data rather than longitudinal data, 
the macro-association between economic growth and consumer dishonest practices was 
only weakly established. 
The second research problem questions which country contextual factors (social, 
economic and cultural) affect economic morality and the dissemination of consumer 
dishonest practices (contextual mechanism). The corresponding hypotheses are H2 and 
H3: 
H2: There is higher acceptance of fraud in countries with greater income inequalities 
(tested in paper 3, EVS data). 
This hypothesis was verified in paper 3. The results show that countries‘ context 
(economic and cultural) is associated with acceptance of certain types of fraud. 
Cheating on taxes is more acceptable in countries with higher income inequalities.  
H3: There is higher acceptance of fraud in countries with higher levels of perceived 
corruption among the government (tested in paper 3, EVS data). 
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This hypothesis was verified in paper 3. The results show that contextual factors at the 
country level (economic and cultural) are associated with acceptance of certain types of 
fraud. More specifically, paying cash in hand to avoid VAT is more accepted in 
countries where corruption in the public sector is more generalized. 
 
The third research question relates to the identification of a mechanism that explains 
how a state of market anomie contributes to the emergence of consumer dishonest 
behaviour (psychological mechanism). The corresponding hypotheses are H6 and H7. 
H6: Relatively deprived individuals are more likely to engage in fraudulent practices, 
(tested in paper 2, ESS data) 
This hypothesis was partially verified in paper 2. Crimes of everyday life are driven by 
feelings of economic hardship only in countries where these practices are deviant. In 
countries where fraudulent behaviour is more generalized, internal motivations to 
behave dishonestly play a secondary role: higher class consumers are more likely to 
commit fraud as they interact more often with the market. 
H7: Individuals who distrust political institutions are more likely to engage in 
fraudulent practices (paper 3, EVS data). 
This hypothesis was verified in paper 3. Distrust in political institutions is associated 
with the acceptance of fraud in all countries considered. 
Economic growth not sustained in social and political institutions impacts consumer 
fraud through market anomie which comprises distrust in those attitudes, fear of being 
victimized and cynical attitudes toward the law (Karstedt and Farral, 2004). Corruption 
in government and income inequality generates distrust in government and markets. 
(Uslaner, 2008). Trust seems to be the common denominator of the impact of macro-
variables in economic morality. If levels of trust in state and market institutions are low, 
the legitimacy of the authority of government and business legitimacy is not recognized 
(Tyler, 2004). As a result, the rule of law may be distorted and non-compliance with 
rules enforced by those authorities will be more common.   Fraudulent activities appear 
as more legitimate and moral standards in the economic sphere are relaxed, impacting in 
turn the moral framework of society and the tolerance of such practices. The impact of 
relative deprivation on consumer fraud may be explained using this mechanism. 
 165 
 
Relatively deprived people are more likely to experience market anomie as they are 
more affected by the effects of economic inequality and the levels of trust in 
government and in business will be lower among this group. Consequently, they are 
more likely to engage in consumer fraud is they have the chance. 
 
Three additional hypotheses (H1, H5 and H8) that do not directly test the social 
mechanisms for consumer fraud, but are suited to descriptive purposes, are: 
H1: CME and LME differ in respect to patterns of consumer dishonest behaviour (tested 
in paper 1, ESS data). 
This hypothesis was verified in paper 1. Passive fraud is more common in developed 
than in emerging market economies. By contrast, active fraud is more common in 
emerging compared to developed market economies. Among the developed market 
economies, passive and active fraud is more common in CME compared to LME. 
H5: The prevalence of consumer fraud varies with class membership (paper 1, ESS 
data). 
This hypothesis was partially rejected in paper 1. In all countries considered, active 
fraud is not linked to social class but passive fraud is well disseminated among the 
higher classes (opportunity is increased). 
H8: Consumer dishonest practices can be grouped into passive and active behaviour in 
all countries (paper 1, ESS data). 
This hypothesis was verified in paper 1 and 2. The structural equivalence of the 
distinction between active and passive fraud for all countries was established. Active 
fraud includes practices where the individual actively initiates the dishonest behavior 
(e.g., false insurance claim) whereas passive fraud relates to practices where the 
individual is faced with a situation (e.g., receiving extra change) and took advantage of 
it (keeping extra change from a shop assistant).  
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5.3: A social mechanism for consumer fraud 
The results of the three papers were integrated in a social mechanism of consumer fraud 
(cf. Figure 5). European Social Survey and European Values Study data predict that the 
emergence of unfair practices in the marketplace is facilitated by the transition to neo-
liberal markets, if these changes are not accompanied by a parallel evolution of social 
institutions.  
This idea is supported by Roland (2004) and Messner and Rosenfeld (2010), who assert 
that a rapid economic development promotes the disembeddedness of the market with 
social institutions. Gradual economic development is built on existing cultural values, as 
materialistic market values are progressively absorbed by values from social 
institutions. If the changes are too quick, they cannot be accommodated by existing 
cultural values and market values will prevail. This leads to an overemphasis on 
materialistic values in society. Sanctions for dishonest behaviour are usually imposed 
by non-economic institutions. As non-economic institutions lose power, moral restraints 
related to dishonest behaviour are lifted by market values. This situation may configure 
a state of market anomie (Karstedt & Farrall, 2006), characterized by distrust in the 
economy and in economic agents, fear of being victimized, and cynical attitudes 
towards the law. A rapid economic development also brings a cornucopia of 
opportunities of unethical behaviour that encompass neo-liberal markets (Karstedt & 
Farrall, 2006; Shover, et al., 2003). An over-emphasis on materialistic values—coupled 
with augmented opportunities to cheat—triggers dishonest practices (both from business 
and consumers). 
A general level of perception of corruption amongst the public sector may also lead to 
changes in economic morality. Corruption in public sector is associated with lower 
judicial/legal effectiveness (Kaufman, 2004). By relaxing legal barriers, law compliance 
regarding fraud diminishes. Fraudulent behaviour will be more common in all sectors, 
and perceptions of the unfairness of the economy will be fostered in society. Thus, there 
is higher acceptance of fraudulent practices in countries with higher levels of 
corruption, because economic morality is poor and law is not effectively enforced. 
Besides the rapid transition to neo-liberal policies and a higher level of corruption, a 
high level of social inequalities may also have an impact on the perception of fairness of 
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the economy.  The ―inequality trap‖ (Uslaner, 2008) suggests that in unequal societies, 
individuals trust less in the economy and in economic agents, and distrust generates 
corruption and fraud. As a result, consumer fraud is more approved in unequal societies. 
The common denominator of the effect of macro-level factors (disembeddedness of the 
market with social institutions, corruption in the public sector and social inequalities) is 
that by impacting economic morality, the syndrome of market anomie may arise. Not all 
individuals hold this constellation of negative feelings towards the market to the same 
extent, and those who feel victimized by unethical business practices are more likely to 
experience anomie. Market anomie sets the stage for dishonest practices by impacting 
individual morality and attitudes towards dishonest behaviour. 
Social inequalities signal a strained social structure with deep boundaries between social 
classes. Lower class individuals are more likely to feel relatively deprived, especially in 
unequal societies (Merton, 1957). Relative deprivation fuels illegitimate ways (such as 
dishonest/criminal behaviour) of achieving material success. This psychological 
mechanism is particularly suited to societies where consumer fraud is uncommon, as it 
applies to behaviour of a deviant nature (Merton, 1938). Relative deprivation offers an 
account for the emergence of fraudulent behaviour, especially in societies where social 
norms dictate its deviance. The perceived legitimacy of governments and regulations is 
maximized in equalitarian societies and transparent and accountable governments help 
to hamper fraud and corruption. 
In societies where consumer fraud is widespread, social norms of behaving dishonestly 
dictate practices in the marketplace. To explain the process of expansion of fraudulent 
behaviour, a critical mass mechanism (Schelling, 1978) explains that consumer fraud 
may be self-sustained once the number of fraudsters passes a certain number. 
As individuals perceive that more individuals are engaging in fraud, the more the 
likelihood that they also commit fraud. First, this may be explained by the power of 
social norms to impel individuals to adopt the behaviour of the majority, especially if 
this behaviour can bring material gains. Second, because as more people are engaged in 
fraud, the perception of the ineffectiveness of the law is stronger. Third, as more people 
are engaging in fraud, the feeling of moral obligation and the expected societal return of 
behaving according to the law loses its effect. This may happen only if a certain 
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threshold for the number of people committing fraud is achieved, and above which the 
economic and social costs of one additional fraud act is negligible.  Consequently, as 
more people are perceived to engage in fraud after a certain limit (that for the sake of 
simplicity only may be fixed at 50 percent of the population), the more people will be 
pushed into fraud, and the higher the perception of widespread fraud that in turn will 
generate even more fraud.  
Relative deprivation and social conformism offer an account for the motivation of 
dishonest practices. Opportunity and psychological characteristics such as human values 
(Schwartz, 1992), attitudes (Beck & Ajzen, 1991) and perception of moral obligations 
(Beck & Ajzen, 1991) determine the extent to which motivation materializes in 
dishonest behaviour. A critical mass model (Schelling, 1978) explains how fraud 
disseminates in society. If people believe that others are doing the same, subjective 
obstacles for initiation behaviour such as damage on social image or fear of being 
caught loose power. Neutralization processes in the form of ―Everybody does it‖ 
(Gabor, 1994) and ―business is unfair‖ legitimate and help individuals to integrate 
dishonest behaviour and determine its continuation.  
The Coleman boat picturing the social mechanism of consumer fraud may be read in 
two directions (Fig. 6). Consumer fraud may the result of cold thinking as postulated by 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1985; Beck and Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein and 
Ajzen, 2010) combined with trust in fellow citizens and in social and political 
institutions. Alternatively, consumer fraud may also be initiated through the suggestion 
of a collective action derived from a critical mass process (Schelling, 1978). The link 
between action and trust is also bidirectional as the actual behaviour is rationalized 
through post-justification that includes distrust and negative attitudes toward the market 
and the economy. Distrust impacts back on income inequality and corruption in 
government as postulated by the inequality trap (Uslaner, 2002).  
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5.4: Methodological implications 
This dissertation departed from the idea that cross-national research based on secondary 
analysis of data lacks theoretical foundations on how social and psychological factors 
combine to give rise to societal phenomena. Cross-national data are nowadays widely 
available, cross-national methodologies are rigorous, and statistical tools are 
disseminated. But as shown in Chapter 3 (p.61), a more theoretically founded approach 
to link micro and macro factors is sought.  
The so-called bridge assumptions—the effect of macro on micro variables and vice 
versa—has been disregarded in cross-national research, more specifically the micro-
macro link. The societal manifestations of individual behaviour, desires or opinions 
(Hedström, and Bearman, 2009) rely mainly on aggregation rules of averaging 
individual scores per country but can also include network effects. The types of 
transformational rules, their impact and their usefulness have not been carefully 
considered in cross-national literature. As noted by Opp (2011), ―there are no 
methodological rules in the literature that explicitly specify in a general way 
possibilities of aggregating micro-variables‖ (p.222).  
In this dissertation, the collective manifestation of individual fraudulent behaviour was 
the rate of consumer fraud, but the limitations of summing up or averaging the 
frequency of individual fraudulent practices to provide country patterns of fraud are 
well acknowledged. The transformational mechanism was not well-articulated in this 
dissertation due to the lack of methodological tools and data to test it, but it is suggested 
that individual fraudulent practices contribute to change individual and societal 
perceptions, about the economy which may in turn contribute to facilitate or sustain 
fraudulent practices.  
A critical mass model is advanced to be one possible transformational mechanism, but 
this was not tested empirically. The transformational mechanism in the social 
mechanism of consumer fraud is analytical rather than empirical, but there is no 
agreement in the literature as to whether the bridge assumptions of a social mechanism 
should be empirically tested, or formulated only in analytical terms, as simulation 
studies seem to be the rule (see Opp. 2011). A future agenda of research on consumer 
fraud should look for additional methodologies, such as longitudinal analysis, 
experiments or even simulation studies to test whether a critical mass model is suitable 
to explain the dissemination of consumer fraud.   
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5.6: Final considerations 
This dissertation brings valuable insights for the explanation of different levels of 
consumer fraud across Europe. Departing from some core ideas on the literature that 
consumer fraud results from a syndrome of market anomie (Karstedt and Farral, 2007) 
arising from the desimbeddedness of the market from social institutions (Messner and 
Rosenfeld, 2001), this dissertation puts together a social mechanism by expanding and 
integrating different theories from the social sciences (p.169). The social mechanism 
results from the combination of linkages between variables taken at different levels of 
analysis and tested with cross-national data (ESS and EVS) using multilevel techniques. 
The results of this dissertation point to the influence of (1) income inequality, (2) 
perception of corruption in the government, and (3) rapid growth in the economy on the 
initiation and perpetuation of consumer fraud. These effects were shown empirically 
with cross-national data and explained through a psychological mechanism involving 
relative deprivation and trust in political institutions as triggering consumer fraud. 
This dissertation constitutes a piece of societal psychology (Himmelweit and Gaskell, 
1990). The psychological approach to dishonest behaviour endorsed here views the 
consumer as a citizen whose behaviour is linked to the societal context in which it takes 
place rather than the rational agent that seeks to maximize gains and minimize losses. 
The idea that the individual and the collective are inseparable encompasses all the 
empirical work and theoretical reflections in this dissertation. Variations in the 
prevalence of consumer fraud across European countries were explained by differences 
in socio, cultural and economic variables that shape the societal contexts. This approach 
demands the development of conceptual models rather than the search of invariant laws. 
The social mechanism of consumer fraud encapsulates those ideas. 
The work presented here constitutes the first step of a programme of research on 
economic morality employing different methodologies to explore the interplay of 
psychological and societal variables. This research programme would inform policies 
aimed at ―nudging‖ consumer morality in the market sphere with clear repercussions on 
the arenas of the social and political life. 
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Annex: Testing social mechanisms with ESS data: A systematic literature review 
A study consisting of a systematic literature review of articles using ESS data is briefly 
presented in this Appendix. This study was carried out in the context of this dissertation, 
with the objective of examining how social mechanisms are addressed and generated by 
cross-national survey research. The results suggest that social mechanisms tend to be 
overlooked in ESS studies. Most of the articles do not consider any type of mechanism 
and when they do, psychological mechanisms (micro) are the most common. 
Transformational (micro-macro) mechanisms were not encountered in the ESS studies.  
 
Method 
A random sample of 70 articles (proportionally stratified by year and academic 
discipline) out of a total of 230 that used ESS data23 was analyzed. All the articles were 
published in international journals between January 2003 (when the ESS begin) and 
December 2009. The selected articles are substantive oriented and they were classified 
as cross-national research in line with Hantrais and Mangen (1996) who consider that 
crossnational research ―studies particular issues or phenomena in two or more countries 
with the express intention of comparing their manifestations in different socio-cultural 
settings, using the same research instruments‖ (p.1).  The articles were classified 
according to: 
 
a) The academic discipline; 
The following social sciences were considered: sociology, psychology, political science, 
economics and methodology of social sciences. The classification took into account the 
journal‘s main scientific area (given by the journal title), the theme of the article and the 
main author‘s academic affiliation (Curriculum Vitæ, field of PhD and/or University 
department he/she belongs).  
 
                                                          
23
 The articles were selected from the ESS Bibliography Archive (110 articles) and other 
bibliographic databases (B-On, ISI-Web of Knowledge, EBSCO, EconLit, InformaWorld, 
IngentaConnect, International Political Science Abstracts, Ovid, Proquest, PsycINFO, PubMed, 
Science Direct and Scopus). 
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b) The topic within academic discipline 
The articles were classified in one or more topics chosen from different lists mantained 
by scientific organizations or bibliographic datasources. For psychology, the PsycoInfo 
content classification was used, for political science, the American Political Science 
Association sections were used and for sociology, an extended list was developed based 
om the sections of the International and the European Sociological Associations.. 
 
c) The number of countries included in the analysis; 
The minimum number of countries has to be two to be a comparative study and the 
maximum number is the number of countries available in the specific round. 
 
d) The typology of crossnational studies proposed by Van de Vijver & Leung (1997);  
the studies were classified as belonging as one of the four methodological categories: 
generalizability study (exploratory studies without testing hypotheses and without 
taking into account country-level variables), psychological differences (studies that test 
hypotheses but without taking into account country variables), theory-driven (studies 
that test hypotheses about with individual and country-level variables) and external 
validation (exploratory studies without testing hypotheses but with country variables); 
 
e) The nature of social mechanisms captured: 
The theoretical and empirical material of the articles were scrutinized bearing in mind 
the three  individual mechanisms proposed in Coleman‘s (Coleman, 1986) micro-macro 
scheme. The articles were considered to test one or more mechanisms if there is an 
explicit concern to explain the predicted/observed associations between variables 
alluding to existing theories (hypothesis deriving from the theories) or original 
theoretical approaches that contain one or more than one mechanism. Articles focused 
on testing only macro-level associations were not considered as testing mechanisms 
unless the theoretical account make reference to the individual or interindividual levels 
of analysis. Articles were classified as testing one or more of the following 
mechanisms: psychological mechanisms (purely psychological), situational mechanisms 
(how macro level conditions affect the behaviour of individuals), or transformational 
mechanisms (how isolated individual actions generate collective outcomes); 
 
 187 
 
 
f) The statistical technique(s) employed; 
The statistical technique(s) used to test hypotheses was also considered. The analysis of 
cross-national data can use a limited number of statistical techniques, varying according 
to popularity and complexity.  The techniques encountered are: analyzing only country-
level data, by aggregating individual level variables (and looking at associations 
between these aggregated variables, or testing mean differences); using individual-level 
data and treating countries as dummy variables in the (multiple) regression; using 
individual-level data clustered by country employing multilevel regression; and using 
individual-level data grouped by country and testing individual and/or cross-level 
effects using multi-group structural equation modelling. 
 
Results 
In this sub-section, the results of the systematic literature review of the ESS articles are 
presented by means of graphs describing particular features of the ESS‘ articles. When 
seeking the description of a more general classification, the population of the 230 
articles was used (e.g., year of publication, or social science domain), but more detailed 
classifications were restricted to the sample of 70 articles (e.g., statistical analyses, type 
of mechanisms). Additionally, several correspondences analysis between the type of 
mechanism and characteristics of the articles were performed, in order to elucidate the 
methodological choices underlying each one of the social mechanisms covered.  
 
Figure 1 displays the number of articles per year. There is an ascending progression of 
between 9 and 15 articles per year between 2003 and 2009 and a decrease of 3 articles 
in 2009. The last figure may not be very accurate because the articles were gathered at 
the beginning of 2010 and some of the most recent articles (last months of 2009) were 
possibly not available in the bibliographic datasets.  
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Figure 1: Number of ESS articles per year (N=230) 
In total, 59.7 percent of the 231 articles were classified in sociology, 15.6 percent in 
political science, 11.7 percent in methodology, 11.7 percent in psychology and 2 (0.8 
percent) percent as medical sciences and 1 (0.4 percent) in economics (cf. Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of articles by academic discipline (N=230) 
Figure 3 presents the number of articles per topic grouped by the most represented 
academic disciplines (sociology, political science and psychology). Within the sample 
of 70 articles analysed, the topics most covered in Sociology are Social indicators (25.7 
percent), Migration, racism, nationalism and ethnic relations (24.3 percent); and Health 
(20.0 percent). Within psychological articles, social psychology is the most 
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representative topic (22.9 percent) and in Political Science, Elections, public opinion 
and voting is the most frequent (15.7 percent). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Number of articles by topic and academic discipline (N=70) 
Note: green= sociology, orange=psychology, blue=political science 
 
Most of the articles (52 percent) analyses 10 to 15 countries (cf. Figure 4) and only less 
than 10 percent analyses 20 countries or more, being including here, studies that analyse 
the whole ESS dataset. 
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Figure 4: Number of countries covered in the analysis (percentage, n=70) 
 
Regarding the methodology, 22 percent of the studies are non-comparative (not 
considered for analysis), 365 percent are theory driven, 20 percent are generalizability 
studies, 18 percent external validation and 2 percent psychological differences (cf. 
Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Type of methodology (percentage, n=70) 
The statistical analysis most common in ESS studies is multilevel regression (27 
percent) and separate country analysis to compare effects (25 percent).  Using country 
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as dummies was employed in 21 percent of the studies and 11 percent employ country 
level analysis. Only, 3 percent of the articles use multigroup structural equation 
modeling and in and 13 percent of cases, there is not any comparison explicit (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Type of statistical analyses (percentage, n=70) 
Most of the articles (59 percent) don‘t test any mechanism, 21 percent test a micro-
mechanism, 10 percent test a situational mechanism and 10 percent test a micro 
combined with a situational mechanism (cf. Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Type of mechanism (percentage, n=70) 
Additionally, several correspondence analyses were performed between the type of 
social mechanism tested (if any) and the characteristics of the study (cf. Figure 8). The 
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results show that contextual mechanisms combined with psychological mechanisms are 
used in political science. Psychological studies have a higher tendency to not cover any 
type of mechanism being confined to associations between variables. This tendency is 
visible in studies relying on the Theory of Human Values (Schwartz, 2002) that 
associate values to attitudinal or behavioural variables with no further theoretical 
elaboration.   
 
Figure 8: Correspondence analysis between type of mechanism and scientific discipline 
 
A correspondence analysis between the type of mechanism and the type of cross-
national study clearly shows that only theory-driven studies deal with social 
mechanisms, as would be easily predicted as the dependence of the social mechanism 
approach on theory (cf. Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9: Correspondence analysis between type of mechanism and type of study  
Regarding statistical techniques used to test social mechanisms, multilevel regression 
and using countries as dummy variables in the regression are more likely to be used to 
 193 
 
test situational mechanisms whereas, analysis by country seems to be chosen to test 
psychological mechanisms (Fig. 10). 
 
Figure 10: Correspondence analysis between type of mechanism and statistical analyses 
 
